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Abstract 
          While scholars have focused on the importance of the landmark decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court and its Chief Justice, John Marshall, in the rising 
influence of the federal justice system in the early Republic, the crucial role of the 
circuit courts in establishing uniformity of federal law and procedure across the 
nation has largely been ignored. This thesis seeks to remedy this lack of research on 
circuit courts by revealing the central role of their presiding Supreme Court justices 
in the successful development of a national court system drawn up from the 
‘inferior’ courts rather than down from the Supreme Court to the lower jurisdictions. 
          This thesis argues that, at a time when the Supreme Court had few cases to 
consider, all of the nation’s law was formulated by the lower courts; with very few 
decisions appealed, the circuit court opinions were invariably accepted as final, 
settling the law for each circuit and for the nation if followed by other justices. 
Therefore, in the early years, it was the circuit experience and not Supreme Court 
authority which shaped United States law.   
          This thesis contributes to an understanding of this early justice system because 
of its focus on and the depth of its research into the work of the circuit courts. 
Through detailed analysis, it reveals the sources used by the justices to influence the 
direction of the law and, by its reading of almost 2000 cases tried by four prominent 
Marshall associate justices, presents insights into momentous issues facing the 
Union. The thesis examines the generality of the circuit work of each justice but 
pays particular attention to the different ways in which each contributed to the 
shaping of United States law. Understanding the importance of the role of the circuit 
courts leads to a more informed reading of early American legal history. 
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Introduction                                                                             
 
          This thesis examines the role of the United States circuit courts in the 
formation of a federal legal system in order to understand the extent to which the 
opinions of Supreme Court justices, presiding over those courts, individually and 
collectively, shaped federal law to meet the political and economic challenges facing 
the emerging Republic. The focus is on the period 1801-1835, the tenure of Chief 
Justice John Marshall, because this was the time in American legal history when the 
most defining and far reaching federal law foundations were laid. 
           A number of issues faced the justices of this era. They were tasked with 
riding circuit with few federal statutes or Supreme Court opinions to guide them and 
had to decide which sources of law to use to achieve a uniform federal justice 
system. There were legal and political dimensions of their circuit work. First, they 
administered federal criminal law and resolved civil disputes. Second, they strove to 
ensure that the novel concept of federal justice was well-received regionally. 
          My investigation of the role of the circuit courts has led me to question the 
premise that the Supreme Court rose to prominence, in the main, through its 
landmark decisions. This thesis examines a factor in the development of the federal 
court system which has remained largely unexplored. Scholars covering the crucial 
early years of the Republic have concentrated on Chief Justice John Marshall and 
the major constitutional Supreme Court opinions. Those opinions which asserted the 
power of judicial review, involving the right to strike down as unconstitutional 
federal and state legislative acts, have deservedly commanded academic interest 
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because of the part they played in the Court’s rising influence.1 However, such an 
approach to the Court’s history ignores the role of the justices on circuit in the 
emergence of federal law which can be ascertained only by examining the disputes 
which fell for resolution in the circuit courts and the manner in which the justices 
determined the issues. That is the basis of this research which focuses on the legal 
principles established by the large number of cases dealt with at circuit level at a 
time when the Supreme Court had very little business to conduct. Domnarski (1996) 
puts it well when he writes, ‘the lower federal courts are where the action is.’2 
Whilst he refers to modern times, he accurately represents the position of the Early 
Republic.  
          The research also examines the effect on the development of federal law of the 
political tensions between the Republican-led Congress and the judicial nationalism 
of a Federalist dominated Supreme Court; its struggle for the sole right to interpret 
the spirit and meaning of the United States Constitution and for the power, on the 
grounds of uniformity, to review federal and state legislation and state court 
decisions. It also investigates the effect these ideological differences had on the 
justices’ circuit opinions. 
                                                          
1 The major works on the Supreme Court are 1. Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States 
History, 2 vols. Revised edition (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1926); 2. George Haskins & Herbert A. 
Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. II, Foundations of Power: John 
Marshall, 1801-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), originally published by 
Macmillan Publishing in 1981; 3. G. Edward White, History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, vols. III-IV, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), originally published by the Macmillan Publishing Company in 1988). The 
most complete coverage of the earlier Jay and Ellsworth Courts is to be found in Julius Goebel Jr., 
History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1971). A wealth of primary material is contained in Maeva Marcus (ed.), 
The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, 8 vols. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985-2007), and in Herbert A. Johnson & Charles F. Hobson (eds.), The 
Papers of John Marshall, 1773-1835, 10 vols. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1974-2006). 
2 William Domnarski, In the Opinion of the Court (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1996), 90.  
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          Novak (1966) refutes the myth of American statelessness advanced by those 
scholars who support the view that the essence of nineteenth-century government 
was its absence. He does so by using over one thousand cases, statutes and 
regulations to demonstrate the ‘pivotal role played by public law, regulations, order, 
discipline, and governance in early American society.’3 By investigating almost two 
thousand opinions, this thesis builds upon Novak’s work by establishing the far 
reaching effects of the emerging body of federal law on the personal and business 
affairs of American citizens. 
          Federal law was shaped, in the first instance, by the many disputes dealt with 
at circuit level which were subject to appeal to the Supreme Court by way of writ of 
error. Because so few circuit opinions were appealed, they were generally regarded 
as final resolutions and, therefore, shaped that branch of law for the circuit and, if 
followed by other justices, for the nation. Interstate and international commerce, the 
prohibition of international slave trade, embargo and neutrality breaches arising 
from European conflicts and the War of 1812 with Britain, and the delicate 
positioning of state sovereignty within the powers of central government were all 
issues which featured heavily in circuit court dockets. However, slavery was so 
much a part of American life, and endorsed by the Constitution that the plight of the 
African-American slave already within the United States rarely featured either at 
circuit or Supreme Court level.  
          The justices chosen for the core of this research are, in order of appointment, 
Bushrod Washington, Brockholst Livingston, Joseph Story, and Smith Thompson. 
They have been selected because, whilst there are some similarities in their 
                                                          
3 William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 1-6. 
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jurisprudence, each demonstrates distinctive contributions to the development of 
federal law. Washington’s dependence on English law; Livingston’s advancement of 
commercial law; Story’s admiralty expertise and his fascination with common law; 
and Thompson’s states’ rights stance and his promotion of the Cherokee cause 
reveal how each, in his own way, shaped American law. Time and space does not 
permit a study of all fourteen Marshall Court associates. However, the four justices 
chosen were amongst the most prominent contributors; had long tenures on the 
Court; and there is sufficient primary material available from which to reach 
meaningful conclusions.  
          The thesis will examine the federal circuit and Supreme Court opinions of all 
four justices and the New York State Supreme Court opinions of Livingston and 
Thompson to ascertain the sources on which they drew, the expertise they developed 
in particular branches of law, and the effect that expertise had on Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion assignment process. Any changes of jurisprudential direction 
from presiding in circuit court to sitting as one of seven justices in the Supreme 
Court also receive scrutiny. 
          In its first decade, from 1789, the United States Supreme Court delivered only 
thirty-eight opinions whereas, although the exact figure will never be known, the 
circuit courts must have dealt with several thousand cases.4 This factor alone speaks 
to the importance of the circuit courts in the overall picture. The grand jury charges 
delivered by the justices at the beginning of each circuit session designed to forge a 
bond between citizen and government are further evidence of the significance of the 
local courts in the reception federal justice. The use of a certificate of division of 
                                                          
4 United States Reports, vols. 2-4. 
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opinion, when the justice sat with the district judge, enabling the circuit courts to 
choose which cases were sent to the Supreme Court for definitive rulings was a 
further device in the search for uniformity. Crucially, the circuit courts were the 
forums in which the justices gained expertise or honed skills gained earlier at the Bar 
which lent to their Supreme Court opinions a confidence and authority stemming 
from their collective circuit experience. In other words, this thesis argues that, in the 
early years, the successful development of the national court system fed up from 
what the Constitution described as the ‘inferior’ circuit courts rather than down from 
the Supreme Court to the lower jurisdictions. 
          Graham (2010) is critical of scholars who have focussed on Marshall and the 
Supreme Court to the detriment of the circuit and district court where he finds, in 
early Rhode Island, most of the federal judicial activity took place. He argues, ‘it 
was the daily operation of the federal courts in each of the states, rather than the 
efforts of a single individual or even the results of a series of Supreme Court cases, 
that allowed the judiciary to emerge as an equal branch of government.’5  This thesis 
seeks to build upon Graham’s research to ascertain whether his finding in one 
constituent part of the First Circuit between 1790 and 1812 can be supported over a 
much wider geographical area for a longer period. Despite the fact that Graham’s 
research ends in 1812, it is valuable because it highlights the significance of the 
grand jury charge and supports the view, taken here, that the political element of the 
charge began to disappear after Justice Chase’s impeachment in 1805 for its misuse. 
Graham’s examination of Justice Story’s 1812 charges reveals only instructions to 
the jury on the law.6 One can see the sense in Graham’s further argument that the 
                                                          
5 D. Kurt Graham, To Bring Law Home: The Federal Judiciary in Early National Rhode Island 
(Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 6. 
6 Ibid. 106. 
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Rhode Island federal courts were a powerful nationalizing force in supporting the 
federal government and the interests of the local merchant class when he cites the 
remarks of Story’s predecessor, Justice Cushing, in his 1794 grand jury charge, that 
the court would harness the power of the community to compel dishonest men to 
perform their contracts. This is a fine example of judicial rhetoric designed to 
persuade the local people that they had a stake in government.7  
          Johnson (1997) is the first scholar to spell out the importance of the associate 
justices as a body and to regard the circuit courts as ‘the training grounds’ for 
Supreme Court justices. He argues that the circuit duties of the justices brought them 
into contact with the grass roots of American life and gave them, when sitting on the 
Supreme Court, an insight into the difficulties facing trial judges.’8  In a 2009 essay 
he recommends that the individual experiences of justices be examined to see how 
their circuit work shaped their personal perspectives as well as their approach to 
constitutional questions.9 This thesis responds to that call for further research but 
does so by examining their approaches to all manner of issues and not just those 
bearing on the Constitution.  
          In a 1970 essay, Newmyer investigates Justice Story’s activities on circuit 
dealing principally with his ties with the local people and his working relationships 
with the district judges and the legal profession. He does not seek to analyse Story’s 
circuit opinions. He focuses on the circuit court influence on the character of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions and their acceptance by the people.10 Relying on the 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 14. Cushing’s charge appears in Marcus, Maeva, (ed.), The Documentary History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800; The Justices on Circuit, vol. 2 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988), 491-496, 491 & 492. 
8 Herbert A. Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Pres, 1997), 137. 
9 Herbert A. Johnson, ‘Bushrod Washington,’ Vanderbilt Law Review, 62:2 (2009), 490. 
10 R. Kent Newmyer, ‘Justice Story on Circuit and a Neglected Phase of American Legal History,’ 
The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 14, No. 2 (1970), 112-135, 134-135. 
7 
 
correspondence of Justices Story and Baldwin, expressing satisfaction that so few of 
their circuit opinions had been taken to the Supreme Court, Newmyer rightly 
deduces that ‘decisions of the circuit court were in the most instances final, binding 
the parties and establishing law for the circuit.’11  This is crucial because it is further 
support for the argument that, in the very early years, those circuit opinions were 
more important than those of the Supreme Court. Because circuit opinions were 
handed down by Supreme Court justices, they were more readily accepted by the 
parties, more so than an opinion delivered by a competent local district judge. 
          Most other scholarly references to the circuit courts are restricted to describing 
the physical and emotional hardships of circuit riding and the justices’ repeated 
efforts to end the duty. That focus has meant that the importance of circuit 
jurisprudence has been largely ignored. Save for the scholars mentioned above, all 
attention has centred on the importance of the Supreme Court landmark cases and 
John Marshall. The calls for further research into the role of the circuit courts in the 
development of federal law have yet to be met. This research begins that process by 
an in depth examination and analysis of 1,445 circuit and 325 Supreme Court 
opinions of the four chosen justices in order to ascertain the influence of  the circuit 
court in American legal history. 
          The justices were obliged to wait for the end of circuit riding until the Evarts 
Act of 1891 which abolished the courts to which they had travelled for so many 
years. They had fought hard to end the duty from the very beginning of the federal 
court system.12 Congress, however, had seen the wisdom of establishing local 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 113-114. Letter, Story to McLean, May 25, 1838 in Mclean Papers, Library of Congress; 
Letter Henry Baldwin to District Judge Joseph Hopkinson, February 20, 1840 in Hopkinson Papers, 
Pennsylvania Historical Society. 
12 Several justices resigned after a short time on the Court, all citing the physical rigours of circuit 
riding and long periods of separation from family. John Blair Jr. resigned in 1796 after 5 years; 
Thomas Johnson in 1793 after only 15 months; and Alfred Moore in 1804 after 3 years. (The 
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federal justice in the major cities of each circuit to cement relationships, through the 
justices, between citizen and federal institutions. I argue that, without the justices’ 
circuit riding, the reception of federal law would have been infinitely more difficult 
and the shaping of United States law a much more drawn out process. Whilst United 
States justices have not ridden circuit for almost 125 years, in England and Wales, 
High Court justices still travel the country to administer justice, a practice originated 
by Henry II in the 1166 Assize of Clarendon. Darbyshire (2011) asked twenty-six 
senior judges for their opinions on, inter alia, judges riding circuit. They favoured 
the system for a number of reasons. Some cases were so serious as to require the 
attention of a High Court Judge and it was thought that the presence of a High Court 
judge based in London would deter local practices.13 Acknowledging the function of 
the Marshall justice as more akin to a campaign to develop and win acceptance for a 
new concept of law, whereas the English judge’s circuit duty is to police a long-
established centrally controlled justice system, there are parallels in the search for 
uniformity and the fact  that the English High Court judges, when dealing with 
appeals from the lower courts, will be, as were the Marshall justices, better informed 
of local problems and difficulties facing provincial circuit and district judges in the 
performance of their duty.  
 
The Myth of Marshall’s Dominance 
          While the emphasis is on the period between 1801 and 1805, the tenure of 
Chief Justice Marshall, it is particularly important to examine the federal legal 
system from its establishment in 1789 in order to understand the Court’s transition 
                                                          
Supreme Court of the United States: Its Beginnings& Its Justices, 1790-1991 (Washington D.C: 
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 1992), 64, 68 & 76. 
13 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Oxford & Portland Oregon: 
Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), 315. 
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from virtual obscurity, at the time of Chief Justice Jay’s resignation in 1795 and his 
later refusal to return to the office in 1801, to an institution playing a much more 
effective role in government by the end of Marshall’s tenure forty years on.14 This 
thesis examines the factors which enabled the Court’s rise in influence, despite deep 
political opposition to the concept of federal justice and it does so by focusing on the 
circuit courts’ role in that transformation. 
          Until recently, biographers of Chief Justice John Marshall have taken the line 
that he achieved prominence for the Court by himself because he dominated fellow 
justices and persuaded them to his point of view by the sheer force of his drive and 
personality. In the first comprehensive account of his life and works, from 1916, the 
admiration which Albert J. Beveridge had for his subject is evident from each of the 
four volumes.15 His description of Marshall as a ‘king on a throne’ gives the flavour 
of his adulation.16 Beveridge makes repeated references to Marshall’s dominant 
personality and unparalleled influence over his associates.17 Similarly, Corwin 
(1919) begins his biography of the Chief Justice by pronouncing him ‘the 
Hilldebrand of American constitutionalism,’ and ignores the contribution of the 
associate justices.18 Decades later, Baker (1974) wonders how the United States 
might have developed without Marshall’s decisions, despite acknowledging that the 
                                                          
14 When declining an invitation to return as Chief Justice in 1801, Jay expressed an unwillingness to 
take part in a system which treated the justices’ opinions on circuit riding with ‘neglect and 
indifference.’ He felt that the Supreme Court did not have the standing to support the national 
government or command the respect of the public. Letter, John Jay to President John Adams, 2 
January, 1801 in Maeva Marcus (ed.), The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1789-1800, vol. 1, part 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 146-147. The reasons 
for Jay’s lack of enthusiasm are detailed in Matthew Van Hook, ‘Founding the Third Branch: Judicial 
Greatness and John Jay’s Reluctance, Journal of Supreme Court History, vol. 40, no. 1 (2015) 1-19, 
4-6. 
15 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Riverside Press, 1916). 
16 Ibid. vol. 4, 82. 
17 Ibid. vol.4, 59-60. 
18 Edward S. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution: A Chronicle of the Supreme Court (Akron, 
Ohio: Summit Classic Press, 2013), 2, a reprint of the 1919 first edition). 
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Court consisted of six associates whom Marshall led but did not control.19 Thus, the 
works of Beveridge, Corwin, and Baker suggest that Marshall’s associates were 
mere thin echoes of the Chief Justice’s voice. 
          In his distinguished biography of Justice Story in 1985, Newmyer describes 
the composition of the Court in 1812 as ‘less than awesome,’ pointing to Marshall as 
the ‘only proven jurist.’ He asserts that the remaining justices comprised a 
‘confusion of specialities and a disparity of talents that threatened to weaken the 
Court as an institution.’ Newmyer bases this view on ‘Marshall’s lack of expertise in 
maritime law, Todd’s usefulness extending only to Virginia/Kentucky land disputes, 
and Duvall having no particular specialization.’20 Whilst Newmyer acknowledges 
that all of the justices save for Marshall, Washington, and Story had sat as state 
supreme court justices, he does not observe that, by 1812, as well as their Supreme 
Court sittings, three justices had had the invaluable experience of presiding over 
busy federal circuit courts; Washington for thirteen years, Johnson for eight years 
and Livingston for five years. Therefore, there is no acknowledgment of the 
importance of circuit work in American legal history. Not all members of the Court 
made the same contribution to the Court’s rise in its influence but this research 
questions the suggestion that by1812 there were insufficient men of intellect, 
learning, and experience in post to advance the Court to a prominent position in 
government. In any event, whilst the Court was composed of great jurists such as 
Marshall and Story, one needs to consider whether the strength of the Court lay in 
the collective wisdom of all of its justices. 
                                                          
19 Leonard Baker, John Marshall: A Life in the Law (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1974), 540-
541 & 767-768. 
20 R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 80. 
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          In more recent times scholars have accepted that Marshall relied heavily on 
his associates. Hobson (1996) accepts that, although the Court often spoke through 
Marshall, ‘the opinion was the product of collaborative deliberation, carried on in 
the spirit of mutual concession and accommodation.’21 However, as his book is an 
account of Marshall’s jurisprudence, it does not detail the nature of the support 
Marshall received. Ten years later Hobson went further, writing that ‘scholarship has 
long exploded the myth of a heroic Marshall who dominated the Supreme Court by 
the sheer force of his individual genius and will.’22 Despite that acknowledgement, 
he still argues that Marshall’s ‘intellect, learning, and personality’ enabled him to 
achieve success in ‘molding [the justices] into a collective entity which spoke with a 
single authoritative voice.’23  He considers Marshall’s willingness to compromise in 
order to achieve unanimity as ‘useful in managing his “family” of brother 
Justices.’24 His references to Marshall ‘moulding’ and ‘managing’ his associates are 
further examples of an insufficient acknowledgment of the importance of the 
contributions of the associates individually or collectively and, in a way, perpetuates 
the myth that the Court was Marshall. 
          Whilst Newmyer describes Story’s considerable contribution to the Court, 
Johnson (1997) is the first scholar to spell out the important influence of the 
associates as a body and regard the circuit courts as ‘the training grounds for 
Supreme Court justices.’25 He seeks to strike a balance between those academics 
                                                          
21 Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996), 16. In 2006, Hobson completed the editing of the magnificent 12 
volume set of The Papers of John Marshall, begun by Herbert A. Johnson in 1974 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1974-2006). 
22 Charles F. Hobson, ‘Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice,’ University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 154, No. 6 (2006), 1421-1461, 1421. 
23 Ibid. 1423. 
24 Ibid. 1424. 
25 Herbert A. Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1997), 137. 
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whom he describes as ‘impassioned Marshall advocates and those who believe that 
the contribution of the associates was ‘of greater significance and quality.’26 Johnson 
was able to give only a brief overview of the role of all of Marshall’s associates in a 
work directed to Marshall’s life.27              
          Robarge (2000) is another who believes that Marshall’s success was 
attributable to his ‘personal dominance over the Supreme Court for much of his 
tenure.’ He cites with approval, insofar as it related to the first ten years of the Chief 
Justice’s tenure, President Jefferson’s criticism that Marshall craftily manipulated 
‘lazy or timid associates’ to his point of view.’28 Whilst Robarge acknowledges that 
Marshall did require help from his colleagues from time to time, he suggests that he 
was demonstrating his open-mindedness and a desire to let the associates feel they 
were contributing to decisions. He regards the requests as part of a technique to 
obtain justices’ future votes.29  I contend that Marshall’s letters to his colleagues are 
simply cries for help from a Chief Justice who really did need assistance and not 
with any ulterior motives. His letter to the senior associate, Justice William Cushing, 
concerning the trial in 1807 of former Vice-President Aaron Burr for treason, is a 
worried and urgent cry for advice. He wrote, ‘It would have been my earnest wish to 
consult with all of my brethren on the bench….Sincerely I do lament that this wish 
cannot be completely indulged.’ Expressing his doubts and fears, he continues, ‘I 
must anxiously desire the aid of all of the judges [on] the doctrine of constructive 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 3-4. 
27 Ibid. Chapter 1, ‘The Chief Justice and his Associates,’ 21-50. 
28 David A. Robarge, A Chief’s Progress: From Revolutionary Virginia to the Supreme Court 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2000), 253-254. Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie 
(Republican journalist), December 25, 1820 in Merrill D. Peterson (ed.), Thomas Jefferson: Writings 
(New York: Library of America, 1984), 1446. 
29 Robarge, 255. 
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treason.’30 That was not the device of a Chief Justice who wished to make his 
associates feel wanted, it was the letter of a judge faced with an intricate and 
politically sensitive trial in desperate need of the advice and support of his 
colleagues. Other letters from Marshall requesting help from Justices Washington 
and Story are not expressed in such urgent tones but it is apparent from their content 
that he has problems which require assistance on topics with which he was 
unfamiliar.31 
          Save for a reference to Joseph Story’s ‘powerful and exuberant intellect,’ 
Robarge is dismissive of the associates, referring to Todd and Duvall as ‘ciphers,’ 
Samuel Chase as ‘ a boorish Federalist,’ McLean as a ‘decorous Jacksonian,’ and 
William Johnson as ‘contentious,’ which is most likely a reference to his propensity 
to dissent.’32 In a chapter on Marshall’s tenure on the Court, Justices Livingston and 
Thompson do not rate a mention, flattering or otherwise and the entire chapter pays 
little attention to the associates. When Robarge acknowledges the importance of   
circuit work generally, he does so to argue that Marshall ‘shaped the contours of 
nineteenth-century America through his circuit opinions.’ He asserts that Marshall’s 
individual circuit contributions were a strong force in transforming the federal courts 
into a true national judiciary because the Fifth Circuit was one of the busiest and his 
circuit opinions involved more points of law than any other justice.33 He downplays 
the circuit contributions made between 1801 and 1835 of the fourteen associates, 
some of whom presided over equally busy circuit courts in New York, Boston, and 
                                                          
30 Letter, John Marshall to William Cushing, June 29, 1807 in Papers of John Marshall, vol. VII, 60-
62. 
31 In all ten letters from John Marshall requesting help from his associates have survived to The 
Papers of John Marshall. A selection of those letters appear in Chapter 1 of this thesis when dealing 
with consistency of opinions across the circuits.  
32 Robarge, 255. 
33 Ibid. 261-262. 
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Philadelphia and whose expertise in admiralty law Marshall was unable to match. 
The inference is that, Story apart, the influence of the associate justices was small 
when compared with that of the Chief Justice and is a further disregard of the 
positive influence of a number of significant justices. 
          Scholars, therefore, differ in their interpretation of the respective parts played 
by the Chief Justice and his associates in the Court’s rise in prominence, but the 
suggestion that Marshall did it alone has not completely disappeared. More scholars 
are beginning to accept that the role of the associates in the Court’s transformation 
was substantial. However, the focus of any book or essay on Marshall will not 
permit of an in-depth consideration of the individual or collective contributions of 
associate justices. What is required for a better understanding of the emergence of an 
effective federal court system is an examination of the link between the circuit work 
of a group of major associate justices and the growth in influence of the Supreme 
Court. This thesis seeks to end the myth that Marshall was the Court. By a detailed 
examination of the work of these four justices on the Court, but more so on circuit, it 
seeks to position them as significant contributory factors in the success of the federal 
court system.  
          The changes in how the Supreme Court delivered its opinions reflect the 
struggle to establish its authority. During the Chief Justiceship of John Jay (1789-
1795) the few opinions were generally delivered seriatim with the junior justice 
speaking first even though the justices were agreed upon the result. Chief Justice 
Ellsworth (1796-1800) was the first to prefer the practice of a single opinion 
preceding rare dissents. In his absence, the justices resorted to seriatim opinions.34  
                                                          
34 William R. Castro, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay 
and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 110-111. 
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To counter repeated attacks by Republican supporters, a problem not faced by the 
first two Chief Justices, Marshall felt it necessary not only to present to the nation a 
united front by the almost exclusive use of the single opinion but also by delivering 
the majority of the opinions himself which, as will appear, infuriated President 
Jefferson. The apparent unanimity behind the single opinion is part of what Johnson 
described as the ‘small group dynamics’ of the Marshall Court, concluding that the 
justices were able to hide their differences and produce an opinion acceptable to all 
or to a majority. This, he argues, was made possible by the harmonious collegial 
residence in the same lodgings, and the need of a small mainly Federalist body to 
present a united front in the face of repeated challenges from a Republican 
administration and others who opposed what they considered to be an overly strong 
federal judiciary.35 It is, therefore, likely that this close harmony also engendered 
mutual support on circuit.  
          Johnson develops his ‘small group dynamics’ theory in a 2000 essay 
comparing the Marshall Court with the European Court of Justice and the need of 
each higher jurisdiction to be sensitive to the demands of their component states. He 
argues that the dynamic might develop from the sharing of tasks and exchange of 
specialized knowledge or the introspective or internal bonding which occurs when a 
small group is opposed by a larger outside body.36 This is another aspect of decision 
making which this research will address. 
          During his thirty-five year tenure as Chief Justice, Marshall delivered 537 of 
the Court’s 1236 opinions and orders for directions.37 Kelsh (1999) has analysed the 
                                                          
35 Johnson, ‘Bushrod Washington,’ 449-450. 
36 Herbert A. Johnson, ‘Judicial Institutions in Emerging Federal Systems: The Marshall Court and 
the European Court of Justice,’ John Marshall Law Review, vol. 33, issue 4 (2000), 1063-1108, 1067. 
37 United States Reports, 1801-1835. 
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opinion delivery practices of the Court in its early years, observing that between 
1790 and 1800, 71% of the cases reported in the United States Reports were simply 
noted as being ‘by the Court’ with no justice named. 24% of the opinions were 
recorded as per curiam after seriatim opinions by individual justices.38 However, 
after Marshall took office and the single opinion of the Court became the norm, he 
dominated the delivery of opinions. Towards the end of his tenure, justices felt free 
to deliver concurrences or dissents.39 He reserved to himself all constitutional issues 
save for those cases in which he had a personal interest when he recused himself. 
This was not unusual as, throughout the history of the Court, Chief Justices have 
delivered many of the landmark opinions. However, the difference between now and 
then is that Marshall wrote the Court’s opinion in a vast proportion of the mundane 
cases.  
          Whilst accepting, at that time, the use of the single opinion as a defence 
mechanism, the compromise of strongly held views to produce a unanimous opinion 
had the obvious disadvantage of stifling different standpoints and inhibiting public 
debate. To understand the value of dissent, one need look no further than Justice 
Thompson’s powerful dispute with the majority in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
which effectively formed the basis of the Court’s majority opinion in Worcester v. 
Georgia, the following year.40 
          The single opinion, delivered invariably by Marshall, is the basis of the widely 
held view that Marshall was the Court. Without wishing to detract from his 
leadership and political acumen, an examination of case reports and contemporary 
                                                          
38 John P. Kelsh, ‘Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court, 1790-1945,’ 
Washington University Law Quarterly, vol. 77 (1999), 137-152, 140. 
39 Ibid. 143. 
40 Both cases are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
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correspondence reveal that this was not the case. It is clear that the opinions he 
delivered in many occasions would have benefitted from the assistance he received 
from his associates rather than they being entirely the product of his own researches. 
This is so because of the extent and quality of the majority opinions, concurrences, 
and dissents of the associates evident in the remaining 696 opinions. The letters from 
Story and Washington to Marshall, examined in Chapter One, helping him resolve 
points of law in his circuit and Supreme Court opinions provide further support of 
associate participation. 
          Two justices throw light on the exchange of views in those early Supreme 
Court conferences held at the house in which all of the justices lodged during term in 
Washington. Story, writing to a friend in 1812, informed him, ‘We moot questions 
as they are argued, with freedom, and derive no inconsiderable advantage from the 
pleasant and animated interchange of legal acumen.’41 In another letter Story 
proffered further insight into the decision making process, writing, ‘My familiar 
conferences at our lodgings often come to a very quick, and I trust, a very accurate 
opinion, in a few hours.’ He went on to express his delight at the successful outcome 
of the first opinion he had been assigned to write, remarking, ‘My own views were 
those which ultimately obtained the sanction of the whole court.’42 It would appear 
that his draft opinion had been revised after consultation with the other justices. 
          Further evidence of the collaborative decision-making process appears in an 
undated letter from Justice John McLean who served on the Court from 1829 to 
1861. He described the scene thus:  
                                                          
41 Letter, Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams, February 16, 1812 in W.W. Story, The Life and Letters 
of Joseph Story, vol. 1 (London: John Chapman, 1851), 214. 
42 Ibid. 215-216. Letter, Joseph Story to Samuel Fay, February 24, 1812. The opinion Story referred 
to was Fitzsimmons et al. v. Ogden et al., 7 Cranch 2 (1812). 
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Before any opinion is formed by the Court, the case after being argued at the Bar is 
thoroughly discussed in consultation. Night after night this is done, in a case of 
difficulty, until the mind of every judge is satisfied, and then each judge gives his 
views of the whole of the case, embracing every point in it. In this way the opinion 
of the judge is expressed, and then the Chief Justice requests a particular judge 
write, not his opinion, but the opinion of the Court. And after the opinion is read, it 
is read to all the judges, and if it does not embrace the views of all of the judges, it 
is modified and corrected.43 
 
 
McLean does not draw a distinction between the practice during his six years with 
John Marshall and the twenty-four years he served subsequently with Chief Justice 
Roger Taney. It is reasonable to infer that the protocol was consistent throughout his 
entire tenure. These contemporaneous accounts support the more recent view that, 
individually and collectively, the justices did not merely sit back and leave it all to 
their Chief.  
          Domnarski does not appear to accept McLean’s account of the mechanics of 
decision making because he writes, ‘But for Marshall, getting the work out quickly 
rather than accountability was the goal. Often, drafts of the Court’s opinions were 
not even circulated to the brethren, which meant that they had no say in the 
reasoning.’44 Clearly, opinions had to be delivered within a reasonable period 
otherwise the Court would be swamped by outstanding business. However, the idea 
that Marshall simply handed down opinions without a majority consensus is 
inconceivable and Domnarski cites no authority for this startling assertion. One can 
understand why a justice would not write out six extra copies of his draft but it does 
not follow that his copy was not circulated or, as Justice McLean records, read out to 
the justices for their comments. The accounts of Justices Story and McLean of how 
the justices debated and decided cases refute Domnarski’s argument that often the 
associates had no say in the reasoning of opinions.  If further proof is required, 
                                                          
43 Undated letter, Justice McLean to a Methodist newspaper in McLean Papers, Library of Congress, 
box 18, cited in John F. Frank, Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V. Daniel, 1784-1860 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 174. 
44 Domnarski, In the Opinion of the Court, 32. 
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Justice William Johnson aired many complaints in a letter to former President 
Jefferson in 1822 about the lack of ability of certain justices and the disappearance 
of seriatim opinions in favour of the single opinion of the Court. At no stage did he 
suggest that an opinion of the Court was delivered without his knowledge of its 
content.45 The accounts of Story and McLean and the absence of criticism by 
Johnson establish full consultation in the Marshall Court decision making process. 
          This thesis looks beyond participation in decision making to the shaping of 
American law through the Chief Justice’s opinion assignment practice. The majority 
opinions assignments were not distributed equally as some justices were much more 
active than others. For example, the United States Reports reveal that Justice Todd 
who sat with Marshall for twenty years only delivered twelve majority opinions and 
Justice Duvall in twenty-three years handed down the same number. At the opposite 
end of the scale Justice Story who spent twenty-four years with Marshall wrote one 
hundred and eighty-three opinions. That disparity is the reason why this research 
examines the effect of circuit expertise on the Chief Justice’s opinion assignment 
practice. Analysis of the circuit and Supreme Court opinions of a particular justice 
will reveal a particular speciality and help an understanding of why a certain type of 
opinion was assigned to him. 
 
Washington, Livingston, Story, and Thompson 
          The decision to focus the research on these four justices was made after their 
cases had been extracted from the 30 volume set of Federal Cases, 1789-1880 and 
from volumes 2-33 (1790-1835) of the United States Reports. These two sets of 
                                                          
45 Letter, Justice William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson, December 10, 1822 cited in Donald G. 
Morgan, Justice William Johnson: The First Dissenter (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1954), 181-182. 
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reports are central to the research and constitute the most important sources of 
primary material. From the 18.000 district and circuit court opinions in Federal 
Cases, 1,377 circuit opinions of all fourteen Marshall associate justices were 
examined together with the 1,236 Marshall Court opinions in United States 
Reports.46 
           The first step was to determine those justices with sufficient opinions from 
which to reach meaningful conclusions. It should be noted that whilst all Supreme 
Court opinions were recorded, the absence of law reporters on certain circuits meant 
that many early opinions were lost because some judges did not commit them to 
paper. The second, and more important, step was to reduce the candidates to those 
whose reports best reflected events and issues facing the nation; revealed distinctive 
approaches to the resolution of their caseloads; and how they shaped American law. 
Having considered those matters, it became clear that Justices Washington. 
Livingston, Story, and Thompson were prominent associates who each made 
significant contributions in different ways to aspects of United States law.   
          Dealing with the justices in order of seniority of appointment, Washington sat 
with Marshall for twenty-eight years, presiding over the Third Circuit (Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey) from 1803 to 1823. Livingston served on the Court for fifteen 
years, riding the Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) from 1808 
to 1823. Story joined the Court in 1811 and spent twenty-four years with Marshall 
and on the First Circuit (Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island). 
                                                          
46 The Federal Cases, 1789-1880, 30 vols. plus index (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 
Company, 1894-1897) contain opinions by Washington (540); Story (456); Marshall (101); 
Thompson (77); Baldwin (48); Livingston (47); McLean (33); Paterson (18); Iredell (13); Todd (11); 
William Johnson (10); Samuel Chase (9); Duvall (4); Jay (3); Wilson (3); Cushing (2) and Ellsworth 
(2). 
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Finally, when Livingston died in 1823, Thompson replaced him on the Court and on 
the Second Circuit and served with Marshall until the latter’s death in 1835. 
          The circuit opinions of Justice Washington between 1803 and 1827 are to be 
found in Federal Cases and in three volumes edited by Richard Peters which he 
compiled from the justice’s manuscript notes.47 In 1827 Elijah Paine Jr. edited a 
volume of New York, Connecticut and Vermont circuit cases, containing a small 
selection of the opinions of Justice Livingston between 1810 and 1822 and those of 
his successor Justice Thompson between 1823 and 1826.48 There is much more 
primary material to assist with an evaluation of Joseph Story’s work in the fourteen 
volumes of his circuit opinions edited by four law reporters with some degree of 
overlapping, which, taken with the Federal Cases, provide substantial evidence for 
an accurate assessment of the circuit aspect of his career.49 The reports of Story’s 
circuit and Supreme Court opinions are complemented by the justice’s many law 
books and, in particular, by his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States. William Story’s Life and Letters of Joseph Story and The Miscellaneous 
Writings of Joseph Story are invaluable sources of primary material on the thoughts 
and jurisprudence of this innovative scholar from Massachusetts.50 
                                                          
47 Richard Peters, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Third Circuit: Comprising the 
Districts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Commencing at April Term, 1803-1827, 3 vols. (vol. 1, 
Philadelphia: William Fry, 1819); vols. 2 & 3 (Philadelphia: Philip H. Nicklin, 1827). 
48 Elijah Paine Jr., Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit Court of the United States 
for the Second Circuit: Comprising the Districts of New-York, Connecticut, and Vermont (New York: 
R. Donaldson, 1827). 
49 John Gallison (ed.), First Circuit Reports, 1812-1815, 5 vols. (Boston: Wells & Lilly, 1815-1817); 
Charles Sumner (ed.), First Circuit Reports, 3 vols. (Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1836-
1841); William P. Mason (ed.), First Circuit Reports, 1816-1830,  5 vols. (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, 
Little & Wilkins, 1819-1831);  W.W. Story, First Circuit Reports, 3 vols. (Charles C. Little & James 
Brown, 1842-1845). 
50 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 3 vols. (Boston: Hilliard, 
Gray & Company, 1833); W.W. Story (ed.), Life and Letters of Joseph Story, 2 vols. (London: John 
Chapman, 1851); W.W. Story (ed.), The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (Boston: Charles C. 
Little & James Brown, 1852).  
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          During his twenty-eight year tenure Justice Washington wrote 80 opinions for 
the Supreme Court and 540 of his circuit opinions have survived. Justice Livingston 
wrote 39 Supreme Court opinions and had 47 of his circuit opinions reported. Justice 
Story was more prolific with 149 opinions of the Court and 456 reported circuit 
opinions. Justice Thompson delivered 57 opinions of the Court and had 77 circuit 
opinions reported. The distinction between the high number of reported circuit 
opinions of Washington and Story and the other two justices is because Washington 
made notes of his opinions which were later transcribed and because Story had the 
advantage of an efficient law reporter. Although the federal Second Circuit was a 
busy court, unlike the New York State Supreme Court, it had no law reporter. 
Consequently, few circuit opinions were recorded. However, because Livingston and 
Thompson had been justices of the New York State Supreme Court, a large number 
of their state opinions are available. Those state reports supplement their rather 
meagre federal circuit court opinions and help to create a fuller picture of the 
jurisprudential philosophy of each justice.51 
          Other scholars, apart from Johnson, have examined Washington’ work. 
Having placed a selection of Justice Washington’s major circuit opinions against a 
background of ‘dramatic, social, cultural, and economic change,’ and of a new 
nation requiring a new legal system, Faber (2000) detects a cautious approach to 
Washington’s jurisprudence and argues that he had a restraining effect on the more 
controversial approaches of Marshall and Story, which ‘moderating influence 
enhanced the wisdom of the great constitutional decisions by restricting their 
                                                          
51 For a comprehensive study of the history of law reporting see, Erwin C. Surrency, ‘Law Reports in 
the United States,’ The American Journal of Legal History, vol.25, No. 1 (1981), 48-66. It was not 
until 1817 that Congress authorized the appointment of an official law reporter for the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
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reach.’52  Stonier (1998) concludes that Washington’s strength lay on circuit rather 
than in the Supreme Court. He does not find Washington to be a cautious justice. 
Instead, he describes the justice’s attitude to decision making as that of ‘a confident 
authority of one who sees himself as the embodied voice of federal law.’53 Faber and 
Stonier acknowledge that they could not do justice to Washington’s voluminous 
reported circuit opinions and, therefore, confined themselves to a limited selection.  
This examination of all of Washington’s reported circuit opinions will show whether 
he was the confident judge seen by Stonier or generally a cautious justice too 
dependent on precedent and overly-concerned should his opinions fail to survive 
appeals. 
          The lack of emphasis on circuit courts and the activities of the less prominent 
justices is evidenced by the fact that, apart from a short essay by Dunne (1969) and 
terse entries in biographical dictionaries, little is known of Justice Livingston. No 
research has been undertaken on his circuit and Supreme Court activities. Dunne 
believes that Livingston’s significant judicial work was performed, not on the 
Supreme Court, but as a puisne judge of the New York State Supreme Court and 
rightly describes Livingston as ‘an elusive and half glimpsed figure of his age.’54 
Certainly no detailed comparisons of his work on circuit and on the Court have been 
published. In fact, he has been largely ignored by scholars for forty-five years. 
Justice Thompson has suffered a similar fate with no scholarly attention to his 
                                                          
52 David A. Faber, ‘Bushrod Washington and the Age of Discovery in American Law,’ West Virginia 
Law Review, vol. 102 (2000), 735-807, 807. 
53 James R. Stonier, ‘Heir Apparent: Bushrod Washington and Federal Justice in the Early Republic,’ 
in Scott Gerber (ed.), Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998), 322-349, 341. 
54 Gerald T. Dunne, ‘Brockholst Livingston,’ in Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel (eds.), The Justices 
of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969, vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1969), 
387-403, 395.  
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Supreme Court and circuit work for over fifty years since Roper’s 1963 PhD 
biography published in 1987.55 
          Justice Story has not undergone the same anonymity as his two colleagues. 
Aside from the wealth of primary material described earlier, there is a detailed 1970 
‘exploratory essay’ by one of his biographers, R. Kent Newmyer which deals with 
the neglected topic of how an examination of the circuit courts collectively and 
individually will lead to a better understanding of the decision making process of the 
Supreme Court.56 Newmyer shows why the circuit courts deserve further study and 
how to test that approach by examining Joseph Story’s work on the First Circuit.57 
Although the essay touches briefly on the nature of Story’s circuit opinions, it is 
valuable in setting the caseload against the need for the courts to cope with current 
events such as the expansion of American shipping during the early years of the 
Napoleonic Wars and the rise in home manufacturing as a result of the embargo on 
trade with belligerent nations. Newmyer points to the declaration of war on Britain 
by the United States in 1812, leading to many questions of international law and 
maritime and prize law relating to the disposition of captured vessels and cargo 
which were determined, in the first instance by either the federal district or circuit 
courts. He believes Story to be well qualified to deal with these branches of the law 
simply because of his extensive practice at the Bar.58 I consider whether his sittings 
in the circuit court not only consolidated but greatly enhanced the knowledge gained 
as an advocate.  
                                                          
55 Donald Malcolm Roper, Mr Justice Thompson and the Constitution (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1987). 
56 R. Kent Newmyer, ‘Justice Joseph Story on Circuit: A Neglected Phase of American Legal 
History,’ The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 12, No. 2 (1970), 112-135. See also Gerald T. 
Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Court (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1970); James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1971). 
57 Newmyer, ‘Story on Circuit,’ 112. 
58 Ibid. 116. 
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          Turning to Story’s circuit opinions resolving commercial disputes, Newmyer 
considers them to be ‘the framework for the regular and orderly conduct of 
economic affairs’59 Merchants respected his opinions and were better able to arrange 
their business affairs in the light of his pronouncements. As to his circuit opinions 
generally, he observes that during Story’s thirty-three years on the circuit bench, 734 
of his opinions were printed and circulated in legal journals thereby securing for him 
national importance.60 This would have the practical effect of making his opinions 
more readily accessible to lawyers outside New England for citing on their circuits; 
another step on the road to consistency across the nation. There have been 
biographies of other Marshall’s associates which although dated are still very useful, 
but they also pay little attention to the importance of circuit work, an omission 
which this research seeks to remedy.61  
          This thesis examines the approaches of circuit justices to the questions of 
existing property rights in land, the promotion of commerce on land and at sea, and 
the establishing of rights and responsibilities of merchants in respect of commercial 
contracts and negotiable instruments. Those circuit opinions also shed light on the 
vulnerability of the nation during hostilities with Britain around the time of the War 
of 1812; the troubled issue of slavery; and reveal how individual justices on circuit 
resolved politically sensitive, emotionally charged and historically significant 
questions. The opinions on circuit and on the Court also reflect the tensions between 
Federalist and Republican over the nature of government and the powers of the 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 125. 
60 Ibid, 129-130. 
61 Francis P. Weisenburger, The Life of John McLean: A Politician on the United States Supreme 
Court (Columbus: The Ohio University Press, 1937); John E. O’Connor, William Paterson: Lawyer 
and Statesman, 1745-1806  (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1979); James Haw, 
Francis Beirne, Rosamund Beirne & R. Samuel Jett, Stormy Patriot: The Life of Samuel Chase 
(Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1980). 
26 
 
federal judiciary to monitor state legislatures and courts which placed the justices 
under extreme political pressure. The justices were acutely aware of the need to 
strike the delicate balance between state sovereignty and the power of federal 
government. This led the Supreme Court, on occasion, to deliver compromise 
opinions designed to avoid direct confrontations with hostile Republican opponents 
at a time when the Court was reeling from the restoration of circuit riding duties, 
threats of impeachment, and the suspension of its sittings for over a year.62  
          Against this background the federal judiciary found it prudent to exercise 
caution and not antagonize a Republican majority in Congress. The justices had 
constant reminders that a substantial part of the public did not share Marshall’s 
vision of a Supreme Court tasked with interpreting the Constitution and the intent of 
its framers. Republicans were incensed at the prospect of the Court overruling 
legislation enacted by a Republican majority in Congress. The justices, therefore, 
realized that every opinion of the Court which impinged upon state sovereignty 
would be subjected to close critical scrutiny, adding to the temptation to avoid 
controversy at a time of weakness. 
           In establishing uniformity of federal law and procedure across the circuits, in 
addition to the few Supreme Court opinions and federal statutes, the justices, whose 
legal training had centred on Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
looked to the English cases and writers to solve problems upon which United States 
law had still to make provision. An examination of circuit opinions discloses how 
the justices drew from all available sources, and, in particular, how, to varying 
                                                          
62 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803) where the Court refused to contest the re-introduction of circuit 
riding by a Republican dominated Congress: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) in which the 
Court, whilst declaring it had the power to judicially review an Act of Congress, refused to order the 
Jefferson administration to deliver Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace. 
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degrees, they adapted English law to fit the social and economic needs of the new 
Republic.63 
          The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One outlines the origins of the 
federal court system through the fierce opposition to the concept of federal 
government in the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates to the 
establishment of the Supreme Court and the circuit and district courts by Congress. 
It also examines the relationship between federal and state courts and considers the 
business of the circuit courts against the historical and cultural background of cases 
generated by an expanding market economy, immigration, westward expansion, land 
disputes, neutrality, and embargo restrictions arising from European conflicts and 
the 1812 War with Britain. It explores the political divide between Federalist and 
Republican and its effect on the way in which the federal courts decided cases. It 
further explains the way in which the justices overcame the lack of guidance from so 
few United States statutes and Supreme Court opinions; how they sought to achieve 
a consistent system of law across the nation by using state opinions, English law and 
by exchanging circuit experiences. It examines the importance of circuit riding in the 
consolidation of federal authority through local federal justice and by the justices’ 
use, in the very early days, of the politically charged grand jury address. 
          Chapter Two focuses on specific aspects of the circuit and Supreme Court 
opinions of Justice Washington to discover the extent to which his jurisprudence was 
founded on the strict application of the doctrine of binding precedent despite a 
                                                          
63 Blackstone’s Commentaries was first published in England between 1765 and 1769. In 1771 it was 
printed in the United States for the first time; an exact copy of the London 1770 4th edition. In 1803 
St. George Tucker’s American version of Blackstone was published in Philadelphia by William 
Young Birch and Abraham Small. Its value to American lawyers lay in the fact that it explained how 
the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights had altered English law in America. It also 
covered subjects such as freedom of expression and slavery laws. 
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rigidity which occasionally resulted in injustice; his Federalist approach to balancing 
state sovereignty with the powers of a strong central government which generally 
came down in favour of the federal government; and the extent to which his view of 
his own slaves as mere items of property to be disposed of as and when he wished 
affected his approach to the slavery cases he tried. 
        The reasons for Justice Livingston’s changing political alliances from 
Federalist to ardent Republican and finally to the Federalism of his youth are 
examined in Chapter Three as an example of the fluidity of political allegiances 
during this period. Also considered is his contribution to the development of United 
States commercial law with particular reference to the responsibilities flowing from 
bills of exchange and promissory notes, the lifeblood of interstate and international 
trade.   His belief, unusual for this period, in the fallibility of jury verdicts and his 
willingness to set aside those which did not accord with his view of the case has 
been considered worthy of investigation.  
          Justice Story’s wish for clarity in federal law, revealed by his determined but 
failed efforts to import the common law into federal criminal and admiralty law, is 
investigated in Chapter Four together with his success in importing common law 
into commercial cases with a diversity aspect and his codification of criminal law to 
bolster the inadequate federal criminal legislation then in force. Also explained is 
how, by repeated exposure to maritime contracts and embargo cases on circuit, he 
became the Court’s leading admiralty expert. Last, but not least, the chapter 
acknowledges the great value to researchers of his voluminous correspondence 
illuminating the inner workings of the Marshall Court.  
              Chapter Five explores why Justice Thompson’s endeavours to promote state 
sovereignty and affirm state legislation disappointed his nominating president, James 
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Monroe, and how his unwillingness to strike down state legislation stemmed from a 
lack of separation of powers in New York State where he sat as a State Supreme 
Court justice and on the Council of Revision which vetted all state bills and 
invariably approved them. The chapter also examines his efforts to shape federal law 
to protect the Cherokee Nation from Georgia’s oppression and his less than 
successful attempts to alleviate the plight of the African-American slave. 
          This thesis, whilst acknowledging the considerable contribution of the Chief 
Justice and the landmark opinions to the Court’s success, will establish the circuit 
court as the foundation of federal court authority by establishing a rapport between 
government and citizen and by its creation of a uniform system of federal law across 
the nation acceptable to the majority. The circuit court experience enhanced not only 
the justices’ individual reputations but also their collective standing as members of 
the nation’s highest tribunal. Further, the combined expertise, gained by presiding 
over the increasingly busy circuit courts, gave them the confidence and authority to 
transform the Supreme Court from a position of weakness upon John Marshall’s 
appointment as Chief Justice in 1801 to an institution playing an effective role in 
government by the time of his death in 1835. 
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            Chapter One                                                                                               
The Federal Circuit Courts: Shaping Local and National Justice for an 
Emerging Republic 
 
          This chapter examines the challenges faced by the justices in their efforts to 
establish a federal court system, the sources from which they fashioned federal law, 
and their efforts to achieve uniformity of decision making across the Union. Those 
responsible for establishing the legal system of any new nation will, of necessity, 
consider foreign models and adopt such principles of law which best fit their needs. 
The chapter explains how the justices used federal statutes, Supreme Court opinions, 
state and English law to establish a system of law acceptable to the majority and to 
fulfil the dual judicial and political role entrusted to them by Congress. Their first 
task was to administer law and procedure consistently across the circuits and resolve 
local litigation. They were also expected to convince the nation that stability and 
prosperity lay in strong national government underpinned by a system of federal 
law.  Both undertakings were set against a background of widespread fears that a 
strong federal system of government and judiciary might lead to an oppressive 
regime similar to that faced by the people under British rule. This chapter examines 
how the justices faced determined opposition to any diminution of states’ 
sovereignty, their shaping of United States law on circuit and the ways in which they 
sought to convince the public of a need for strong central government and a system 
of federal law. 
The Politics of Federal Law                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
          Determined opposition to the concept of a separate federal judiciary and its 
probable political role was expressed at the Constitution Convention, the various 
ratification conventions and the debates preceding the passing of the Judiciary Act of 
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1789 which established the federal court system. Those debates show the divisions 
between Federalists determined to achieve a powerful national government 
underpinned by a federal judiciary and Republicans who were suspicious of any 
body, be it political, legislative or judicial which would diminish the rights of the 
states to control their own affairs. Watts (1987) expresses contemporary fears by 
painting a negative picture of the Federalists as a party clinging to ‘paternal 
traditions of elitism’ …which ‘expressed fear of, or distain for, the self-made man.’ 
He regards the Federalist promotion of Atlantic trade solely for growing profits for 
the merchants to preserve the existing social order. On the other hand, he regards the 
Republicans as ‘designers and shapers of a new order’ in which hard-working men 
might thrive economically to counter the ‘decay and decline which would result 
from Federalist domination.1  The suggestion that the federalists were concerned 
only to further the interests of the ruling classes is not borne out by the many circuit 
opinions examined in the following chapters, which reveal that whilst the justices 
did preserve existing property rights and promote commerce, they did so for the 
benefit of all members of society and not just the elite. Despite the ratification of the 
Constitution and the passing of the Judiciary Act 1789, those party differences 
persisted and placed at risk the future of the federal judiciary because of the 
insuperable problem of striking a balance between federal powers and states’ 
sovereignty. 
          To fulfil the demanding judicial and political roles President Washington, 
appointed to the Court experienced and leading lawyers, strongly committed to 
Federalist ideals. The importance to him of the political aspect is apparent from a 
                                                          
1 Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 13. 
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letter he wrote to Chief Justice John Jay in 1789 describing the judicial department 
as ‘the keystone of our political fabric.’2 He repeated this view when writing to the 
justices before they went out on circuit for the first time requesting them to let him 
know how the people reacted to local federal justice and to control by central 
government.3  He ensured that the associate justices came from different states, 
thereby establishing regional diversity as an important criterion.4 The practice of 
appointing justices by areas was sensible because each justice would be conversant 
with the law and procedure of his region, gained from practice at the bar or from 
sitting as a judge of the state court. Although the law and practice varied from state 
to state, there would always be one justice on the Court familiar with the law of the 
state from whence the appeal or writ of error came. A geographic balance was also 
politically motivated because the states were more likely to support a justice from 
their area they knew and respected.                                                
          As well as selecting justices from different areas, President Washington 
ensured that the justices were men who had played a significant role in the 
ratification of the Constitution and were, therefore, committed to the notion of a 
strong national government.5 He believed the political philosophy of a justice more 
important than his judicial experience anticipating that the federal judiciary would 
interpret the Constitution in a way which would fortify the position of central 
government. Whilst he nominated some who had never sat as judges, he chose 
exceptional lawyers who had achieved great success at the Bar.6 James Wilson, one 
                                                          
2 Letter, President Washington to John Jay , October 5, 1789, reproduced in Henry P. Johnson, The 
Correspondence and Papers of John Jay, 4 vols., vol. 3 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1890), 378. 
3 Letter, President Washington to the Justices of the Supreme Court, April 3, 1790, reproduced in 
Marcus, Documentary History, vol. 2, 21. 
                 4 Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (London: Allen Lane, 2010), 602. 
5 Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States, vol. 1 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2011), 167. 
6 Wood, Empire of Liberty, 412. 
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of the original associate justices and a signer of both the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution, had no judicial experience but was one of the 
country’s leading lawyers who lectured at the College of Philadelphia (later to 
become the University of Pennsylvania).7 His law lectures reproduced in his 
Collected Works demonstrate an extensive knowledge of the law.8 Washington’s 
nomination of Wilson suggests that he and the Senate viewed the Court as a body 
which would not confine itself to narrow points of law but would, when delivering 
an opinion would have regard not only to the relevant law but also any political 
aspect of the case. 
          The efforts to set up a uniform cross circuit system of federal law must be 
viewed against the continuous party political divisions between Federalists and 
Republicans and the attacks on the federal judiciary by extremist elements of the 
Republican majority in Congress which threatened the very existence of the federal 
judiciary. A mere twelve days after President Jefferson took office, Republican 
Representative William Branch Giles in his letter of congratulation asked the 
President to dismiss all Federalist judges including those of the Supreme Court.9 
Jefferson clearly felt that he would not have the support of Congress to remove 
Supreme Court justices and, therefore, compromised in the Judiciary Act of 1802 by 
removing from office the federal circuit judges appointed by President John Adams 
on the eve of his departure from the White House, thereby restoring the justices’ 
                                                          
7 Steve Sheppard (ed.), The History of Legal Education in the United States; Commentaries and 
Primary Sources, 2 vols. vol. 1 (Pasadena, California: Salem Press Inc., 1999), 15. 
8 Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall, (eds.), The Collected Works of James Wilson, 2 vols. 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). 
9 Letter, William Branch Giles to Thomas Jefferson, March 16, 1801 in Dice Robin Anderson, 
William Giles: A Study in the Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790-1830 (Menasha, 
Wisconsin: Collegiate Press at George Banta Publishing Co., 1914), 77. 
34 
 
circuit riding duties. One effect of the 1802 Act was to rearrange the sitting pattern 
of the Court so that it could not reconvene for eighteen months.10  
          The Court sat again on February 24, 1803, and Chief Justice Marshall 
delivered the historic opinion of Marbury v. Madison. Whilst criticizing Jefferson’s 
Secretary of State for refusing to deliver to William Marbury his commission from 
President Adams appointing him a justice of the peace, the Court refused to order 
that Marbury should have his commission, Marshall holding that Congress was not 
empowered to pass that part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which extended the 
original jurisdiction of the Court to grant a writ of mandamus. In effect, the Court 
found that that particular part of the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution and 
the Constitution must prevail. In an extremely politically sensitive case the Court 
appeased the Federalists to some extent by declaring that Marbury should have had 
his commission, and at the same time placating the Republicans by holding that the 
Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief. Most importantly, Marshall held 
that the Constitution empowered the Court to review the acts of the executive and 
the legislature.11 This was the first and only time the Court declared it had the 
authority to judicially review an act of Congress; a power suggested by Alexander 
Hamilton in Federalist 78 some fifteen years earlier when he remarked that ‘where 
the will of the legislature declared in statutes, stands in opposition to that of the 
                                                          
10 There is a wealth of scholarship dealing with Republicans’ repeated attempts to undermine the 
federal judiciary; Joseph Wheelan’s, Jefferson’s Vendetta: The Pursuit of Aaron Burr and the 
Judiciary (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, 2005) details Jefferson’s private and public 
attacks on John Marshall who presided over the circuit trial of Burr; Richard E. Ellis, The 
Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971), argues that the struggle over the federal court system was generated by extremists of both 
parties; James F. Simon’s What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic 
Struggle to Create a United States (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) charts Jefferson’s 
determination to thwart a Federalist dominated Court.  
                11 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1 Cranch), 1803. 
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people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, 
rather than the former.’12 
          Marshall’s compromise rankled with Jefferson for the remainder of his life 
and he made his distaste for the federal judiciary clear in a letter the following year 
to Abigail Adams, the wife of former President John Adams, complaining of the 
partiality of the Federalist judges, and, in a clear reference to Marbury v. Madison, 
expressing the view that the right claimed by the Court to review the acts of the 
executive and the legislature made the judiciary a despotic branch of government.13   
          Jefferson was no stranger to the impeachment proceeding process. In 1797, 
justifiably aggrieved at the presentment of a grand jury against a Republican state 
representative on an allegation that he had breached the Sedition Act of 1798 by 
criticism undermining the federal government, he wrote to James Monroe suggesting 
that the grand jury be impeached for interfering with a citizen’s freedom of speech. 
His petition requesting impeachment was received favourably by the Virginia House 
of Delegates but not acted upon.14 Jefferson himself faced the threat of impeachment 
in 1781 for allegations of incompetence whilst Governor of Virginia.15 
          Impeachment reared its head once more when Jefferson sought to attack the 
federal judiciary by instigating proceedings to remove from office Federal District 
Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire. Pickering was unfit to remain in office due 
to mental illness, but the Constitution provided for removal from judicial office only 
                                                          
12 Publius (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist No. 78, May 28, 1788 in Joanne B. Freeman, (ed.) 
Hamilton: Writings (New York: Library of America, 2001). 423.  
13 Letter Thomas Jefferson to Mrs Abigail Adams, September 11, 1804 in Lester Capon (ed.), The 
Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 278-280. 
              14 Letter, Jefferson to Monroe, September 7, 1797 in Paul Leicester Ford, The Works of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. VIII (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904), 339-340. 
15 Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull, Impeachment in America, 1635-1805 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984), 85-86. 
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in the case of treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanours.16 
Nevertheless, the Republican majority in the Senate removed him from office.17 
Significantly, shortly before the Senate tried Pickering, Jefferson was instigating 
impeachment proceedings against Justice Samuel Chase for his intemperate bias 
during Alien & Sedition trials against Republicans and for his public attacks on the 
Maryland Republican administration. He wrote to Congressman Joseph Hopkinson 
who was managing the Pickering trial suggesting impeachment proceedings against 
Chase but wishing not to be known as the instigator.18 The impeachment 
proceedings instigated in 1804 against Chase failed as the Senate decided that his 
conduct did not meet the necessary ‘high crimes and misdemeanour’ threshold.  
District Judge Richard Peters was threatened that he too would be impeached, on the 
grounds that he had sat with Chase on the Alien and Sedition trials. Fortunately for 
him the House refused to sanction his impeachment, but the possibility of 
proceedings caused him great anxiety.19  
          An independent judiciary is crucial to the fair and impartial administration of 
justice. All judges must be free to perform their duty without political pressure and 
threats of dismissal for failure to follow the policies and ideals of a ruling party. It 
would appear, however, that during Jefferson’s presidency, for the federal judiciary 
to assert its independence and claim the power to review an Act of Congress, was 
sufficient cause to undermine federal law and remove judges from office. This                               
                                                          
16 United States Constitution, Article II, section 4. 
17 See President Jefferson’s message of February 3, 1803 to the House of Representatives placing 
Pickering’s case before the House for consideration of impeachment. In James D. Richardson, A 
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 1 (Washington D.C: Bureau of 
National Literature and Art, 1905), 356. 
18 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the Administration of Thomas 
Jefferson ( C. Scribner’s Sons, 1889), Library of America Edition edited by Earl N. Habert, 1986), 
402-403. 
19 Letters, District Judge Richard Peters to Senator Timothy Pickering, Pickering Papers MSS, 
XXVII, 46 & XXXI, 101, cited in Warren, The Supreme Court, vol. 1, 281-282.  
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was a far cry from Jefferson’s view expressed in a letter to George Wythe as far 
back as 1776, writing that ‘The judicial power ought to be distinct from both the 
legislature and executive, and independent upon both…they [the judges] should not 
be dependent upon any man.’ He did, however, propose impeachment for 
‘misbehaviour.’20 Subsequent events would appear to show that he later viewed as 
misbehaviour the holding of political views differing from the government.  
          Attacks against the Federalist judiciary were also directed at state judges. The 
Pennsylvania Republican party began a campaign to impeach and remove a number 
of Federalist state judges. In 1803 the State Senate impeached and removed from 
office Judge Alexander Addison on purely party political grounds just eight days 
before Jefferson began to pursue District Judge Pickering.21 The following year the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives impeached Chief Justice Edward Shippen 
and associate justices Thomas Smith and Jasper Yeates, all Federalists, for alleged 
high misdemeanours. All three judges were acquitted by the State Senate as 
moderates within the party refused to support dismissals.22 There were no further 
impeachments, Jefferson, in 1807, announcing in a letter to Senator William Giles 
that the device was of no use in dislodging members of the federal judiciary. The 
letter also reveals his orchestration of the prosecution for treason of his former Vice-
President Aaron Burr in the Richmond circuit court presided over by John Marshall. 
Jefferson complained of Marshall’s trickery and his search for loopholes in the 
                                                          
20 Letter, Jefferson to Wythe, July 1776 in Paul Leicester Ford (ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson, 
vol. 2 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904), 219 
21 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1919), vol. III, 163-165.  
 
22 Hoffer & Hull, Impeachment in America, 221-227. 
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prosecution case.’23 He was furious when the jury acquitted Burr of treason and 
believed that Marshall had connived in the acquittal. Normally he restricted his 
criticisms of the judiciary to private correspondence. However, on this occasion in 
his Seventh Annual State of the Union Message, he expressed his profound 
disagreement with the not guilty verdict, questioning whether the acquittal was due 
to ‘a defect in the testimony, in the law, or in the administration of the law.’24 Here, 
by suggesting that the acquittal may have been caused by the ‘administration of the 
law,’ he was asking the country to accept his view that Marshall connived at Burr’s 
escape from sentence of death. The acquittal clearly preyed on his mind because 
seven years later he complained of ‘our cunning chief justice twisting Burr’s neck 
out of the halter of treason.’25 There were no further impeachment proceedings 
during the remainder of his second term of office but this undermining of the 
judiciary between 1801 and 1809 and threats to remove from office those judges 
who displeased him made the justices’ duties on circuit and on the Court much more 
challenging. Although Jefferson abandoned impeachment, his opposition to the 
federal judiciary remained strong even after he had left office.26        
                                                          
23 Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Senator William Branch Giles, April 20, 1807, in Albert Ellery Bergh, 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff.htm  1173-1176 (accessed 
26.04.2015). 
24 Fred L. Israel, The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966, 3 vols. (New York: 
Chelsea House/ Robert Hector Publishers, 1966), vol. 1, 93. 
25 Letter, President Thomas Jefferson to President John Adams, January 14, 1814, in Capon, Adams-
Jefferson Letters, 423. 
26 In 1810 Jefferson regarded the death of Federalist Justice William Cushing as ‘a circumstance of 
congratulation,’ because it enabled President Madison to nominate a Republican justice. Letter, 
Jefferson to Madison, October 15, 1810 in James Morton Smith (ed.), Republic of Letters: The 
Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776-1826, 3 vols. (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), vol. 3, 1646; There are also his attempts to interfere with the 
practice of the Supreme Court’s single opinion by writing to Justice Johnson and President Madison 
to persuade justices to issue seriatim opinions. Letter, Jefferson to Johnson, October 27, 1822 in 
Merill D. Peterson (ed.), Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1459-
1463. Letter, Jefferson to Madison, June 13, 1823 in Ford, Jefferson: Works, vol. 12. 296.  There are 
many more examples of Jefferson’s attempts to undermine of the federal judiciary long after his 
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The Grand Jury Charge: A Bond between Government and Citizen    
          At the beginning of each term, on all circuits, the presiding justice delivered a 
charge to the grand jury, the main purpose of which was to inform members of the 
grand jury of the law applicable to cases they were later to try. At the same time it 
enabled a justice to endorse federal government policy and many early grand jury 
charges had heavy political overtones. The importance of the grand jury was 
recognized in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which provides that ‘no 
person shall be held for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury.’ The differences between the currently 
approved grand jury charge and those of the late 18th century and early nineteenth 
century are striking. Federal judges today simply remind the grand jury of its 
function under the Fifth Amendment, stressing the jury’s independence, and that it 
stands between the government and the person under investigation.27  This is a far 
cry from the overtly political statements of the early justices. Albert J. Beveridge, 
John Marshall’s biographer, observed, in 1919, that the justices used their charges to 
preach on religion, morality, and partisan politics.28 This was, as Henderson (1971) 
noted, merely a continuation of the practice of judges during the colonial and 
revolutionary periods.29 Grand jury charges during the first decade of the federal 
courts were printed in local newspapers and, therefore, the justices’ message to the 
jury would have a wide circulation.30 The charge of Justice Samuel Chase to a 
Baltimore grand jury in 1803, in which he fiercely denounced the Republican 
                                                          
27 Model grand jury charge approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States, March 2005. 
URL: www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/juryservice/modelgrandjurycharge.aspx  (accessed 
26.04.2015). The model is merely a guide to judges and may be amended to suit circumstances. 
28 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, 4 vols, vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin 
Company, 1916-1919), 30. n. 1.  
29 Dwight D. Henderson, Courts for a New Nation, (Washington D.C: Public Affairs Press, 1971), 40. 
30 Erwin C. Surrency, History of the Federal Courts, (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 2002). 
281, n. 47. 
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administration, taken with his general intemperance on the bench, resulted in the 
impeachment proceedings other justices were unlikely to face as their charges were 
mild in comparison and which despite a political content attracted little attention 
from Republican newspaper proprietors.31  
          On his first circuit in 1790 Chief Justice Jay set the tone by explaining to the 
grand jury that the new nation needed a federal system of justice to overcome many 
differing state laws which were for the benefit of individual states rather than the 
whole Union.32 When dealing with the birth of the federal court system, in language 
that was moderate and persuasive, Jay stressed the importance of administering 
federal justice locally and accepted that putting such a system in place was not an 
easy undertaking. 33 He acknowledged the task of reconciling state and federal court 
jurisdictions as complex but promised that every effort would be made to ensure that 
they would be ‘auxiliary instead of hostile to each other’.34 Jay declared the grand 
jury system as the best possible means of bringing offenders to justice.35 His purpose 
was to forge a bond between the national government and the federal judiciary on 
the one hand and the grand jury and through it the wider public on the other hand. 
His concluding remarks to the grand jury are suggestive of a partnership between the 
citizen and the government to be overseen by the good offices of the federal 
judiciary. His message, in concluding his charge, was very clear. If the citizens 
                                                          
31 The controversial extract of Chase’s charge is reprinted in Haw et al., Stormy Patriot, (Baltimore: 
Maryland Historical Society), 214-215. 
32 Charge of John Jay to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York on April 12. 
1790, reprinted in Marcus, Documentary History, vol. 2, 25-30. 
33 Ibid. 27. 
34 Ibid. 28. 
35 Ibid. 29. 
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supported the national government and its laws, the government and the federal 
judiciary would ensure that their rights and liberties were fully protected.36 
          Jay’s charge to the grand jury in Boston that spring was in like terms. It was 
well received. The foreman of the grand jury praised the ‘very excellent charge,’ and 
expressed the hope ‘that the circuits might continue to be visited by justices of the 
same, learning and integrity and ability as the current incumbents.’ The foreman 
requested and was given in due course copy of the charge for the press which 
ensured a much wider audience.37 Justice James Wilson received similar praise in 
Philadelphia in the same term and, again, a request from the grand jury foreman for 
a copy of the charge for publication. It was printed in full in the Pennsylvania 
Gazette of April 12, 1790. It also received wide coverage in newspapers in New 
York, Boston, New Hampshire, and North Carolina as did the same charge by 
Wilson in Delaware, Virginia, Maryland, and Rhode Island between May and July 
1790.38  The Boston based Massachusetts Centinel of May 1, 1790 acclaimed 
Wilson’s ‘able and masterly’ delivery and his demonstration of ‘the efficacy and 
superiour (sic) excellence of that [government] established in the United States.’39 
Wilson’s charge was unusual because, although it praised the Constitution and the 
institutions of grand and petty juries, it did not seek to promote the virtues of either 
federal government of federal justice. The charge was simply a commentary on the 
Constitution and the relevant law.40 He was at pains to assure the grand jury that the 
citizen was protected because all acts of state and federal legislatures must conform 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 30. 
37 Ibid. vol. 2, 61. 
38 Ibid. vol. 2, 33. 
39 Ibid. vol. 2. 41. 
40 Ibid. vol. 2, 33-45. 
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to the Articles of the Constitution which was meant to accommodate ‘the 
dispositions, manners, and habits of those, for whom it was intended.’41     
          Wilson’s politically neutral charge was in stark contrast to that which the 
turbulent Justice Samuel Chase delivered to the Baltimore Grand Jury on May 2, 
1803. He used the charge to protest the Republican led Judiciary Act of 1802 which 
terminated the offices of sixteen federal circuit judges. He also denounced the 
Maryland Assembly’s decision to abolish the State General Court and its extension of 
suffrage based on property owning rights to include all white males, which he 
declared would ‘rapidly destroy all protection to property, and security to personal 
Liberty; and our Republican Constitution will sink into a Mobocracy, the worst of all 
possible Governments.’ He ended his charge with a personal attack on the framers of 
the current Maryland legislation, accusing them of ‘pulling down the beautiful fabric 
of wisdom, and republicanism, that their fathers had erected.’42      
          Justice James Iredell’s charge to a Republican grand jury which appeared in 
the Augusta Chronicle of October 17, 1791 met with faint praise. Whilst the Georgia 
jury thanked the justice for his charge on the law, the foreman launched into a 
comprehensive list of objections to federal government policies and a demand for a 
Bill of Rights guaranteeing a Republican form of government to each state.43 Finally 
to add to Iredell’s discomfort the foreman complained that the federal judiciary of 
the United States was too expensive to maintain.44 The grand jury clearly resented a 
federal government interfering with state sovereignty. The complaint that the federal 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 33. 
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judiciary was too expensive was just another way of saying the state’s judicial 
system was fit for purpose and could cope very well without federal intervention. 
Having played a major role in North Carolina’s tortuous process of constitutional 
ratification, Iredell knew there were many opponents of the federal system of 
government and was, therefore, not surprised by the hostile reception. Writing to his 
wife about the charge he made light of the protest by referring to ‘some 
Presentments they made discovering some dissatisfaction at particular things, but 
decently expres[sed?].’ 45 “Philanthropos” writing in the Augusta Chronicle of 
November 26, 1791 was highly critical of Iredell’s charge, commenting that he had 
spent so much time extolling the virtues of the federal government that he forgot to 
instruct the grand jury on its duty to preserve order in society. 46 
          One looks to the message in the charge, the way in which it was formally 
accepted by the grand jury, and its reception in local and national newspapers to 
discover whether the grand jury charge achieved its desired effect. Its influence 
depended on where the message was delivered. Thus, as has been seen by comparing 
reactions to the charges, in the generally Federalist North the charge was usually 
well received and was more likely to cement relationships between the federal 
government and the local people, whereas charges supporting the federal 
government would make little impression on local opinion in any state resenting 
perceived federal government interference with state sovereignty. However, after the 
impeachment proceedings of Justice Chase, whilst the federal courts generally 
furthered Federalist policies the overtly political element disappeared from the grand 
jury charge. One is entitled to draw this inference from the absence of reporting of 
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charges in the primary documents examined. Had there been any controversial 
charges, it is more than likely they would have surfaced.47 The grand jury charge did 
serve a useful purpose in the Court’s first decade as, in a sense, a party political 
broadcast on behalf of the federal government depending upon which justice 
delivered the message.   
 
The Role of the Circuit Courts in the Constitutional Ratification Debates              
 
          Whilst awaiting a body of Supreme Court guidance any jurisprudential 
advances depended upon the justices determining the applicable law and procedure 
to resolve the many and varied disputes they faced on circuit. The need to adopt a 
consistent approach across the circuits was crucial to the survival of the federal 
justice experiment. One aspect of the search for uniformity was the justices’ practice 
whilst on circuit of exchanging experiences and seeking advice from colleagues 
more experienced in particular branches of law.  They also looked to state laws and, 
because of a common legal education, relied heavily on guidance from English law 
to supplement available United States law.  
          The United States Constitution gave little guidance on the nature and extent of 
the powers of the federal courts. Whilst the Constitution outlined the original and 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it was silent on the extent of the 
jurisdiction of the ‘inferior’ district and circuit courts, and how the federal courts 
would co-exist alongside state courts, leaving jurisdictional issues to Congress. Ellis 
(2004) believes that President Washington deliberately avoided a battle over the 
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shape and powers of the federal courts and left the issue to Congress because the 
concept was so controversial.48 However, an alternative view is that many items of 
detail were deferred for full debate in Congress after the Constitution was law. The 
first task was to have the points of principle enshrined in the Constitution ratified by 
nine of the thirteen states as required by Article VII as soon as possible.  
          The difficulties facing the framers of the Constitution in establishing the 
federal courts are evident from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention at 
Philadelphia between May and September 1787 and best illustrated in the speeches 
of George Mason and John Marshall at the Virginia Ratifying Convention in June 
1788.49 Mason believed the establishment of federal district and circuit courts would 
erode the rights of the state legislatures and courts to order their own affairs and 
posed the question, ‘What is to be left to the State Courts?’ He suggested that the 
object of establishing federal courts was ‘the destruction of the legislation of the 
states.’50 He argued that appeals to the Supreme Court should be limited to questions 
of law as to empower the Court to review the facts would undermine jury verdicts.51 
It is plain from his speech that two matters which concerned him greatly were his 
belief that the federal courts might re-open land purchases and enforce payments of 
debts to British subjects which many state courts had refused to countenance.52 
Mason’s proposed amendment, which was lost, was to limit the intervention of 
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federal judicial power to those causes of action accruing after the ratification of the 
Constitution.53 In reply, Marshall assured the Committee of the Convention of the 
impartiality of the federal judges, going as far as to suggest that they might well be 
more independent than the judges of the state courts, and emphasizing the need for 
federal courts to alleviate overcrowded state court dockets, but, most importantly, 
that the state courts would not lose jurisdiction of the cases they currently decided.54 
Marshall’s questioning of the independence of the state judiciary resulted from the 
susceptibility of resident judges to local pressure due to a lack of security of tenure. 
This tension between the powers of federal courts and the functions of state 
legislatures and judicial functions, expressed at such an early stage, would dominate 
political and legal thinking throughout the Marshall era and beyond. Much later, in 
1833, Justice Joseph Story gave his view of the reason why the state courts had not 
been entrusted with cases of federal cognizance. He believed that it was perceived 
that local or sectional interests would prevent state courts from dealing with national 
issues in an independent manner, particularly as some state justices might be more 
concerned about the effect of their opinions on their continuing in office rather than 
on the national interest.55  
          The Senate began to debate the Judiciary Bill in early April 1789 and the 
extensive political wrangling which followed delayed its signing into law by 
President Washington until September 24 of that year. The main hurdles delaying 
the bill were the fundamental questions of how much power the Constitution would 
transfer from the states to the nation and whether state courts should be permitted to 
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decide on federal rights and powers, but with a right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court.56  
 
The Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Courts 
          The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the United States Supreme Court 
should consist of a chief justice and five associate justices and that the Court should 
sit in February and August of each year at the seat of government.57 As to the 
inferior courts, the country was divided into thirteen districts with a district court for 
each district presided over by a district judge resident in the district.58 The thirteen 
districts were organized into three circuits. The Eastern Circuit comprised New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York. The Middle Circuit had 
within its boundaries New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia, 
whilst the Southern Circuit consisted of South Carolina and Georgia. At this time 
Maine and Kentucky were parts of Massachusetts and Virginia respectively. Each 
circuit court was to consist of two justices of the Supreme Court and the district 
judge of the district, any two of whom were to constitute a quorum. However the 
district judge was not permitted to vote on any appeals from his own decisions.59 
          The requirement that two justices attend each sitting of the circuit court was 
relaxed in 1793 by Section 1 of the Judiciary Act 1793 largely due to the justices’ 
complaints to Congress of the hardship of circuit riding and only one justice was 
                                                          
56 Urofsky & Finkelman, A March of Liberty, vol. 1, 164. 
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The Court commenced sitting in New York in 1790, moving to Philadelphia the following year 
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58 Ibid. Sections 2 & 3. 
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required to attend with the district judge.60  The Judiciary Act of 1801 reduced the 
number of Supreme Court justices from six to five, established six federal judicial 
circuits and appointed sixteen new circuit judges to staff the courts, thereby relieving 
the justices of their circuit riding duties.61 The Republicans rightly believed that the 
reduction in the number of justices was a political manoeuvre designed to limit the 
incoming President Jefferson’s ability to make appointments to the Court. The new 
circuits were designated as the First Circuit (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island); the Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont); the Third 
Circuit (New Jersey and Pennsylvania); the Fourth Circuit (Maryland and 
Delaware); the Fifth Circuit (Virginia and North Carolina), and the Sixth Circuit 
(South Carolina and Georgia). 62  
          The repeal of that part of 1801 Act creating the new circuit judges was not far 
off. It was obvious that the outgoing President John Adams had packed the bench 
with committed Federalists which the incoming Jefferson regarded as a blatant 
political manoeuvre. Kerber (1970) rehearses the debate in Congress surrounding the 
repeal of the 1801 Act, arguing that the issue between the parties was more than a 
saving of salaries of the newly appointed circuit judges; the repeal of the Act was an 
attempt to make ‘federal justice less available – all for the benefit of local 
government.’63 The Act of 1801 had created sixteen new circuit judges; three for 
each circuit save for the Sixth Circuit which received only one which meant that the 
circuit courts would sit far more often than the Supreme Court justices could, given 
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their other duties. The abolition of the new posts resulted in less federal circuit 
sitting times, hence Kerber’s reference to local government benefit i.e. the state 
courts taking in more business. The Republican majority in Congress passed the 
Judiciary Act of 1802, abolishing the posts of the newly appointed circuit judges and 
re-instating the circuit riding duties of the justices whilst retaining the new circuits. 
The Act assigned one justice to each circuit and restored the number of justices to 
six.64 The Seventh Circuit was established in 1807 for Ohio, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee, presided over by the seventh justice, Thomas Todd. The various 
Judiciary Acts set out in precise terms the venues on each circuit at which the court 
would sit, and the day of the month each sitting was to commence. The circuit courts 
were to sit twice annually in each district.65 
          The criminal jurisdiction of the federal district court, which was exclusive of 
the state courts, was limited to crimes against United States law, ‘where no other 
punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one 
hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months is to be 
inflicted.’ The district court also had exclusive original jurisdiction in civil cases of 
admiralty and maritime matters which included seizures on the high seas or 
navigable waters, and for seizures on land, and for penalties and forfeitures. All 
cases in the district court except admiralty and maritime matters were to be tried by 
a jury where issues of fact were to be resolved.66 
          The circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in respect 
of criminal cases but exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases carrying greater 
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punishment than that which the district judge could impose.67 In civil cases the 
circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in what were termed 
diversity cases, involving citizens of different states or non U.S. citizens, or in cases  
in which the United States was a petitioner and the amount in dispute exceeded 
$500. In other civil cases the jurisdictions of the circuit and district courts coincided 
so that litigants could choose where to commence an action. Appeals from district to 
circuit court in admiralty cases where the disputed amount exceeded $300 and 
appeals in all other cases where the claim exceeded $50 were by way of a full 
hearing in which the district judge had no vote but was permitted to record the 
reasons for his original opinion.68 The Judiciary Act 1789 delivered the promises of 
the Federalists during the debates on the bill by giving the states’ concurrent 
jurisdiction with the district and circuit courts in many cases, the state courts 
retaining jurisdiction on all matters arising under state civil and criminal law.69  
 
              ‘A Certain Uniformity of Decision in United States Law’ 
          Congress gave little guidance to the justices as the law they should apply to 
resolve the disputes they encountered. The Constitution extended the judicial power 
‘to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United 
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority…and to all 
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdictions.’70 The jurisdiction of the circuit courts 
i.e. the types of cases they were permitted to try was quite straightforward. The 
difficulty lay in deciding what laws were to be applied to the cases. Obviously the 
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justices would interpret existing and future treaties, but apart from defining the law 
of treason, the Constitution was of little help in this regard and the justices awaited 
legislation from the first Congress. To add to the difficulty the Supreme Court would 
not produce a body of precedent for some years to come. 
          The Judiciary Act of 1789, whilst not solving the problem, did provide by 
Section 34 that ‘the laws of the several states …shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they 
apply.’71  Congress was directing the federal courts to apply American law in the 
shape of state law until sufficient United States statutes and Supreme Court opinions 
were available for guidance.72 As Congress was pre-occupied in the early years with 
essential legislation establishing government departments such as the War Office, 
the Treasury and a temporary Post Office, very few statutes were passed to aid the 
justices in the performance of their duties. The primary importance in passing 
revenue laws meant that a law of secondary importance such as the Crimes Act of 
1790 was not enacted until April 30, 1790, one year after Congress first met.73 
Whilst the statute covered the most serious offences such as treason, piracy, murder 
and arson, and the more prolific crimes of larceny, forgery, perjury and bribery, it 
did not prohibit all federal criminal activity. Those omissions would present 
problems for those justices who had no wish to fill the vacuum using English 
common law principles. 
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52 
 
          The direction in section 34 of the Judiciary Act 1789 to apply state laws to 
disputes in the federal courts was extremely difficult to comply with because no 
state at that time had judges who wrote opinions or reporters to record the spoken 
words. Some states had no statute codes; others had codes which were incomplete. 
When in 1785 the states were asked to supply copies of all of their statutes to 
Congress and to the other states they were unable to comply. This meant that the 
Supreme Court justices began their circuit riding without copies of the local 
statutes.74  However, in time, the states formalized court hierarchies and established 
supreme courts with appellate jurisdictions whose opinions were reported, and the 
statutes of states’ legislatures were printed, enabling federal judges to consult state 
laws when forming their opinions. In the meantime they had little choice but to look 
to English law for guidance, as the following brief overviews demonstrate. A more 
detailed examination of how each justice found his way will appear in the following 
chapters.  
          Justice Washington was one who drew heavily on state laws. Pennsylvania 
law reports were certainly available by the April 1803 term in Philadelphia when he 
set aside an arbitration award relying on the opinions of the Chief Justice of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the President of Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas.75 An examination of all of Justice Washington’s circuit opinions show him to 
be a judge who relied heavily on the opinions of the Pennsylvania superior courts. 
He expressed his confidence in state sources when writing, ‘Although not bound by 
their decisions, they are and ought to be highly respected.’76 He admitted being led 
into error in one case by relying too much on an opinion of the Pennsylvania chief 
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75 Hurst v. Hurst, 12 F. Cas. 1028 (April, 1803). 
76 Barnes et al. v. Billington et al, 2 F. Cas. 858 (April 1803).  
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justice.77 However, the reported circuit opinions of Justice Livingston show almost 
no reliance on state court opinions. A feature of his reported opinions is the absence 
of citations. Many of his cases are resolved by findings of fact rather than by points 
of law. The absence of citations may be due to poor reporting as many of his 
opinions are summaries in the third person, but it may be that, like Marshall and 
unlike Story, he preferred not to cite cases. 
          Justice Smith Thompson regularly relied upon state court opinions. It was to 
be expected that the opinions of the New York Supreme Court would loom large in 
his federal circuit jurisprudence as he had been an associate justice and later chief 
justice, serving on that court for sixteen years before his appointment to the nation’s 
highest tribunal. A good example of his reliance on state supreme court decisions is 
his lengthy opinion in Vermont v. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
(1827) in which he cited no less than twenty-four New York state opinions.78 He, 
like Story, preferred to support his opinions with cited cases, and his practice was 
made easier by the meticulous reporting of William Johnson, New York State’s first 
official law reporter. Unlike the reports of Thompson’s federal circuit opinions, 
Johnson’s reports were verbatim transcripts of the opinions delivered and, therefore, 
much more useful as precedents because the arguments and reasoning were readily 
apparent. 
          In the first circuit opinion of Justice Story reported in the Federal Cases, his 
reliance upon state opinions is clear. In that one case turning on the liability of a 
common carrier, he cited three opinions of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, two opinions from William Johnson’s New York Supreme Court 
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reports, and one opinion of the New Hampshire Superior Court of Justice.79 Story’s 
circuit cases between 1811 and 1835 show frequent favourable citations of state 
opinions.  It is apparent from surviving federal circuit opinions that the views of 
state superior courts were important sources to the justices in those early years. They 
looked for guidance, not only to the superior courts of the states comprising the 
circuits upon which they sat but also to the state court opinions of other states as is 
demonstrated in the above example of Justice Story’s opinion in Citizens Bank v. 
Nantucket Steamboat Co.  
          The circuit opinions of the justices, save for Justice Livingston, show a greater 
dependence on English law than the assistance afforded by the state superior courts. 
The lawyers of the early Republic, whether attending university, the Inns of Court in 
London, or serving as clerks in lawyers offices, had been trained on the principles of 
the English common law. They had been brought up on a diet of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Littleton on Coke, and the major decisions 
of prominent English jurists. It was, therefore, likely that the justices would lean 
heavily on English law in the absence of United States statute and case law, despite 
an understandable resistance to the use of English statutes and cases to resolve 
American disputes, given the suffering under colonial rule before and during the 
Revolutionary War.  A New York law of 1786 declared that the common law was in 
force in the state but the only English statutes to be applied were those recognized 
by the colony on April 9, 1775. Yet twelve years later that state prohibited the 
citation of any such statutes in the state courts and, to complicate matters, in 1833, a 
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New York court held that certain English statutes had become part of the common 
law and, as such, were receivable in court.80 
          In 1807 Kentucky went beyond the New York restrictions by banning outright 
the citation of any English cases decided after the commencement of the Revolution. 
The following year the chief justice of the Kentucky Court of Appeals enforced the 
prohibition by refusing counsel permission to read from the report of an English case 
decided five years earlier.81 The fear of some states that their legal systems were in 
danger of being unduly influenced by their former rulers did not extend to the 
reception of English law in the federal court, whether district, circuit or Supreme 
Court. On the contrary, the federal court reports show a widespread acceptance of 
English law by the justices provided it did not infringe the Constitution or existing 
United States law. This was so to the end of the Marshall Court era despite the great 
increase in Supreme Court opinions to guide the justices. However, the imported 
English law had to be relevant and adapted to the needs of many ordinary American 
citizens who, unlike their European counterparts, had much greater opportunities to 
purchase land and establish businesses in a country expanding geographically and 
economically. 
          As will appear in Chapter Two, Justice Washington relied heavily on English 
law throughout his time on circuit. In his very first sitting in Philadelphia in the 
April 1803 term he was very disappointed to find that there were no English 
authorities on the point.82 This is a theme which runs through his circuit opinions. 
He relied frequently on the decisions of Lords, Coke, Stowell, Ellenborough, and his 
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particular favourite Lord Mansfield. The Federal Cases reveal Washington’s 
reliance on legal precedent to support his opinions, and the manner in which he 
searched for sources. Justice Livingston’s approach to the use of English decisions 
differed markedly from Washington’s practice.  Despite having English authorities 
cited to him by counsel in argument, Livingston often handed down opinions devoid 
of or with minimal reference to precedent. Livingston expressed high regard for the 
authority of an English judge in only one of his reported opinions when he referred 
to Chief Baron of the Exchequer Comyn as ‘an authority in himself.’83 He followed 
English law or practice in only two of his reported cases. In one case he refused a 
continuance because the affidavit failed to give the name of the missing witness in 
accordance with the English practice.84 In the other he followed decisions of Sir 
William Scott and Lord Mansfield on an admiralty point.85 However, as will be 
observed from Chapter Three, there are examples of a determination to oust English 
law in favour of American law and his opinions disclose a certain pride in and a 
distinct preference for the emerging body of United States law. 
           Joseph Story’s opinions were erudite and displayed a willingness to review 
the law from all possible sources, and from English law in particular. He made this 
plain in his first term of the Massachusetts circuit court. He was delighted when he 
found that his own view of a case had been confirmed by a recent English case 
‘where the subject was very elaborately considered by Lord Denman.’ In the same 
case he cites with approval a treatise on shipping by Lord Tenterden and a decision 
of Mr Justice Dampier.86 The following year in an embargo case, Story followed a 
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doctrine of Lord Hale declaring that there could not be any better authority.87 These 
two cases early on in Story’s judicial life reveal an eagerness to rely upon the 
English authorities and his opinions in the Federal Cases show that this was so 
throughout his time on the First Circuit. His respect for the English authorities never 
diminished.           
          In 1825 in a circuit court case involving the court’s power to order 
amendments at common law and by statute, Justice Thompson considered in detail 
the practice of English judges on amendments, English statutes from Edward III to 
George I and the decisions arising under them, analogous to United States statutes.88 
Again, the Federal Cases show that Thompson regularly relied upon English 
decisions through to the end of the Marshall Court in 1835 when he had to decide 
whether admiralty had jurisdiction in an action for salvage for the retaking on land 
of property captured by pirates, and called in aid Lord Hale’s construction of a 
statute of Henry VIII.89 It follows, therefore, that, Livingston apart, the four justices 
were eager to use English law to help them resolve their circuit cases. 
          That justices generally looked to the same sources for legal precedents meant 
that they were more likely to achieve consistency of decision making across the 
circuits.  This need for consistency had been recognized before the Judiciary Act of 
1789.  Supreme Judicial Court Justice David Sewell wrote to the newly elected 
Senator for Massachusetts, Caleb Strong that ‘a certain uniformity of decisions 
throughout the United States whether in the federal or State Courts, is an object that 
may be worthy of consideration.’ Sewell would soon have a more than casual 
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interest in the concept of uniformity as he was shortly to be appointed a federal 
district judge for Massachusetts.90  
          Justices not only looked to state law and English law for guidance. Wherever 
possible they followed each other’s circuit opinions. Justice Washington followed a 
circuit opinion of Justice Story; a course which was subsequently affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in an opinion delivered by Justice Story.91  Washington again 
followed an opinion of Justice Story in a patent case.92  In a case involving the 
circulation of banknotes, Washington followed not only one of his own circuit 
opinions but also an opinion from the circuit court of the District of Columbia.93 
Washington held Chief Justice Marshall in the highest regard and in 1827 relied 
upon Marshall’s opinion on the admissibility of evidence in the trial for treason of 
former Vice-President Aaron Burr, which Washington used in a counterfeiting trial 
on circuit.94 He also valued the opinion of Justice Todd and followed his opinion in a 
Kentucky banking case, expressing himself entirely satisfied and concurring entirely 
with Todd’s view of the law.95  Thus Washington sought consistency by following 
the circuit opinions of his brethren despite the fact that they were not binding upon 
him.  
          Justice Livingston also wished for consistency of decisions across the nation 
and would look to the decisions of his brethren on circuit to achieve this objective. 
In 1810 in New York when trying an alleged breach of the embargo, he expressed 
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his high regard for the opinions of Justice Washington writing that they ‘would 
always receive the most respectful consideration from this court.’96 He did, however, 
point out the difficulties he sometimes faced when opinions from other circuits were 
cited to him because of the absence of a full report which meant he was unable to 
discern the arguments advanced and the reasoning behind the opinion.97 A justice 
was unlikely to follow the fact of a decision of another court without knowing the 
basis of the opinion and so the absence of accurate and available law reports did 
hamper but did not defeat the justices’ desire for uniformity of opinions. In the same 
year in another embargo case this time in Connecticut, Livingston held over the 
amount of penalty because he wanted to learn the practice in the circuit courts of 
New York and Virginia where similar actions had been brought.98 This is another 
example of a justice looking to the wider picture, concerned not merely to establish 
patterns on his own circuit, but determined to achieve, as a member of a team, 
nationwide uniformity of law and practice.  
          In Adams v. Story (1817), Livingston acknowledged the right of each state to 
pass insolvency and bankruptcy laws but made the point that in a country as 
extensive as the United States, those laws should be uniform, so that none of the 
larger ‘commercial’ states should be without a code on the subject. He believed that 
Congress should determine such a uniform plan displacing state legislation. He also 
expressed regret that the issue had not yet received a decision of the Supreme Court 
which would have ‘produced a uniformity of judgment, at least in the courts of the 
United States.’99  Although Justice Story was a staunch supporter of consistency 
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across circuits the Federal Cases reveal that he rarely cited circuit opinions other 
than his own. 
          Justice Smith Thompson was also keen to follow the circuit opinions of the 
other justices where appropriate. There are numerous examples of this in the Federal 
Cases. Justice Story was a particular favourite. He followed Story in The Mary 
(1824) and in United States v. Sturges et al. (1826). In the latter case he made 
express reference to the importance of consistency when he wrote, ‘By finding the 
point directly adjudicated upon in one of the courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction with 
this, I shall adopt it as governing the present case. It is of the highest importance that 
there should be uniformity of decision in the construction of statutes.’100  Further, in 
1829, when holding that the federal courts had power to make rules of practice under 
the Judiciary Act 1789, Thompson followed two circuit opinions - those of Justices 
Washington and Story.101 
          Lest it be thought that all justices were eager to follow other opinions, Justice 
William Johnson was not always so co-operative. He was, on occasion, unwilling to 
accept even the authority of the Supreme Court. In a dissent in 1828 Johnson angrily 
complained when the majority held that the circuit court in a trial by jury had no 
power to compel a plaintiff to submit to a non-suit, i.e. to force a plaintiff to abandon 
his claim against the defendant. Johnson protested against ‘the right of forcing upon 
my circuit, the practice of other circuits,’ pointing out that ‘I can never know the 
practice of my own circuit until I come here to learn it.’102 Justice Johnson’s attitude 
in no way undermines the overwhelming ethos of uniformity. Clearly he was 
unhappy that a practice which had adopted on his circuit was not one which the 
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Court could endorse.  One question which divided the justices on circuit and which 
did not advance consistency was whether United States law recognized a common 
law of crime. This is an issue which will be investigated fully in Chapter Four. 
          Consistency was also achieved by conversations between justices when 
together in Washington and by correspondence when apart on circuit. This exchange 
of information was crucial to the decision making process. Collegiality was vital to 
the decision making process of the Court. It also had a large part to play in relation 
to circuit business. The justices boarded in the same lodging-house in Washington 
which facilitated their ability to decide cases promptly as they discussed the day’s 
oral arguments and often reached decisions during the evening. This collegiality 
engendered a spirit of friendship and co-operation which is revealed in Story’s 
letters to Nathaniel Williams and Samuel Fay set out in the Introduction to this 
research and is also shown in the correspondence between justices exchanging 
circuit news and seeking and receiving advice on difficult points of law. 
          John Marshall was eager and pleased to receive help from his colleagues on 
topics with which he was unfamiliar or in respect of troubling cases likely to attract 
much public interest such as the trial on circuit in 1807 of former Vice-President 
Aaron Burr for treason.103  Marshall’s plea to Cushing in that case was not an 
isolated request for assistance. There are numerous examples of such requests, 
usually addressed to Washington and Story on unfamiliar topics, mainly on 
admiralty points but also on debt, forfeiture and insolvency, revealing his wish for 
consistency across the circuits.104  
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          It must not be thought that Marshall was the only justice who sought help with 
difficult circuit cases. He gave advice to Justice Washington in a bankruptcy case in 
1814.105 Story and Washington advanced uniformity by exchanging what G. Edward 
White (1988) describes as semi-annual reports of new and interesting cases they had 
decided on their respective circuits. White believes that Marshall, Story and 
Washington were keen on ‘shaping federal Law,’ and this argument is borne out by 
their correspondence.106  These exchanges of information and the answering of calls 
for help furthered the justices’ aim of uniformity. 
          Uniformity necessitated working together on circuit as well as in Washington 
to strive, by using law from a variety of sources, and, by following wherever 
possible the circuit opinions of their colleagues, to achieve that crucial consistent 
approach to the  resolution of civil and criminal proceedings. It was important that 
citizens, whether they were farmers, manufacturers, inventors, landowners, ship-
owners, or corporate bodies, could order their business and domestic affairs in such 
a way as to feel reasonably confident that they would receive the same protection 
under federal law in every state of the Union. There was little point in establishing 
federal courts whose law and procedure differed from circuit to circuit in the same 
way as the courts of the several states. If the system was to work, it was the task of 
the justices to assure the people and crucially the business community that, no matter 
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he was anxious to receive Story’s report in return. Letter, June 19, 1821 in the Joseph Story Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. 
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where they lived, worked or travelled, the federal courts would implement the law in 
a uniform manner across the nation. 
 
Conclusion 
          The federal judicial system had troubled beginnings. From the outset      
Federalists had to contend with determined political opposition at the Constitutional 
Convention, various ratification conventions and the debates during the passage of 
the Judiciary Act 1879.  Whilst the Act successfully negotiated the Congress, 
reasonable Republican fears remained that a federal judiciary would so interpret the 
Constitution so as to strengthen the power of central government at the expense of 
state sovereignty. 
          President Washington’s nomination of Supreme Court justices who were 
notable and experienced lawyers from different parts of the country and who had 
played a significant role in the ratification of the Constitution went a long way 
towards ensuring a positive reception of federal law regionally. Local people were 
more likely to accept the concept of federal justice if judges visited the main cities 
on circuit so that they might observe, first-hand, federal justice at work, or read of 
the justice’s activities in the local press.  
          The justices had a dual function on circuit: judicial and political. First, they 
administered criminal law and tried civil claims. Second, they promoted the concept 
of federal government locally, attempting to forge a bond between government and 
citizen using the grand jury charge at the beginning of each circuit session to extol 
the virtues of the Constitution and the institutions it had established. The reception 
the charge met depended very much on where it was delivered. That political 
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element of the charge was much in evidence during the first decade of the federal 
courts, but after its misuse by Justice Chase leading to his impeachment in 1804, the 
charge was used merely to direct the grand jury on the law relating to matters 
relevant to the cases they were to try.  
          The Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798, which were rigorously enforced by the 
federal judiciary, were ostensibly designed to combat revolutionary fervour arising 
from events in France but were used to restrict criticism of the Federalist 
government. Those unpopular measures resulted in the Republican-led Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 asserting the right of states to disregard 
federal legislation which they deemed unconstitutional. This heavy-handed statutory 
denial of freedom of speech and of the Press was a factor in the defeat of President 
John Adams and the election of President Jefferson in 1801 and did little to advance 
the popularity of the federal justices. 
          The justices realized how vulnerable they were when President Jefferson 
repealed that part of President Adams’ 1801 Judiciary Act creating sixteen 
‘Federalist’ circuit judges, thereby restoring the justices’ circuit riding duties. The 
1802 Act also suspended sittings of the Supreme Court for over a year. Whilst the 
Court in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison, asserted the power to judicially review acts 
of Congress, the justices generally kept a low profile, avoiding a direct confrontation 
with President Jefferson as was demonstrated by their meek acceptance in, Stuart v. 
Laird, of the reintroduction of circuit riding. The actions of a powerful majority in 
Congress held in check, certainly during President Jefferson’s two terms, the Court’s 
desire to play a more active role in government. 
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          The justices went on circuit with no specific guidance as to the approach they 
should adopt to achieve the uniform system of federal law and procedure essential to 
the stability of the emerging nation. They were left very much to their own devices. 
They did not start with a clean slate because many years of British rule had let their 
mark on the legal systems of individual states. There were few Supreme Court 
opinions and hardly any federal statutes to guide them so they looked to other 
sources to fashion American law pending a greater output of federal legislation and 
Supreme Court authorities.  In the meantime, they looked for uniformity in the 
decisions of state supreme courts, each other’s circuit opinions, and, particular, the 
English common law. Consistency was achieved by exchanges of ideas when 
together in Washington and by writing to each other on circuit seeking help on 
unfamiliar branches of law together with the exchanges of semi-annual reports of 
interesting cases between Justices Washington and Story. In this way the justices 
achieved the uniformity of law and procedure essential to the stability of the vast 
areas administered by the federal government. 
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            Chapter Two                                                                                
Bushrod Washington: The Role of Precedent and the Preservation of 
Federalism Ideology 
          Joseph Story’s eulogy at the death of his close friend and colleague Bushrod 
Washington contained a description of him as ‘a good old fashioned Federalist’ with 
a ‘cautious mind’ who was ‘distinguished for moderation.’ Story added,    
He indulged not the rash desire to fashion the law to his own views… Hence, he 
possessed the happy facility of yielding the just the proper weight to authority; neither, 
on the one hand, surrendering himself to the dictates of other judges, nor, on the other 
hand, overruling settled doctrines upon his own private notions of policy or justice.1  
 
It was appropriate that Justice Story should touch upon the part played by legal 
precedent in Washington’s jurisprudence because it is a doctrine apparent even from 
a cursory examination of his circuit and Supreme Court opinions. District Judge 
Joseph Hopkinson’s eulogium on Washington was similarly even handed by praising 
Washington as ‘respectful of the authority of decided cases but equally careful and 
discriminating in applying them.’2 However, an in-depth analysis of those opinions 
reveals, not the delicate balance suggested by Story and Hopkinson, but a constant 
search for precedent for guidance as to what his opinion should be, and a feeling of 
unease when having to break new ground. Nevertheless, the eulogies are a useful 
starting position from which to open up the debate about the source of legal 
authority in the early Republic and invite an investigation to reveal this justice’s part 
in the creation, on circuit, of a uniform body of federal law and procedure. 
          The chapter focuses on Washington’s role in the shaping of American law 
which had its foundation in the expertise he gained whilst presiding over the United 
                                                          
1 Joseph Story, Eulogy on Justice Washington, December 1829 in W.W. Story, Life and Letters of 
Joseph Story, vol. 2, 29-33. 
2 Joseph Hopkinson,  In Commemoration of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, Late one of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States (Philadelphia: T.S. Manning, 1830), 16.  
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States Third Circuit between 1803 and 1829. Its main thrust involves an examination 
of the thread touched upon by Justice Story which had an important place in 
Washington’s jurisprudence; his belief in the need for uniformity which flowed from 
adherence to legal precedents. By far the most important factor in Washington’s 
jurisprudence was his strict application of this doctrine of precedent. A conservative 
Federalist he upheld existing property rights and endeavoured to secure the nation’s 
economic prosperity by promoting interstate and international trade. This aspect of 
Federalist philosophy was a significant stabilizing factor in which precedent featured 
strongly.  This quest for uniformity, the preservation of property rights, and the 
advancement of trade will be demonstrated by an analysis of his circuit court and 
Supreme Court opinions. His work on circuit has been largely neglected by scholars 
despite the fact that the opinions are far more numerous than his Supreme Court 
majority holdings and, therefore, admit of a greater insight into his jurisprudence and 
political outlook. Two further aspects of his jurisprudence are highlighted, namely 
his personal and judicial approach to the issue of slavery and the way in which he 
dealt with the tension between central government powers and state sovereignty. 
 
              A Federalist’s Journey from Revolutionary Virginia to the Supreme Court             
          Bushrod Washington was born into the colonial aristocracy in Bushfield, 
Virginia on June 5, 1762. His father, John, was President George Washington’s 
younger brother and his privileged position enabled him to send his son to the 
prestigious William and Mary College from which he graduated A.B. in 1778. He 
also studied law at the college, attending the lectures of George Wythe, and met 
John Marshall; the beginning of a lifelong friendship at the Bar and on the Supreme 
Court Bench. 
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          Having enlisted as a private during the Revolutionary War, Washington 
witnessed the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown.  After the War, 
supported financially by his uncle, he studied law in Philadelphia in the offices of 
James Wilson who was to be one of President Washington’s first appointees to the 
Supreme Court. Washington began his law practice in Westmoreland County, 
Alexandria and later moved to Richmond specializing in chancery cases. Politically 
active in the Federalist cause, he was elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in 
1787, supporting the adoption of the Constitution at the ratification convention the 
following year.  
          Despite stiff competition in Richmond from outstanding advocates such as 
John Marshall and Patrick Henry, Washington’s practice grew. His own Virginia 
Court of Appeals Reports reveal that between 1792 and 1796 he had appeared as 
counsel in approximately one quarter of the 149 reported cases. Having acted in 
several matters for his uncle, his reputation was such as to persuade Thomas 
Jefferson to instruct him in a chancery suit. Horace Binney, a noted advocate, 
described Washington’s practice at the Bar as mainly on the Chancery side with a 
good grounding in common law, but no experience of commercial law or jury trials.3   
          Justice Washington was a deeply religious man, a life-long member of the 
Episcopal Church of the United States, leading morning and evening prayers at 
Mount Vernon. Binney believed that Washington was sustained in his private life 
and public duties by a constant observance of his religious beliefs.4 Washington had 
been active on behalf of his church as an advocate, successfully resisting Virginia’s 
attempts to seize church lands.5 He was also a vice-president and charter member of 
                                                          
3 Horace Binney, Bushrod Washington (Philadelphia: C. Sherman & Son, 1858), 11-12. 
4 Ibid, 27. 
5 Blaustein & Mersky, 247. 
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the American Bible Society, attending its meetings, and taking an interest in its 
work.6 Casper (2008) believes that it was Washington’s religious beliefs which led 
him to become President of the American Colonization Society in 1816, committed 
to create African colonies of free American blacks. In 1820 Washington explained 
the objects of the Society as ‘an instrument in the conversion of Africans to 
Christianity’ in order to establish ‘the kingdom of the Messiah in every quarter of 
the globe.’7  The venture was open to the criticism that the objectives were 
impossible in view of the large numbers involved or that it was a device to rid the 
nation of potentially troublesome freed slaves.8         
          Washington did not find his deep religious convictions incompatible with his 
ownership of slaves, whom he regarded as property to be disposed of as and when he 
thought fit. Like Justice William Johnson of South Carolina, he was born into a 
slave-owning family and inherited the family plantation and 42 slaves from his 
father in 1787.9 The following year he wrote to his uncle informing him that he had 
resolved to give his full attention to his law practice which meant that he intended to 
sell the plantation and the slaves who tended the land. He used the sale proceeds to 
discharge part of the debts he had also inherited.10 When he inherited Mount Vernon 
from his uncle in 1802, Washington brought with him those slaves he had retained 
who would have been domestic servants as the plantation had been sold. George 
                                                          
6 Bushrod C. Washington, ‘The Late Mr Justice Bushrod Washington,’ The Green Bag, vol. IX, No. 8 
(Boston, August 1897), 334. 
7 Scott E. Casper, Sarah Johnson’s Mount Vernon (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 13-15. Citing 
Bushrod Washington, ‘The People of Color,’Niles Weekly Register 11 (January, 25, 1817), 355-356, 
and Adam Hodgson, Letters from North America (London: Hurst, Robinson & Co., 1824), 15-17. 
8 According to the United States Census Bureau, the 1810 census revealed that out of a total 
population of 5,660,067, there were living predominately in the Southern States 1,005,685 slaves and 
167,691 ‘free non-whites.’ http://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/statistics_on_slavery.htm   (Accessed 
21/04/2014). 
9 Donald Morgan, ‘William Johnson’ in Friedman & Israel, Justices, 356. 
10 Letter, Bushrod Washington to George Washington, November 20, 1788. Mount Vernon Archives 
cited in Annis, 56-57. 
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Washington had declared that the 123 slaves he owned were to be freed upon the 
death of his wife Martha. However, Bushrod Washington persuaded Martha to free 
them immediately because of security concerns. Despite being granted freedom, 
many of the slaves remained at Mount Vernon where food, clothing, shelter, and 
medical care were available.11  They had little choice in the matter given the near 
impossible prospect of independent living.   
          In 1821 Washington sold fifty-four of his slaves from Mount Vernon to pay 
for losses incurred in the running of the estate. The story of the sale appeared in the 
influential Baltimore newspaper Niles Weekly Register which criticized him for 
selling the slaves as if they were ‘hogs or cattle’ and accusing him of dividing 
families. Washington’s reply in the Baltimore Federal Republican revealed the 
mind-set of the typical Virginia slave-owner and denied the right of any person to 
question his legal or moral right to sell his property.  He did not feel obliged to free 
his slaves just because his uncle had done so and Justice Washington did not free his 
slaves in his will.12 Despite expressing an abhorrence of the slave trade, 
Washington’s opinions examined later in this chapter reveal a pattern of upholding 
the rights of the ‘owners’ of those slaves already held in bondage in the United 
States.   
 
Justice Washington and the Role of Precedent in the Federal Legal System 
          Washington’s pre-occupation with case law was first apparent from his 
compilation of two volumes of Virginia Court of Appeal case reports in the early 
                                                          
11 Annis. 202. 
12 Annis, 198-203. 
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part of his law practice.13   He compiled them for his own use for citing in court and 
not with a view to publication.14 The most striking aspect of Justice Washington’s 
jurisprudence is his search for and reliance upon the doctrine of precedent which is 
best illustrated by his circuit opinion in United States v. Bright (1809) when he 
wrote,  
Miserable indeed, must be the condition of the community where the law is 
unsettled, and decisions on the very point are disregarded, when they come 
up again, directly or incidentally into discussion… There is no standard by 
which the rights of property, and the most estimable privileges to which 
citizens are entitled, can be regulated.15 
                         
This observation reveals his vision of a federal legal system founded upon the strict 
adherence to precedent to ensure that citizens would have some idea of the prospects 
of success in litigation as well as knowing their rights and obligations under the law. 
The preservation of ‘rights of property’ and ‘privileges’ as well as the promotion of 
commerce loomed large in Federalist philosophy and is a common theme in the 
opinions of all four justices.  
           Blackstone, in 1765, in the first volume of his Commentaries spoke of ‘the 
rule of precedent as one of general application,’ and ‘an established rule to abide by 
former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation.’ Precedent was 
essential because it secured stability in the law.16 In 1788, Alexander Hamilton also 
believed that judges should be bound by strict rules and precedents defining their 
duty in every case they tried. He anticipated a large volume of precedents which 
would require men of skill and integrity to master so many opinions. This was an 
argument supporting security of tenure for the few who would undertake such an 
                                                          
13 Bushrod Washington, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, 2 vols. (Richmond: Nicholson, 1798). 
14 Charles F. Hobson, ‘St. George Tucker’s Papers,’ William and Mary Law Review, vol. 47, issue 4, 
Article 6 (2006), 1250-1251. 
15 United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1235 (1809). 
16 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, First ed., vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarenden 
Press, 1765-1769), 69-70. 
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arduous position. It would have been a difficult, if not an impossible task, for a 
federal justice to assimilate a large body of authorities if his tenure was fixed for a 
short term, or determinable at the will of the legislature or electorate.17      
          Achieving a balance between precedent as a crucial element of stability and 
the injustice which might flow from the slavish adherence to a doubtful authority is a 
question which has troubled judges since the early days of the federal judicial 
system.  Any prior decision which is prima facie absurd or is shown by subsequent 
evidence to have been based on a false premise must be reviewed. However, the re-
examination of a case without a compelling reason cannot be justified. The difficulty 
lies in drawing the line.  Justice Thurgood Marshall identifies the certainty which 
results from adherence to precedent in his dissent in Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 
expressing the view that fidelity to precedent was fundamental ‘to a society 
governed by the rule of law…if governing standards are open to revision in every 
case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will.’ He argues that if the 
doctrine of precedent was weakened, it would destroy the Court’s power to resolve 
disputes between those with power and those without.18  
          Lee (1999) examines how the doctrine of precedent was applied in the 
Marshall Court. He found a tension between the importance of following past 
decisions to preserve stability and certainty in the law and the common law 
declaratory theory which permitted some examination of the prior decision. He 
concludes that the general approach of the Marshall Court was that it sought to 
resolve the tension by a strong presumption in favour of precedent and a limited 
                                                          
17 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 78 (The Judiciary Department) in Rossiter, The 
Federalist Papers, 470.  
18 Cited in Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 6-7. 
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notion of the right to correct past errors.19  Lee highlights Washington’s deference to 
precedent in Ogden v. Saunders (1827). Some eight years earlier in Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, Washington had concurred in an opinion which had upheld the 
power of state legislatures to pass bankruptcy laws even though he believed that that 
power was vested exclusively in Congress. He did so quite simply because he 
believed that dissent weakened the authority of the Court. When the point arose 
again in Ogden, Washington felt compelled to follow Sturges even though his 
private view of the correctness of the original opinion had not altered.20       
          The examination of Washington’s opinions which follow, support the view 
that Washington’s approach to precedent was more akin to submission than a 
‘deference’ to the doctrine, even though, on occasion, he anticipated it might result 
in an injustice as he acknowledged in Scriba v. Insurance Co. of North America 
(1807) when declaring, ‘We have nothing to do but pronounce the law without 
considering how it may affect the parties on either side.’21 He took the same line in 
Kirkpatrick v. White et al. (1826) holding that he had no option but to follow the 
rules of law and equity and refuse jurisdiction, again stressing that it was not for him 
to consider the consequences of his decision.22 
          His opinions also demonstrate a strict and restrictive approach to the 
application of statutory interpretation; all flowing from a philosophy in which 
caution and the preservation of the status quo outweigh the risk of an innovative 
                                                          
19 Thomas R. Lee, ‘Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist 
Court,’ Vanderbilt Law Review, vol.52 (1999), 666-686. 
20 Ibid. 673. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819). Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
21 Scriba v. Insurance Co. of North America, 21 F. Cas. 874. Penn. October, 1807. 
22 Kirkpatrick v. White et al., 14 F. Cas. 685. Penn. April, 1826. See also for more examples of 
Washington’s seemingly indifferent attitude to the consequences of his opinions. Beardsley v. Torry. 
2 F. Cas. 1188. Penn. October 1822 and New Jersey v. Babcock, 18 F. Cas. 82, New Jersey, April 
1823.  
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solution meeting the justice of a case. Justice Story’s description of Washington as a 
man with a ‘cautious mind’ who was ‘distinguished for his moderation’ accurately 
summarized his colleague’s jurisprudence. Whilst deference to precedent has the 
obvious benefit of making future decisions more predictable, a too rigid approach to 
the doctrine may perpetuate injustice. Duxbury (2008) suggests that ‘constant 
recourse to precedent might indicate that a decision maker has few or other solutions 
at his disposal [or] might betray a fondness for the easy option or an unwillingness 
to think seriously about what is at stake.’23 Duxbury’s comments would seem to fit 
Washington’s approach to precedent rather well. 
          Washington displayed such a rigid approach to precedent in Croudson & Ors. 
v. Leonard (1808) when, relying on English authorities, he held that the sentence of 
a Barbados admiralty court condemning a vessel and cargo was conclusive evidence 
against the insured, proving that he had falsified his warranty of neutrality, thereby 
forfeiting his insurance cover. He believed that he was bound by the legal principle 
which upheld the decisions of all admiralty courts of competent jurisdiction, despite 
accepting that such a strict adherence to precedent might prove oppressive to citizens 
of neutral nations; he felt it was a matter for government to remedy the mischief not 
the judges.24 Because it is not possible to detect a general judicial philosophy from 
just two Supreme Court opinions, this study examines all of his circuit court 
opinions searching for evidence revealing whether his strict adherence to stare 
decisis in Ogden and in Croudson  were isolated examples of his practice or 
comprised a pattern of rigid reliance. 
                                                          
23 Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 31. 
24 Croudson v. Leonard, 8 U.S. 434 (1808). 
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          Washington looked to federal and state precedents to support his opinions on 
circuit, but his circuit reports reveal a significant reliance on the  reported cases  of 
the English judges, many of whom he held in the highest regard. He did, however, 
distinguish between English decisions pre and post the Revolution. In Crawford et 
al. v. The William Penn (1819) he rejected the Exchequer case of Anton v. Fisher 
because ‘it was decided long after our Declaration of Independence, and even after 
the treaty of peace; and is, therefore, not to be considered an authority in the courts 
of this country, so as to overrule the decision in Ricord v. Bettenham [an English 
case] in 1765.’25 Washington again voiced respect for English law in Barnes v. 
Billingham (1803) commenting favourably on a federal court opinion which ‘was in 
perfect unison with the English decisions.’ Lord Mansfield was his particular 
favourite whom he followed wherever possible. In the bail case of Bobyshall v. 
Oppenheimer (1822) Washington wrote, ‘I choose to adhere to the long established 
rule recognized and confirmed by Lord Mansfield, in preference to the modern 
practice of the English courts; particularly as the rule of the supreme court of this 
state is not pretended to be different from that stated by Lord Mansfield.’ 26  
          Washington once more praised Lord Mansfield in Ferguson v. Zepp (1827) 
when construing a will and followed Mansfield’s 1775 decision in Hogan v. 
Jackson, Cowp. 299 writing, ‘As these expressions have received a definitive 
judicial interpretation, by the highest authority, more than half a century ago, it can 
only be necessary to look to the authority itself for their meaning.’27  It is  indicative 
of Justice Washington’s high regard of  English law that he should deem an English 
                                                          
25 Crawford et al. v. The William Penn, 6 F. Cas. 781. New Jersey. October 1819. 
26 For a selection of favourable references to Lord Mansfield see, Calbraith v. Gracy, 4 F. Cas. 1030. 
Penn. April 1805. Marshall v. Delaware Ins. Co., 16 F. Cas. 838. Penn. April, 1807. Penn v. Klyne et 
al., 19 F. Cas. 166. Penn. April 1817. Bobyshall  v. Oppenheimer, 3 F. Cas. 785. Penn. October, 
1822. Rhoades et al. v. Selin et al., 20 F. Cas. 631. Penn. October 1827. 
27 Ferguson v. Zepp, 8 F. Cas. 1154. Penn. April, 1827. 
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judge as ‘the highest authority,’ despite the fact the United States Supreme Court 
was in its thirty-ninth year and had by then handed down over a thousand opinions 
defining the shape of American law. Lord Mansfield was not the only English judge 
guiding Washington. He also looked for support from the precedents of Sir William 
Scott, Lords Ellenborough, Loughborough, Coke, and Sir William Blackstone.28  
          Washington’s regard for the English authorities was not confined to case law. 
In Krumbar v. Burt et al. (1809) he wondered why the legislature of the United 
States had not taken from the English statutes the provisions regarding contingent 
interests in bankruptcy.29 Further in Hurst v. Hurst (1807) he noted that the 
Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds was an exact copy of the English Statute of Frauds 
which entitled him to examine all the English decisions on the issue.30 
          Even if English precedent was available to assist him, Washington also looked 
to the opinions of state superior courts to support the English authorities despite the 
fact that state decisions were merely persuasive authorities, observing in Campbell et 
al. v. Claudius (1817) that he had great respect for the opinions of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas.31 He also followed decisions of the 
New York Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery and, particularly, James Kent, 
                                                          
28 Examples of his reliance on these judges are; Sperry v. Delaware Ins. Co., Penn. October 1808 
(Ocean marine insurance, Sir William Scott); King v. Delaware Ins. Co., 14 F. Cas. 516. Penn. 
October 1808 (Ocean marine insurance, Lord Ellenborough); United States v. Colt, 25 F. Cas. 581. 
Penn. April, 1818 (Embargo bond, Lord Loughborough whose opinion he preferred to that of Sir 
William Blackstone); Ramdulollday v. Darieux, 2 F. Cas. 211. Penn. April, 1821 (Promissory notes, 
Lord Ellenborough); Field v. Joel Gibbs et al., 1 Peters 155. New Jersey. October 1815 
(Conclusiveness of judgments, Lord Coke). 
29 Krumbaar v. Burt et al., 14 F. Cas. 872. Penn. October 1809. 
30 Hurst v. Hurst, 12 F. Cas. 1031. Penn. April, 1803. 
31 Campbell et al v. Claudius, 4 F. Cas. 1161. Penn. October, 1817; Barnes et al. v. Billingham et al., 
2 F. Cas. 858. Penn. April, 1803; Hurst v. Hurst, 12. F. Cas. 1031. Penn. April, 1803; Kingston v. 
Kincaid et al., 14 F. Cas. 590. Penn, April 1806; Hylton v. Brown, 12 F. Cas. 1123. Penn. October, 
1806); Mott v. Maris, 17 F. Cas. 905. Penn. April, 1808; Talbot v. Simpson, 23 F. Cas. 644. Penn. 
October, 1815; Lanning v. London et al., 14 F. Cas. 1123. Penn. October, 1821; Burton et ux. v. 
Smith, 4 F. Cas. 876. Penn. October, 1826. 
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the eminent New York jurist.32 This reliance on non-binding state opinions adds 
further support to the argument that Washington was anxious to explore every 
avenue for material which might help him arrive at a conclusion. However, where 
there was a conflict between state procedure and the English practice, Washington 
preferred the latter. Thus, in Craig (1803) where at an early stage of the organization 
of the federal courts, the circuit courts had adopted a practice of the state courts 
based on the English practice, Washington held it improper to depart from the 
federal court practice because the state’s practice had changed.33 
          Washington also used the persuasive authority of his brother circuit judges. In 
an action for infringement of patent, Washington followed a circuit opinion of 
Justice Story and was affirmed on appeal, Justice Story writing the opinion of the 
Court.34 He followed Story again in Treadwell et al. v. Bladen (1827), another patent 
case.35 In Martin v. Bank of United States (1821) when Washington had to rule on 
the practice of cutting bank notes in half to send parts by different mail, he followed 
an opinion of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, holding that the bank 
could not refuse payment if all parts were produced.36  In the counterfeiting trial of 
United States v. Moses (1827) Washington ruled that the arresting officer should not 
answer the defendant’s request for the name of the informer as to do so would be 
prejudicial to the administration of justice by deterring persons from making 
disclosures of crime. He wrote that he was following a ruling made by Chief Justice 
                                                          
32 Marshall v. Delaware Ins. Co., 16 F. Cas. 838. Penn. April, 1807; Potts v. Gilbert, 19 F. Cas. 1203. 
Penn. April, 1819; United States v. Astley et al., 24 F. Cas. 875. Penn. October, 1819; Ridgway v. 
Underwood, 20 F. Cas. 760. New Jersey. October 1821; Pendleton v. Evans, 19 F. Cas. 140. Penn. 
October, 1823. 
33 Craig, Trenton, New Jersey, April 1803 in Peters, Reports of Third Circuit Cases, 1803-1818, vol. 
1, 1. 
34 Evans v. Hettick, 8 F. Cas. 861. Penn. October, 1818.  Affirmed in 20 U.S. 353. 
35 Treadwell et al. v. Bladen, 24 F. Cas. 144. Penn. October, 1827. Story’s circuit opinion was 
Goodyear v. Matthews, Case no. 5578 in F. Cas. 
36 Martin v. Bank of United States, 16 F. Cas. 885. Penn. October 1821. 
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Marshall in the Virginia circuit court during the trial for treason of former Vice-
President Burr.37 This research has identified only one case in which Washington 
disagreed with a colleague’s circuit opinion. In Beach v. Woodhull (1803) despite 
holding a New Jersey Act to be retrospective and unjust in its operation, Washington 
nevertheless upheld it because it did not infringe the Constitution. He declared 
himself not bound by Justice Chase’s circuit opinion which took the opposite view.38 
          Washington’s reliance on the authorities depended very much on the quality 
of reports of cases cited to him and he highlighted the problem of shoddy law 
reporting in Crawford et al. v. The William Penn (1819), complaining of precedents 
cited to him without a full and accurate report of the case which meant that he could 
not understand counsels’ arguments or the justice’s reasoning.39 
          Despite his experience as a busy advocate, Washington’s opinions do not 
exude the confidence of those of Justices Story, Livingston and Thompson. In Odlin 
v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (1808) Washington set out his approach to 
decision making which was to seek out Supreme Court opinions, state court 
decisions, and English cases upon which to base findings. If he had no guiding 
precedent he was comforted by the fact that, if he was wrong, the Supreme Court 
would correct his error.40 He again publicly expressed his unease in McFadden v. 
The Exchange (1811), deciding that the circuit court had jurisdiction over a vessel 
which had been captured by a French warship and was then in port in Philadelphia 
under French colours. His reversal of the district judge troubled him and he 
wondered if his decision would bear the close scrutiny of the Supreme Court. He 
                                                          
37 United States v. Moses, 27 F. Cas. 5. Penn. October 1827.  
38 Beach v. Woodhull, Trenton, New Jersey, April 1803 in Peters, Reports of the Third Circuit, 1803-
1818, vol. 1, 2. 
39 Crawford et al. v. The William Penn. 6 F. Cas. 781. New Jersey. October 1819. 
40 Odlin v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 18 F. Cas. 583. Penn. October, 1808. 
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wrote, ‘I feel cheered that the error of my judgment, if I have committed one, can 
and will be corrected by a superior tribunal; for surely a question of such national 
importance as this is, ought not, and I hope will not rest upon a decision of this 
court.’ His call for an appeal was accepted by the parties and he was reversed in the 
Supreme Court.41 Again in Consequa v. Williams (1816) he suggested a possible 
correction by the Supreme Court if he was mistaken but the parties compromised the 
suit after Washington had handed down his opinion.42 
          These expressions of uncertainty explain Washington’s constant search for 
support in precedent and his unease in having to decide a novel point without the 
comfort of a binding or persuasive authority.  In Hurst v. Hurst (1807) he was called 
upon to interpret a Pennsylvania statute and, bemoaning the absence of precedent to 
guide him, he wrote ‘This being a case of first impression, and arising out of a state 
law, I have only to regret that it has fallen to the lot of this court to give a 
construction to it, before it has been considered and decided upon by the supreme 
court of this state,’43 He wanted an interpretation by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court upon which to formulate his own view of the law. It is not speculative to 
suggest that Joseph Story would have been delighted to be the first to proffer an 
opinion on a new statute, and that demonstrates the difference in approach between 
the two justices. 
          Washington did not always confine the authorities he followed to those in 
which the facts were materially the same. In the same term in Bond v. The Cora 
(1807), he remarked, ‘But although no certain rule can be established to govern 
every possible case, yet it is proper to refer to former decisions in cases not very 
                                                          
41 McFaden v. The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85. Penn. October, 1811. 
42 Consequa v. Willings, 30 F. Cas. 55. Penn. October 1816. 
43 Hurst v. Hurst, 12 F. Cas. 1031. Penn. April 1807. 
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dissimilar from that under consideration.’ He then followed a Supreme Court 
decision remarking that it ‘does, in all the circumstances, nearly represent the 
present as any I have met with’44 His use of the phrases, ‘not very dissimilar’ and 
‘nearly represent’ suggest a willingness to use a past decision which he believed, 
although not materially the same, was close enough to underpin his opinion. The 
following year in Mott v. Morris, Washington and District Judge Peters doubted 
whether their construction of the law on the question of priority of payment out of a 
bankrupt’s estate was correct, Washington wrote,   
But, as it has been adopted by the supreme court of this state, our respects for the 
talents of that court, and our wish that as little collision as possible should take 
place between the decision of the federal and state tribunals upon the same question, 
will induce us to adopt the same construction.45  
 
Both judges were unconfident but because the state supreme court had reached a 
decision on the point, they followed it for the sake of harmonious federal and state 
jurisdictional relationships. Nowhere in his decision does Washington say that the 
state opinion was correct. 
                    In Hylton v. Brown (1806) he followed a decision reached by Lord 
Hardwicke in Metcalf v. Hervey, 1 Ves. Sr. 248, despite the fact that he did not agree 
with it, simply because he regarded the English decision as ‘an authority binding 
upon us, and is too strong to be got over.’46  At an earlier hearing in Hylton when 
deciding whether two witnesses were required to validate a will made in 
Pennsylvania, Washington found no precedent to guide him so District Judge Peters 
consulted directly and informally with two former state superior court judges to 
ascertain the usual practice. In Delancy v. M’Kenn (1806) Washington again looked 
                                                          
44 Bond v. The Cora, 3 F. Cas. 838. Penn 1807. The Supreme Court precedent was The Blairau ,6 
U.S. 240.  
45 Mott v. Maris, 17 F. Cas. 905. Penn. April, 1808. 
46 Hylton v. Brown, 12 F. Cas. 1129. Penn. April, 1806. 
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for assistance outside the usual channels when, unable to find any ‘adjudged’ case, 
he took to asking the opinions of ‘three gentlemen of the bar,’ not connected with 
the case, whether a copy of a title deed could be proved in evidence.47  Asking 
former judges and members of the bar who had no involvement in the cases is a very 
useful way of assisting the decision making process. However, it was an 
unsatisfactory practice because those outsiders were not called as expert witnesses 
and subjected to questioning on their views. These cases support the view that 
Washington generally felt the need to find some support his opinions, even from 
unorthodox sources, so as not to have the responsibility of interpreting a new statute 
or decide a novel point of law. He felt more confident following principles of law 
well established by others.  
         This view of Washington, as a justice on occasion expressing a lack of 
confidence, is at odds with that of Stonier (1998) who, whilst acknowledging that his 
Supreme Court opinions were ‘modest, even diffident in tone,’ argues that his circuit 
opinions, ‘which usually take the form of his charges to the jury…bespeak the 
confident authority of one who sees himself as the embodied voice of federal law.’48 
While the cases which follow support Stonier’s view of Washington’s rapport with 
juries, the opinions do not confirm the view of a justice of ‘confident authority’ 
when difficult points of law arose.   
          A good example supporting Stonier’s assessment of Washington’s diffidence 
on the Court is to be found in his majority opinion in Ogden v. Saunders (1827) 
when he differed from Marshall on whether a state bankruptcy law passed before the 
execution of a contract was incorporated into the contract. Washington wrote,  
                                                          
47 Delancy v. M’Keen, 7 F. Cas. 371. Penn. April, 1806. 
48 Stonier, 341. 
82 
 
I should be disingenuous, were I to declare, from this place, that I embrace it [my 
conclusion] without hesitation, and without a doubt of its correctness…it must 
remain for others to decide whether the guide I have chosen is a safe one or not.49   
 
          As the sole arbiters of fact, juries were just as important to the court process as 
the judge and a good relationship between the two was essential to the 
administration of justice. Washington’s many comments in the reports show that he 
believed trial by jury to be fundamental to a free society. Its members were drawn 
from all walks of life; that some had experience of commercial life is apparent from 
Washington’s charge in the bill of exchange case of Bell et al. v. Davidson (1818) 
when he remarked, ‘This is a question of account, and the jury will not expect 
assistance from the court; they will examine the accounts, and form an opinion on 
them.’50  
          Despite fully accepting that the resolution of factual disputes lay entirely with 
the jury, where the law was clear and the evidence compelling, Washington 
occasionally charged the jury on the verdict they should return. An example is 
Calhoun v. Vechio (1812) in which he said, ‘This is a very plain case…the plaintiff 
is therefore entitled to a verdict for the principal and interest of his account.’ The 
jurors, as they invariably did, complied with the charge. 51  He was also not averse to 
expressing strong views in a criminal trial. In United States v. Morrow (1827) the 
jury found the defendant not guilty after Washington observed that the counterfeit 
coins were such a miserable imitation of the genuine half dollar as to fool no-one.52 
In Consequa v. Willings (1816) he explained that, contrary to the generally accepted 
practice, he always expressed a view on the facts if they were clear but never when 
                                                          
49 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
50 Bell et al. v. Davidson, 3 F. Cas. 100. Penn. April, 1818. 
51 Calhoun v. Vechio, 4 F. Cas. 1049. Penn. April, 1812. 
52 United States v. Morrow, 26 F. Cas. 1352. Penn. October, 1827. 
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they were in doubt.53 The problem with that approach is that by reserving to himself 
the decision as to whether the facts were plain or doubtful, he usurped the function 
of the jury. That he should take such a forceful line is at odds with his mainly 
cautious attitude to his circuit duties. It would appear that he was more forceful 
dealing with factual issues than novel points of law because Section 22 of the 
Judiciary Act 1789 and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution prohibited, save 
for exceptional circumstances, a review of a finding of fact but directions on law 
were always open to higher scrutiny.   
          There are only two reported cases where Washington refused to accept the 
verdict of a jury. In King v. Delaware Insurance Co. (1808) he ordered a new trial 
because he considered the jury’s verdict a finding of law which they were not 
competent to make.54 He took the same course in Willis v. Bucher et al. (1818), 
observing that the law must be for the judge as if he wrongly interpreted the law, it 
would be open to the Supreme Court to look at his reasoning and correct him. In that 
case he expressed great satisfaction at having to refuse verdicts of the jury on just 
two occasions in sixteen years.55  
          Once a jury had returned a verdict, Washington refused to re-open the case for 
some perceived irregularity. In Harrison v. Rowan (1820) he would not inquire into 
the jury’s deliberations despite affidavits from jurors complaining of undue pressure 
from other members of the jury. He would not tolerate the undermining of a verdict 
solemnly delivered in open court by delving into the secrets of the jury room.56  One 
can understand this approach as there must be some finality to litigation and that 
                                                          
53 Consequa v. Willins, 6 F. Cas. 336. Penn. April, 1816. 
54 King v. Delaware Insurance Co., 14 F. Cas. 516. Penn. October, 1808. 
55 Willis v. Bucher et al. 30 F. Cas. 63. Penn. April, 1818.  
56 Harrison v. Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 663. New Jersey. April, 1820. 
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jurors occasionally have second thoughts ought not to be sufficient reason for re-
opening the issues. The case of United States v. Haskell et al. (1823) brings to life 
the hardships sometimes faced by juries. In this mutiny at sea trial the jury had been 
kept together deliberating for three days and without food for twenty-four hours 
because they were not allowed to separate until they reached a verdict. Washington 
gave instances of the proper and necessary discharge of juries such as exhaustion, 
tampering with a juror, drunkenness or a juror becoming insane, which were 
problems he never faced. 57  
 
Property Rights and Commercial Law on Circuit 
                 The 520 reported circuit opinions of Washington demonstrate how he preserved                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
existing titles to land and ownership of personal property. They also reveal his part 
in securing the economic prosperity of the nation by settling substantive federal law 
and procedural guidance which, in turn, promoted commercial activity.   He used, 
on circuit and on the Court, the constitutional prohibition against ‘the impairment of 
contracts’ to preserve existing and future contractual obligations. His reported 
opinions cover the following branches of law: Maritime, marine insurance, and prize 
law (121); Land disputes and interpretation of wills (94); Mercantile law (78); 
Criminal law (33); Patent infringements (23); Bankruptcy (19); Revenue Duty (11); 
Habeas corpus (6); Slavery (6); Constitutional law (3). There were thirteen opinions 
covering diplomatic immunity, husband and wife, and the duties of trustees but too 
few of each to discern any patterns. The remaining opinions deal with procedural 
issues such as the admissibility of evidence, continuances, dismissal for want of 
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prosecution, competency of witnesses, jurisdiction, costs, and order of speeches 
which show the need for a thorough grounding in procedural as well as substantive 
law if cases were to be concluded efficiently and expeditiously. 
          Many of Washington’s land dispute cases arose because of the manner in 
which lands were described in warrants.  Often there were no man-made boundaries 
and it was difficult to identify natural borders such as mountains, rivers and streams 
in regions little explored, resulting in different claimants to the same land.   His task 
was to bring order and certainty into real property ownership. In his first circuit 
court in Philadelphia he set out his approach to resolving such disputes by declaring 
that title to lands under the Pennsylvania Act of April 3, 1792 required occupancy 
and a bona fide intention immediately to reside on the land either personally or by a 
tenant. Carrying out improvements to the land was not conclusive and was merely 
evidence of an intention to settle.58 He stressed the importance of a warrant holder 
using due diligence in having the land surveyed or he would lose priority over 
another warrant holder who, without knowledge of the earlier warrant, obtained the 
first survey.59 His guidance to occupants of land was designed to ensure that titles 
were not defeated by a failure to observe the technicalities of land law. 
          Milligan v. Dickson (1817) is an example of Washington’s determination to 
uphold existing rights of ownership of land. He had to decide whether he ought to 
approve the practice of admitting in evidence a power of attorney which went to 
proof of title. He declared, ‘This usage forms one of the great and essential 
landmarks of real property in this state; and if titles depending upon it are to be 
uprooted this day, I will not be the judge to commence this work of devastation.’60  
                                                          
58 Balfour’s Lessee v. Meade, 2 F. Cas. 543. Penn. April, 1803. 
59 Gordon v. Kerr et al., 10 F. Cas. 801. Penn. October, 1806. 
60 Milligan v. Dickson et al. 17 F. Cas. 376. Penn. April 1817. 
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In  Huidekoper v. Burrus (1804), he preserved the ownership of land by the then 
occupiers against an argument that settlement of United States land was essential if 
title was to pass. He ignored, when considering persistence in settlement, the failure 
to enter upon the land between 1792 and 1798, because of the real danger to life 
during the Indian wars.61   
          Washington extended his protection of property rights even to those who had 
assisted Britain during the Revolutionary War when, in Gordon v. Holiday (1805), 
he held that the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 avoided all state proceedings, subsequent 
to the treaty, for the confiscation of enemy property. Therefore, an heir was entitled 
to succeed to the land owned by an alien.62 On occasion land titles were challenged 
on the basis that the requisite formalities of transfer or registration had not been 
complied with. Washington refused to interfere with title in Griffith v. Tunckhouser 
(1817) holding that a warrant and survey returned into the land office and accepted 
in Pennsylvania, transferred the legal title, and the regularity of the survey made by a 
sworn officer would be presumed unless the contrary was proved.63   Failure to 
produce the original patent was not necessarily fatal to proving title. In Willis v. 
Bucher et al (1818), he preserved the status quo by charging the jury that an entry in 
the books of the land office in Pennsylvania that the balance of the purchase price 
had been paid by the person ‘to whom the patent had issued’ was evidence that the 
patent had actually been issued. Surveyors were required to enter and trace the land 
after a warrant had been granted. However, Washington, in Torrey v. Beardsley 
(1818) rejected a challenge to a title where the surveyor had traced the lines of the 
tract of land before a warrant for the land had been granted and had applied that 
                                                          
61 Huidekoper v. Burrus, 12 F. Cas. 840. Penn. April, 1804. 
62 Gordon v. Holiday, 10 F. Cas. 798. Penn. April, 1805. 
63 Griffith v. Tunckhouser, 11 F. Cas. 42. Penn. April. 1817. 
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original survey to a later general warrant on un-appropriated land without returning 
to the land to make a fresh survey.64 These cases support the conclusion that the 
Federalist policy of the preservation of existing titles to land was high on 
Washington’s list of priorities. His circuit opinions reveal a determination to 
preserve existing land titles and, by setting out clear procedural rules, to ensure that 
ownership of land did not fail on a technicality. 
          That Washington had more than a passing acquaintance with Pennsylvania 
land law and would be well qualified to field disputed land questions on the Court is 
evident from his reported circuit opinions. Despite the fact that his cases had been 
solely concerned with Pennsylvania and New Jersey titles, principles of land law 
common to other states coupled with the assistance of colleagues from other circuits 
would see him through if asked to write for the Court on this topic. 
          Whilst this thesis, in part, looks to the use to which circuit expertise was put 
on the Supreme Court, Washington’s circuit opinion in Bleeker v. Bond (1819) 
highlights how knowledge gained sitting in the Supreme Court might be put to use in 
the circuit court. In this circuit case Washington was able to bring to bear the 
knowledge he had acquired as a justice who had joined in the majority opinion in the 
landmark Supreme Court case of Fletcher v. Peck (1810).  The Supreme Court had 
ruled unconstitutional a Georgia statute which had sought to avoid fraudulent sales 
in 1795 by corrupt Georgia legislators to land speculators of 35 million acres of 
Georgia land (now the States of Alabama and Mississippi) at rock-bottom prices. 
Some fifteen years later the land had been subdivided and ended up in many 
different hands, some of which were purchasers for value with no notice. It would 
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have been a nightmare situation attempting to unravel so many titles. The Supreme 
Court held the Georgia statute unconstitutional because it infringed Article 1, 
Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution, prohibiting any state from passing a law 
‘impairing the obligation of contracts,’ despite the fact that the original sales had 
patently arisen as a result of bribery.65 This was the first time the Court struck down, 
as unconstitutional, a state statute. By upholding this dubious agreement, the Court 
was sending a clear message to the business community that it would uphold their 
less questionable contracts wherever possible. Washington applied the Fletcher ratio 
to his circuit case and did so with the confidence of a justice who had heard the 
issues fully argued at the highest level.   
          Whilst Washington protected existing proprietary rights, he did acknowledge 
the right of the federal and state governments to acquire private property for the 
general good.  In Bleeker, he gave a glimpse of his political philosophy, and an 
exception to the sanctity of contracts, observing, ‘It is true, that private interests 
must be subservient to the public necessities. This results from the nature of the 
social contract. Under every government…private property may be taken for the 
public good, provided fair compensation be paid for it.’ However, he further 
demonstrated his commitment to the sanctity of contracts when, in Golden v. Prince 
(1814), he held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law which authorized the discharge 
of a contract by payment of a smaller sum at a different time and in a different 
manner than originally agreed on the ground that it impaired the obligation of 
contracts.66 
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          Washington promoted commerce by setting out firm rules governing bills of 
exchange, promissory notes and accommodation bills so that men of business would 
know precisely their rights and obligations in relation to these negotiable 
instruments, the lifeblood of national and international trade. 67  He protected the 
rights of an enemy alien on a bill of exchange holding that, if the debtor knew that 
the alien had an agent in the United States, interest on the bill did not abate during 
the war.68 Meticulous in ensuring that the parties to a bill of exchange abided by the 
original terms he held, in Craig v. Brown (1819), that where a defendant promised to 
pay the amount due under the bill ‘when able’ and the plaintiff did not wait and sued 
immediately, Washington held that the creditor could not afterward resort to the 
promise to pay when able. 
          He extended his promotion of commerce by clarifying the law and procedure 
governing maritime contracts and ocean marine insurance. There were so many such 
cases in the hub port of Philadelphia that definitive statements of law and practice 
were necessary to assist those engaged in this expanding mode of international trade. 
In McGregor v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (1803), he regulated the 
relationship between insurer and insured by holding insurers bound by the terms of 
the contract and unable seek to reduce compensation on a total loss of freight by 
relying on an alleged local custom which was not well known in the trade and which 
was unreasonable.69 He insisted, in Delaware Insurance Company v. Hogan (1807) 
                                                          
67 Humphreys v. Blight’s Assignees, 12 F. Cas. 875. Penn. April, 1803; Perry et al. v. Crammond et 
al, 19 F. Cas. 277. Penn. April, 1804; Corser v. Craig, 6 F. Cas. 601. Penn. April, 1806; Gallagher v. 
Roberts, 9 F. Cas. 1089. Penn. April, 1808; McMurtry v. Jones, 16 F. Cas. 312. Penn. April, 1813. 
                 68 Denniston et al. v. Imbrie, 7 F. Cas. 485. Penn. April, 1818. 
69 McGregor v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 16 F. Cas. 129. Penn. April, 1803. 
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that the terms of a marine insurance policy could not be departed from unless fraud 
or mistake was clearly made out.70 
          The marine insurance issues presenting themselves to Washington were many 
and varied. Avoidance of a policy due to a deviation from an agreed route was a 
common source of dispute. In times of war, vessels were liable to capture by the 
enemy and it was, therefore, important to know the route and port of destination to 
assess the risk and fix a premium. Washington held, in Martin v. Delaware Ins. Co., 
(1808), that the smallest unjustified deviation from an agreed course avoided the 
policy.71  Thus, in Cruder v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co. (1809) he avoided a policy where 
the ship went off course to pick up additional hands, holding that a ship should have 
sufficient hands to man her at the departure port.72 He did, however, admit of 
exceptions to his strict view of these cases and in Coles et al. v. Marine Insurance 
Co. (1812) he found acceptable a deviation to effect essential repairs of storm 
damage or landing to obtain fresh provisions.73 However, in another aspect of 
Cruder, a deviation to effect repairs which were required at the commencement of 
the voyage avoided cover.74  That Washington was sensible of the difficulties facing 
masters of vessels in wartime was demonstrated in Goyon v. Pleasants (1814) by his 
ruling that a deviation to evade enemy British cruisers did not vitiate the policy.75 
          The effect of misrepresentation and the concealment of information which 
would affect the risk in marine insurance contracts was a topic familiar to 
Washington’s circuit court and one which required opinions to guide the conduct of 
                                                          
70 Delaware Insurance Company v. Hogan, 2 Peters 4. Penn. April, 1807. 
71 Martin v. Delaware Ins. Co., 16 F. Cas. 894. Penn. October, 1808. 
72 Cruder v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 6 F. Cas. 921. Penn. October, 1809. 
73 Coles et al. v. Marine Insurance Co., 6 F. Cas. 65. Penn. April, 1812. 
74 See Cruder, n. 74  
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the parties. In Kohne v. Insurance Company of North America (1804) the insured 
failed to disclose to the insurer that his vessel was carrying goods from Cuba to 
Spain despite a prohibition by the British government of a neutral vessel trading 
between a colony and a belligerent mother country. Washington directed the jury 
that the risk of capture and forfeiture had been increased and the failure to give full 
disclosure avoided the policy.76 He came down heavily on fraudulent or negligent 
disclosure of the fate of vessels before effecting insuring. He obviously avoided the 
policy in cases where the insured knew the ship had already been lost and extended 
the bar to recovery in Vale v. Phoenix Insurance Co. (1805) where the plaintiff had 
reliable information which would have led him to believe the ship which had his 
goods on board may well have been lost at sea.77 He sent a clear message to insured 
trading with a belligerent country or carrying goods which infringed the United 
States neutrality laws that, unless they made disclosure of those material facts, the 
insurers would be entitled to vitiate the policies in addition to any forfeiture for 
breach of embargo.78 
          Washington acknowledged the need to deviate from the agreed route to repair 
and re-provision vessels after damage and delays caused by abnormal weather 
conditions so that the ship might resume her voyage or return home. In Ross v. The 
Active (1808) he held that a master was entitled to sell part of the cargo to effect 
essential repairs to the vessel where the owner of the ship also owned the cargo.79 
However, when  a master borrowed money on the security of the ship and cargo 
                                                          
76 Kohne v. Insurance Company of North America, 14 F. Cas. 835. Penn. April, 1804. 
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which enabled the lender to claim the property if the loan and interest was not paid 
upon the ship’s safe return to its home port, the lender had to satisfy the court that 
the loan was necessary for the continuance of the voyage.80  
          He was not the only justice who realized that international trade could not 
flourish unless there were sufficient seamen to man the nation’s mercantile marine. 
He tried cases of misconduct at sea, arising from excessive punishment by the 
master or conduct ranging from mere insubordination to open revolt by the crew. In 
United States v. Smith et al. (1809), he went outside the facts of the case to explain 
carefully to the jury the limits of the master’s authority to correct his seamen and 
their duty of submission to lawful orders. In that case he directed the jury that where 
a master used an unlawful weapon or put the seamen in danger of his life, the 
seaman was entitled to use reasonable force to protect himself.81 On occasion 
unscrupulous masters and owners attempted to avoid paying seamen wages earned. 
Washington was keen to protect the position of the crew by insisting that no charge 
of desertion or absence without leave justifying loss of all or part of the 
remuneration would be accepted unless there was a contemporaneous entry in the 
ship’s log recording the allegation.82 Where in Sims v. Jackson, (1806) a seaman 
hired for a return  voyage from Philadelphia to Batavia died in Batavia, Washington 
affirmed the district judge’s decision to award his widow the full wages instead of 
the half offered by the owners.  Experience and common sense prevailed in Ketland 
v. Lebering (1808) to ensure that the administrators of a deceased received his 
wages. The owners claimed that no-one named John Lebering had served on board 
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their vessel. Washington called for the ship’s muster roll which showed a John 
Lebrun on board. He remarked, ‘We know by everyday experience that a false 
pronunciation of surnames is frequently given, particularly with the abridgment of 
them.’83 Washington again came down on the side of the crew in Girard v. Ware et 
al. (1815). A United States vessel was captured by the British blockading Delaware 
Bay and the crew was forced ashore. After a ransom was paid the ship was permitted 
to proceed to Philadelphia with a new crew, the old crew not being given the option 
to continue the voyage. Washington held that the crew were entitled to wages for the 
entire trip but, in a judgment of Solomon, he held that they had to contribute towards 
the ransom.84 By laying down clear rules as to the conduct of the parties in maritime 
contracts and by protecting those who manned the vessels, Washington was again 
actively promoting commercial enterprises. 
         The above cases reveal how the circuit opinions of this conservative Federalist 
were designed to preserve existing property rights, the obligation of contracts, and 
stimulate national and international trade by setting out guidelines for business 
relationships on land and at sea. This study now turns to the generality of the 
justice’s circuit work, to include not only landmark circuit opinions but also those of 
limited jurisprudential value to ascertain the overall expertise Washington gained 
from the day to day resolution of the many varied legal problems he faced in 
Philadelphia and Trenton. 
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States’ Rights, the War of 1812, and Slavery 
           
          Washington dealt with two important constitutional cases on circuit; one 
involving a state’s attempt to deny by force the authority of a federal court and the 
other a state’s determination to protect its natural resources against outsiders. He 
also delivered many opinions resolving competing claims to captured merchant 
vessels and warships before and during the 1812 War between the United States and 
Britain and settled the fate of vessels attempting to breach United States embargo 
and neutrality laws. Although he dealt with a small number of slavery cases, the 
opinions do permit an insight into his approach to this troubled issue. The opinions 
reflect the deep tensions facing the nation in its formative years. 
          The constitutional cases were United States v. Bright (1809) and Corfield v. 
Coryell (1823).85 Bright was a case in which Washington resisted severe local 
pressure when holding that no state had the power to defy an order of a federal court. 
The dispute concerned competing claims for prize money in respect of the captured 
British sloop, The Active. Gideon Olmstead and other Connecticut sailors had been 
captured by the British during the Revolutionary War and were forced to serve on 
the sloop. Olmstead and his mates managed to gain control of the sloop and while en 
route for New Jersey it was captured by a Pennsylvanian warship. Both captors 
claimed the sloop as a prize of war and a  jury of the Pennsylvania state admiralty 
court, without stating any facts, gave Olmstead a mere quarter share. Olmstead then 
took his case to the court of appeal in prize cases, set up by Congress under the 
Articles of Confederation and he was awarded the whole of the prize. The state court 
refused to acknowledge the award and in 1779 the three quarter share was paid to 
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the state treasurer. As late as 1802, Olmstead took action in the federal district court 
to enforce payment of the full share he had been awarded twenty-three years earlier. 
District Judge Peters found in his favour whereupon the Pennsylvania legislature, in 
open defiance of the federal court order, passed an act ordering the treasurer’s 
representatives to pay the three-quarter share into the state treasury. The Supreme 
Court issued mandamus compelling Judge Peters to enforce his order. General 
Michael Bright and his militia, on the express orders of the governor, assembled 
outside the home of the treasurer’s representatives with muskets and fixed bayonets 
and resisted the efforts of the federal marshal to enforce the district judge’s order. 
The general and his men were subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for 
resisting United States law and tried by Washington, Peters, and a jury. With local 
sentiment running high in favour of the defendants, Washington took charge of a 
potentially explosive situation. The defendants argued that the federal court had no 
jurisdiction to reverse a jury verdict of a state court and that they had been acting 
under the direct orders of the state governor. Washington charged the jury that the 
Supreme Court in Penhallow v. Doane (1795) had established that an appellate prize 
court had the power to reverse a state admiralty court on findings of fact and law and 
that was settled and at rest.86 He was emphatic in his charge to the jury that no state 
had the power to declare the judgments of the national courts null and void because 
the Constitution had declared United States law to be the supreme law of the land. If 
that were not so, government would be undermined and liberty curtailed and the 
threat of physical violence with potentially terrible consequences was a monstrous 
reaction which could never be justified. 
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          The jury returned a special verdict which placed the responsibility of the 
verdict on Washington’s shoulders. They found that the defendants had resisted the 
federal marshal but had done so on the orders of the governor, leaving the court to 
decide whether acting on superior orders was a defence to the indictment. 
Washington had no hesitation in holding that the threatened use of force to resist a 
lawful federal court order was no legal justification as the general and his men had a 
paramount duty to the Union and not to the state governor. Taking the view that 
obedience to the governor was a mitigating factor, he imposed modest sentences 
which were never served, the situation having been defused by President James 
Madison’s immediate grant of pardons. The case illustrates the tensions between 
state and federal authorities and how, on occasion, the circuit court tried disputes 
with potentially nationwide repercussions. It also demonstrates how important it was 
to have a justice presiding who had the courage and determination to uphold the 
Constitution, the Union, and the authority of the federal courts against intense state 
pressure. 
          Bright was not the only case in which Washington vehemently condemned 
those resisting federal authority. In United States v. Lowry et al. (1808) three armed 
defendants threatened to kill a deputy federal marshal who had served on them court 
orders for possession of land. Sentencing each man to three months imprisonment, 
Washington said, ‘the courts of justice are the sanctuaries of the law; and it is 
through the law that that the government speaks and acts. Impair by any means…the 
power of these tribunals…and you attack the majesty of the law…and the 
foundations of the republic.’87 
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          His other major constitutional opinion arose much later in his tenure and is 
probably the most important case he tried on circuit. Corfield v. Coryell (1823) 
turned on the constitutionality of an 1820 Act of Assembly of the State of New 
Jersey prohibiting non-residents of the state from gathering oysters in New Jersey 
waters from May to December. He gave his opinion after much thought as the legal 
issues were argued in the October 1823 term and the opinion was not handed down 
for six months. The case was important for two reasons. First, Washington had to 
decide whether the prohibition contravened Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution 
which conferred on the citizens of each state ‘all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states.’ Second, and because the vessel seized and condemned 
had been hired out with its coastal licence to a citizen of Pennsylvania, it was argued 
that a state prohibition usurped the power bestowed upon Congress by virtue of 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution ‘to regulate commerce…among the several 
states.’ These constitutional challenges gave Washington the opportunity to expound 
his view of the purpose, meaning, and effect of the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
          The most important privileges and immunities enumerated by Washington 
were:  
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire 
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject to such 
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole; the right 
of a citizen to pass through or reside in any other state for the purpose of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to 
institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are 
paid by other citizen of the state.88 
 
The list is not exhaustive but includes the crucial freedoms, echoing the rights to, 
‘Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness’ enshrined in the Declaration of 
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Independence. This early attempt at defining the ‘privileges and immunities’ clause, 
unusually for a circuit court opinion, was extensively cited by the Supreme Court in 
the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases when considering the meaning of the ‘privileges and 
immunities’ clause of the 1808 Fourteenth Amendment.89  
          In Corfield Washington stressed the importance of engendering mutual 
friendship and intercourse among the citizens of the different states of the Union but, 
in the event, held that the state law was not unconstitutional because the oyster beds 
were the common property of the citizens of New Jersey whose legislature had the 
power to regulate the use of such a natural resource. Washington disposed of the 
privileges and immunities argument by similar reasoning, holding that any fishery or 
oyster bed was as much the property of the individual who owned it as was any dry 
land he owned. Therefore, it was lawful for the state legislature to pass laws 
protecting such ownership against others whether they were fellow citizens or 
outsiders. A state legislature can never be compelled to extend to citizens of other 
states the rights which belong exclusively to its own citizens. To have held 
otherwise would have undermined the right of a state to control assets owned in 
common by its citizens. This case was one of the few occasions when Washington in 
a circuit opinion threw his normal caution to the wind and expressed himself 
forcefully on an issue of supreme national importance. 
          Bright and Corfield demonstrate how important the federal circuit courts were 
not only to the development of American law but also to the resolution of potentially 
dangerous tensions between the federal government and a state, and significant 
competing claims between states. A state prepared to use violence to defy an order 
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of the United States Supreme Court and attempts by outsiders to use the natural 
resources of a sovereign state were issues which required determination by a judge 
who had Supreme Court status and not by a local district judge upon whom the 
pressures would have been far greater. These two cases and the 1812 War cases 
which follow show the wisdom of Congress in sending justices out on circuit 
anticipating that not all of their functions would be straightforward. 
          The bulk of Washington’s circuit work comprised maritime law, prize cases 
and marine insurance of which there are one hundred and twenty one reported 
opinions. Prize cases alone account for twenty-four of the maritime cases.90 During 
the war between the United States and Britain from 1812 to 1815, 1634 British 
vessels were taken as prizes by Americans, 1500 of which were sent with prize 
crews to American ports but it is estimated that half were recaptured en route by 
British privateers.91 Much of Washington’s maritime work arose as a result of the 
Embargo Act of December 22, 1807 passed by Congress as a counter measure to 
repeated violations of United States neutrality by Britain and France who were 
seizing American vessels and impressing crews. The Act prohibited any ship leaving 
a United States port for a foreign port. In fact the embargo hit the United States 
harder than it did the European powers and American manufacturers and farmers 
suffered great hardship because of the total ban in imports and exports. Ships were 
idle and seamen out of work. Because of widespread opposition, on March 1, 1809, 
the Embargo Act was replaced by a Non-Intercourse Act which confined the ban to 
trade with Britain and France. Section 2 of the 1807 Act required all masters or 
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owners of vessels to give a bond with sureties to a local collector for double the 
value of the ship and cargo guaranteeing that she was bound for another American 
port. Merchants and ship owners devised ways of evading the embargo despite 
heavy penalties and unsuccessful attempts resulted in an appearance before Justice 
Washington fighting to avoid the forfeiture of vessel and cargo. 
          Washington saw through desperately spurious excuses quite easily. In United 
States v. The Paul Sherman (1815), the master of a vessel took on board cargo at a 
port where trade was prohibited. He then sailed into a U.S. port ostensibly to land 
men saved from a wreck. Washington, in rejecting, the master’s story observed, 
‘The illegality of the transaction is attempted to be concealed by a drapery too thin 
to impose on the most credulous mind.’92 He did, however, examine each case 
scrupulously. Thus, in Parker v. United States (1806) he reversed the district court’s 
condemnation of a vessel for breach of embargo when he reasoned that forfeiture 
could not be claimed after the vessel had arrived within the jurisdiction of a foreign 
power and he refused forfeiture in United States v. Dixey et al. (1811) when he was 
satisfied that a vessel bound from Philadelphia to New Orleans struck the Bahama 
Bank and was obliged to put into Havana for essential repairs.93 Further, in United 
States v. Morgan et al. (1811) he held an embargo bond void because it was more 
onerous than the Act.94  
          Washington’s opinions are invariably expressed in measured and moderate 
language. However, in one prize case, he expressed his anger when he perceived an 
injustice which he felt unable to remedy. In Armroyd et al. v. Williams et al. (1811) 
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a French admiralty court condemned as a prize an American vessel on the ground 
that she was in violation of the Milan Decree by which Napoleon prohibited all trade 
with Britain. Washington upheld the forfeiture but with the utmost reluctance, 
complaining that the regular order of things had been disturbed by the ‘violence and 
rapine of the belligerents’ [Britain and France]. He wrote, ‘we sicken with disgust in 
giving the appellees the benefit of a general principle of law which complies 
submission to so daring assault on our neutral rights.’ Despite his anger at the action 
of the French court, he felt constrained to reach his holding because it was a 
competent court of the law of nations and its decisions, however unpopular, were 
binding. His view was that it was for the courts to follow the law of nations and for 
the government to protect its citizens.95 That opinion was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, also believed the French decree 
to be subversive of the law of nations but not one which the Court could examine.96 
The attitude of Washington and the Court, through Marshall, is indicative of a new 
nation which, notwithstanding the unreasonable and unjust actions of powerful 
European countries, was not prepared to be known as a republic unwilling to 
subscribe to international law doctrines, however distasteful the circumstances. 
          Despite their maritime differences, France, Britain and the United States were 
as one in their desire to stamp out the slave trade.  The Act of March 22, 1794 
prohibited any citizen or resident of the United States from equipping vessels within 
the United States to carry on the trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country. 
Despite the fact that there are only six reported slavery opinions delivered by 
Washington on circuit, three of those cases give an insight into Washington’s 
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approach to the issues. In Tryphenia v. Harrison (1806), he dealt with an allegation 
of breach of the 1794 Act. Two French women were aboard a brig with their two 
slaves for whom they had paid passage from St. Thomas to Havana. The district 
court found the brig to be in breach of the Act but Washington reversed the district 
judge, holding that the slaves were not carried for sale but as attendants. 
Notwithstanding his condemnation of the slave trade as ‘this inhuman and 
unjustifiable traffic,’ he then distinguished between those free Africans then being 
transported into slavery and those already in bondage. He wrote, ‘why should 
congress prohibit the carrying of persons, already slaves in one of the West Indian 
Islands, to be sold in another? The situation of these unfortunate persons cannot be 
rendered worse by this change of situation and masters.’97 This view of African 
slaves as personal property was to be echoed, as described earlier, when justifying 
the sale of his slaves in 1821.  
          There are two of Washington’s reported cases in which slaves achieved 
freedom. In Butler v. Hopper (1806) Washington held that a former Member of 
Congress from South Carolina who lived, attended by his slave, both in South 
Carolina and Pennsylvania, had breached the Pennsylvania Act of 1780 which 
prohibited the holding of a negro in the state unless registered under the Act. The 
Act provided exemptions for the domestic slave of a member of Congress or of a 
person passing through or sojourning in the state without becoming a resident. 
Washington charged the jury that the ‘owner’ could not claim either exemption 
because he had been out of Congress for two years and was a resident of 
Pennsylvania as he lived in each state for half of the year. The slave was declared a 
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free man.98 Similarly in Ex parte Simmons (1823) another slave who resided with his 
master in Philadelphia for a period in excess of six months, with no attempt to return 
him to the plantation in Charleston until his application to the court, was held by the 
jury, on Washington’s charge to be free under the provisions of the same Act.99 The 
two opinions in favour of freedom resulted from clear breaches of statutory 
provisions and are examples of the justices’ very limited success in the area of 
domestic slavery. 
          Washington’s expertise in specific areas of law was gained from his practice 
at the Bar and from his work on circuit.100 What remains to be examined is the 
extent to which this expertise was put to use in the Supreme Court majority opinions 
he was assigned to write and any shifts in jurisprudential attitude from circuit court 
to Supreme Court. His Supreme Court opinions are sparse when compared with his 
circuit output. Unlike the 520 surviving reported circuit opinions which comprise 
only a fraction of Washington’s opinions, every Supreme Court opinion he delivered 
was recorded in the United States Reports. The first twenty-seven volumes of those 
reports show that during his thirty one years on the Court Washington wrote, when 
compared with John Marshall and Joseph Story, a modest eighty opinions. Eight 
were handed down seriatim, two were dissents, two concurred with the majority, 
and the remainder he wrote as the opinion of a unanimous Court or on behalf of the 
majority. His opinions covered the following topics:- twenty-three maritime, prize 
and marine insurances cases; eleven land disputes; ten cases with a contract and 
mercantile background; nine constitutional law cases; six wills or intestacy disputes; 
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five criminal cases; two infringement of patents; and one slavery case. The 
remaining opinions settled procedural issues such as the admissibility of evidence, 
whether an action was statute barred or how many counsel were permitted to argue 
on each side of the case. 
          Washington’s two dissents were delivered with great reluctance. He believed 
dissenting opinions weakened the authority of the Court as shown by his urging 
Justice Story not to dissent in what he described as ‘ordinary cases’ because it ‘was 
of no benefit to the public.’101 In Mason v. Haile (1827) he announced his custom of 
never dissenting when he disagreed with the majority unless considering important 
constitutional issues.102 This public admission was made at the end of his tenure. If 
he had gone public whilst President Jefferson was in office it would have provided 
him with much needed ammunition with which to attack Marshall’s departure from 
the seriatim opinions of his predecessors. The problem with this approach is the 
difficulty in defining ‘ordinary cases.’ There are so many cases which do not raise 
‘important constitutional issues’ case but which are of sufficient significance to 
merit a dissenting view. It is clear that his reluctance to dissent arose solely from his 
wish that the Court present a united front to the nation. 
          In Mason, he was unable to accept the majority view that the states had the 
right to regulate or abolish imprisonment for debt retrospectively as it altered the 
contractual position of debtor and creditor and, therefore, infringed the contracts 
clause of the Constitution. In dissenting, Washington demonstrated the rigid 
adherence to the sanctity of existing contracts he had adopted in his circuit opinions. 
His only other dissent occurred in Lambert’s Lessee v. Payne (1805) when 
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abandoning his usual strict interpretation of words used in legal documents, he 
sought to look with indulgence at technical words used by a testator unused to legal 
phrases, but his was the lone voice.103 It is easy to understand his dissent in Mason 
which was a case with constitutional implications. However his dissent in Lambert’s 
Lessee is more difficult to comprehend as it was a case which affected only the 
immediate parties and was contrary to his custom expressed in Mason.  
          Washington concurred in the landmark case of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward (1819). The New Hampshire legislature enacted laws upheld by the New 
Hampshire Superior Court placing appointments to the college board in the hands of 
the state governor, effectively nationalizing a private institution in the early days of 
a nation dedicated to free enterprise. The college had been established by a Crown 
Charter in 1769. Controversially, John Marshall held the charter to be a private 
contract between the college and the Crown. It followed, therefore, that the 
legislation was unconstitutional, contravening the prohibition on a state passing laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts. Marshall cited no authorities to support his 
view that the charter was a contract, boldly declaring that, ‘It can require no 
argument to prove the circumstances of this case constitute a contract.’ Washington, 
troubled that such an assertion had been made devoid of any supporting precedent, 
took the unusual step of filing a concurrence which cited United States and English 
decisions supporting Marshall’s view. Justice Story took a wide entrepreneurial 
approach, seeking to bring all corporations and charters within the protection of the 
contracts clause, whereas Washington believed that it should cover only institutions 
such as the college.104 This case illustrates Washington’s commitment to promoting 
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commerce through the contracts clause but confirms the ‘moderation’ described by 
Story in his eulogy by severely limiting the category of institutions entitled to 
protection under Article One, section 10.  
          Washington again emphasized that commitment to contractual obligations in 
the constitutional case of Green v. Biddle (1823), delivering the majority opinion 
refusing an application for a rehearing. Virginia had by compact surrendered to the 
United States land which later became the state of Kentucky but restricted 
Kentucky’s right to interfere with any titles already granted by Virginia. Washington 
held, as Justice Story had on the original hearing, that Kentucky’s legislation 
restricting the titles granted by Virginia was an infringement of the obligation of 
contract.105 
           Washington wrote for the Court on slavery on just one occasion when, in 
1824, the Court rejected the argument that the Acts of 1794, 1810, and 1818 to 
suppress the slave trade were limited to a prohibition against bringing into bondage 
persons who were free in their own country. The district court of Alabama had 
confiscated a vessel and cargo, which included slaves, for contravening the Acts by 
transporting, on an American vessel, slaves from one slave holding country to 
another. Washington affirmed the district judge but, following his circuit court 
opinions and his view of slaves as mere ‘property,’ he wrote for the majority that 
those existing slaves on board who were passengers ‘to be delivered to their owners 
or to those to whom they had been consigned,’ should be returned to their owners.106  
          Save for Washington’s opinion in Ogden v. Saunders (1827) his contribution 
to bankruptcy and insolvency law on the Court was small. In that case the Court 
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pondered whether the federal government had exclusive powers in bankruptcies. 
Congress had been given authority, in the Constitution, to establish uniform 
bankruptcy laws throughout the Union but had not exercised the power. 
Washington, for the majority, held a New York bankruptcy law to be within the 
Constitution on the narrow ground that it had been enacted before the contract had 
been entered into and would have been in the parties’ contemplation and, therefore, 
did not impair the contract. Washington expressed his respect for ‘the wisdom, the 
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body’ and declared that he would 
always presume that legislation complied with the Constitution unless the contrary 
was proved ‘beyond all reasonable doubt.’107 This was an admission further 
supporting an unwillingness to look at existing laws with a critical eye.   
          One of Washington’s few patent cases, Evans v. Jordan (1815), sheds light on 
Marshall’s opinion assignment practice. Marshall did not sit because it was an 
appeal from his circuit opinion and Washington was the senior associate whose view 
clearly coincided with the majority. During the course of his opinion he revealed 
that he had dealt with the same point on his circuit. His seniority coupled with 
knowledge of the specific point of law made him the ideal candidate for the task. It 
is difficult to imagine a failure to mention his familiarity with the issue before being 
asked to write the opinion.108  
          Because civil disputes formed the major part of the Court’s work, there were 
few criminal cases to be assigned by the Chief Justice. Washington authored only 
five. One is relevant because it highlights a way in which the circuit court shaped 
American law. In United States v. Kelly (1826), Washington merely stated that the 
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Court was considering a division of opinion from the judges of the Pennsylvania 
circuit court. In his circuit opinion, however, he made it clear to counsel that he and 
the district judge had reluctantly given a definition of the crime of revolt because 
other judges had done so on circuit. He believed it was for Congress to define the 
offence, so he invented a division of opinion to have the law clarified by the Court. 
In the event he gave the opinion of the Court, and, emboldened by his brethren, he 
had no hesitation in declaring that the Court was competent to define the offence.109  
 
Conclusion 
          Washington was an extremely cautious justice, almost entirely dependent on 
the doctrine of precedent for guidance as to what his opinion should be; unhappy 
when he was faced with a novel point of law and overly concerned about the view 
the Supreme Court would take if his rulings were taken on appeal. That his defining 
jurisprudence was the need for certainty and uniformity of federal law is supported  
by his opinion in United States v. Bright of the ‘miserable’ condition facing any 
community disregarding precedent. He felt constrained by legal principles in 
Croudson & Ors. v. Leonard even though he accepted injustice would arise, taking 
the view that a judge should not usurp the function of government by remedying 
injustices in the law. He was firmly of the view that a judge was duty bound to 
follow the law and not consider the effect on the parties as he did in Scriba v. 
Insurance Company of North America and in Kirkpatrick v. White et al.  His refusal 
to investigate alleged irregularities in jury deliberations and his obvious pride in 
declaring that he disagreed with his juries only twice in sixteen years are further 
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examples of an inflexible approach to the administration of justice. (King v. 
Delaware; Willis v. Bucher; Harrison v. Rowan; United States v. Haskell et al.). 
          In Ogden v. Saunders, Washington felt compelled to follow the earlier 
decision of Sturges v. Crowninshield , in which he had concurred, despite believing 
it to have been wrongly decided. This approach, for the sake of unanimity, was also 
evident in his advice Story not to dissent because it weakened the Court’s authority 
and also by his remark in Mason v. Haile that he never disagreed with the majority 
unless it was a constitutional issue. It is further supported by only two dissents in 
thirty years; once in Mason and the other in Lambert’s Lessee v. Payne which was 
not even a constitutional matter.  
          In his search for support Washington and the other justices looked for 
guidance to the small number of federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions; to 
state laws and, in particular, to the decisions of the English courts and the text-books 
of the English jurists. Washington was more reliant than his colleagues on the 
decisions of English judges and Lord Mansfield, in particular, whom he regarded as 
the highest authority. (Ferguson v. Zepp; Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer and Barnes v. 
Billingham). His reliance on English law and practice was such that, in Craig, where 
state law conflicted with English law, he preferred the latter. Washington readily 
adopted the opinions of other circuit courts even though of only persuasive 
authority. (Treadwell et al. v. Bladen; Martin v. Bank of United States, and United 
States v. Moses). On occasion he was so keen to find cases to guide him that he 
looked at decisions based on facts of which were not materially the same as those 
under consideration, as he did in Bond v. The Cora. His uncertainty was apparent in 
Mott v. Maris where he followed a state court decision about which he had doubts. 
In Hylton v. Brown, unable to find any direct authority, the court approached 
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informally two retired judges for advice. Further, in Delancy v. M’Kenn, 
Washington sought the advice of counsel unconnected with the case. These cases 
show the lengths to which he went to form an opinion. 
          His public expressions of doubt as to the correctness of his opinions in cases 
such as Odlin v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; McFadden v, The Exchange 
and Consequa v. Williams give the impression of a judge constantly looking over his 
shoulder to the Supreme Court and are in stark contrast to his robust indications to 
juries on factual issues which were not open to appeal and to his firm handling of the 
politically explosive cases of Bright and Corfield. 
          Criticisms of Washington’s narrow interpretation of statutes, his rigid 
dependence on the doctrine of precedent, his uncertainty, and his lack of concern of 
the consequences to the parties of his opinions should be balanced against the 
undoubted benefits of stability which precedent brought to his circuit court. This 
meant that industrious counsel, willing to research the authorities, would have been 
well placed to advise their clients on the reasonable prospects of success of their 
litigation. 
          Because of his extensive grounding at the Bar and on the circuit bench, 
Washington approached his maritime opinions for the Court with more confidence 
as those cases generally depended on findings of fact rather than difficult points of 
law. He, alone, had to decide whether to accept or reject excuses for breaches of 
embargo or revenue laws. He was quick to see through spurious defences (United 
States v. The Paul Sherman) but willing to refuse forfeiture where the explanation 
appeared reasonable. (Parker v. United States; United States v. Dixey et al; United 
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States v. Morgan et al.). Overall, his enforcement of the embargo laws was more 
even-handed than his brother Story. 
          Washington’s protection of existing property rights was demonstrated in 
Milligan v. Dickson when he refused to overturn many titles to land on a point of 
evidence and in Gordon v. Holiday he safeguarded from confiscation the title of an 
heir to an enemy alien. Generally his approach to land disputes was pragmatic and 
he waived minor irregularities whenever he could in order to preserve the status quo. 
(Griffith v. Tunckhouser; Huidekoper v. Burrus; Willis v. Bucher et al; Torrey v. 
Beardsley) 
          Washington’s conservative Federalism was also evident in his promotion of 
commerce by the rules he laid down governing bills of exchange and promissory 
notes (Craig v. Brown; Humhries v. Blight’s Assignees; Perry et al. v. Crammond et 
al; McMurtry v. Jones) and by his clarification of the law and procedure governing 
maritime contracts and marine insurance (McGregor v. Insurance Company of 
Pennsylvania; Delaware Insurance Company v. Hogan; Vale v. Phoenix Insurance 
Co). 
          Corfield v. Coryell and United States v. Bright were the two most significant 
circuit opinions Washington wrote. Not only do they reveal momentous 
constitutional issues facing the union, they show why it was prudent to have 
Supreme Court justices ride circuit to deal with such politically sensitive matters. 
The opinions are also notable because they present the normally diffident 
Washington in a new light. In Corfield, his restricting to its citizens the right to 
harvest the state’s natural resources and his willingness to break new ground by a 
bold interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution reveal 
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a justice determined to preserve property rights. In Bright, by vehemently 
condemning a state’s use of force to defy an order of a federal district judge, he 
made it plain that federal law was supreme and would be enforced. 
          Washington’s view of his slaves as mere items of personal property was 
evident in his approach to the one opinion on slavery he wrote on circuit, in 
Tryphenia v. Harrison, when he was unable to see the harm to slave, sold to another 
master on a different Caribbean island. It is fair to observe that he strictly enforced 
the prohibition placed on the international slave by the Act of 1794 and declared 
slaves free for clear registration and residence breaches of the Pennsylvania 1780. 
Otherwise he had no impact on the plight of those already held to slavery within the 
United States. 
          In short, Washington’s jurisprudence is well illustrated by his many surviving 
circuit opinions. His approach was dominated by precedent which provided the 
stability and uniformity he sought, despite occasional injustices. His opinions, whilst 
sometimes expressing uncertainty, reveal the importance to him of the supremacy of 
the national government and federal justice and the need for unanimity on the 
Supreme Court. They also disclose a resolve to preserve existing property rights and 
to seek economic prosperity by shaping contract law to promote inter-state and 
international trade.  
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Chapter Three                                                                  
Brockholst Livingston: Consolidating Mercantile Law 
 
          Despite holding office as a justice of the New York State Supreme Court for 
five years and of the United States Supreme Court Justice for sixteen years, 
Brockholst Livingston is one of the lesser known associate justices of the Marshall 
Court and has been largely ignored by scholars. There has been no book-length 
biography and so little has been written about his life and cases that it is difficult to 
discern his jurisprudence without an examination of his state, federal Second Circuit 
and Supreme Court opinions. This will allow a discovery of his role in the resolution 
of the political and economic issues of the period and reveal how he developed the 
law to meet such challenges. Special attention will be paid to his time as presiding 
justice of the Second circuit and to those opinions he delivered which helped to 
shape the commercial law of the United States between 1802 and 1823.   
          The source of all references to Livingston in biographical dictionaries is a 
twelve page sketch written by Gerald T. Dunne in 1969 with four additional pages 
setting out the text of one New York and one Supreme Court opinion.1 Dunne had 
earlier edited and commented upon ten letters passing between Livingston and 
Justice Story between 1812 and 1822 which touched upon circuit and Supreme 
Court business.2  That is the extent of the scholarship on this Supreme Court Justice 
as no-one has taken up Dunne’s call, forty-six years ago, for a biography of a man 
who had close connections with the ‘Revolution, the evolution of the first political 
parties, the emergence of an authentically American corpus of commercial law, and 
                                                          
1 Gerald T. Dunne, ‘Brockholst Livingston,’ in Friedman & Israel (eds.) The Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court, 1789-1969, vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1969), 387-403. 
2 Gerald T. Dunne, ‘The Story-Livingston Correspondence,’ The American Journal of Legal History, 
vol. 10 (1966), 224-236. 
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the institutional development of the Supreme Court under a Federalist Chief Justice 
with Democratic-Republican associates.’3   G. Edward White’s description in 1988 
of Livingston as ‘the third of the “silent” Justices of the Marshall Court’s cohesive 
years,’ may explain the reluctance of scholars to study him.4 Whilst Livingston was 
not amongst the first rank of the Marshall Court justices, for White to describe him 
as ‘silent’ and to place him with Justices Todd and Duvall does him a great 
disservice. This examination of all of his reported opinions from three jurisdictions 
begins a response to Dunne’s suggestion for further research and demonstrates not 
merely a supportive acquiescent role on the Court but an active participation in the 
shaping of the substantive and procedural constituents of United States business law.  
 
The Early Years: Political Allegiances: From Federalist to Republican  
          Livingston was born in New York City on the 25 November 1757 into one of 
the most distinguished and wealthy New York families, his father having been 
governor of New Jersey during the Revolution. Livingston was graduated B.A. from 
the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University) in 1774, with fellow student, 
James Madison, later to become the fourth president of the United States. His plan to 
study law was interrupted by service in the Continental Army. Having attained the 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel at just 21 years of age, he served as an aide to General 
Benedict Arnold and witnessed the surrender of General John Burgoyne in 1777. 
Coming from such a privileged background it was only to be expected that he would 
support Federalist ideals.   
                                                          
3 Dunne, ‘Brockholst Livingston,’ 397. 
4 G. Edward White, A History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vols. III-IV: The Marshall 
Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 327. First 
published by Macmillan Publishing Company in 1988. 
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          His adherence to the Federalist cause came under intense pressure between   
1779 and 1782 while serving as private secretary to his brother-in-law, John Jay 
because of the extreme personal animosity between the two men. Livingston, who 
had an explosive temper, was frequently insolent towards his brother-in-law, and 
often made disparaging remarks about Congress to foreigners.5 This does not appear 
to be as a result of disillusionment with Federalist policies but more due to his 
extreme dislike of his brother-in-law. Jay, a leading Federalist was then United 
States Minister to Spain and later, in 1789, the first Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. He had been sent abroad in 1779 to obtain recognition and 
economic aid for the United States and when, in 1782, Jay left for France to 
negotiate the treaty which ended the Revolutionary War, Livingston returned home.  
On the voyage from Spain, Livingston’s vessel was intercepted and he was captured 
by the British. Upon reaching New York he was held there for a time as a prisoner of 
war but was set free upon giving his parole to a British General, Sir Guy Carlton, a 
decision which required a letter of explanation to President Washington.6 The 
capture by the British in 1804 of a vessel in which Livingston had a substantial 
financial interest and her subsequent condemnation by a British Admiralty court 
caused him great inconvenience and an anxious wait of nine years before he 
                                                          
5 Whilst in Spain, Livingston’s sister Sarah (John Jay’s wife) wrote to their father of her ‘discontent 
& disgust’ at her brother’s ‘insolent’ treatment of her husband and his bad behaviour generally, and 
of his disparaging remarks about the Congress to foreign visitors. In her letter she refers to ‘my 
brother’s temper I always knew to be irritable to an unhappy excess.’ Letter, Sara Jay to William 
Livingston, Madrid, 24 June 1781 in Landa M. Freeman, Louise V. North and Janet M. Wedge, (eds.) 
Selected Letters of John Jay and Sarah Livingston Jay (Jefferson, North Carolina: MacFarland and 
Company Inc., Publishers, 2005), 107-108. 
6 Friedman & Israel, vol. 1. 388. 
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recovered his losses after suing his insurers.7 It was a further event which did not 
endear him to Britain. 
          Upon his release Livingston began reading law in Albany under Peter Yates. 
Yates was an anti-Federalist delegate to the Continental Congress who spoke against 
ratification of the Constitution, and who later was appointed a state judge of the 
Western District of New York. While there is no evidence to suggest that Yates 
sought to bring Livingston within the Republican fold, he would have been exposed 
to his master’s extreme political views. Livingston was admitted to the Bar in 1783, 
practising in New York until his appointment to the New York Supreme Court in 
1802.  He had an extensive practice at the Bar and in one murder case was co-
counsel with Alexander Hamilton, later Secretary of the Treasury, and Aaron Burr 
whose main claim to fame, apart from killing Hamilton in a duel, was his 
appointment as Vice-President of the United States and subsequent trial for treason. 
          That Livingston had also been involved in at least two duels and had actually 
killed his opponent in a contest in New York in 1798 was not seen as a bar to his 
political or legal ambitions.  His proficiency in law, his powerful family 
connections, and his ties to the wealthy of the City brought him success despite his 
lack of self-control.  His relationship with John Jay further deteriorated when, in 
1785, Jay sued and obtained judgment against Livingston for repayment of a loan 
and, during the course of the proceedings, accused him of insulting and libelling him 
whilst serving as his private secretary in Spain. The rift never healed.8  Livingston 
served as a Federalist on the New York Assembly between 1786 and 1789 and his 
                                                          
7 Livingston & Gilchrist v. Maryland Insurance Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch), 506 (1813). A jury found 
against Livingston in the Maryland Circuit Court but the Supreme Court (which Livingston has just 
joined but recusing himself) ordered a new trial on the ground of the justice’s misdirections. 
8 Walter Stahr, John Jay (New York: Hambledon & Continuum, 2005), 231.   
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political and professional prospects were enhanced when on July 5, 1789, he 
delivered the first Independence Day oration in St. Paul’s Church, New York to an 
audience which included President Washington and members of Congress.  
           Jay, having served three years as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, and tired of riding circuit, ran for the governorship of New York State in 
1792. It was a bitter campaign and he was narrowly defeated. Livingston and others 
had argued successfully that crucial and potentially decisive votes cast for Jay in 
Otsego County should not be counted because they had been delivered by a sheriff 
whose commission had expired. This led Livingston’s sister (Jay’s wife) to complain 
that she felt that he had disgraced the Livingston name by his opposition to his 
brother-in-law.9  It is clear that within a few short years Livingston would have a 
political party, led by Jefferson and Madison, to further his ambitions and to support 
in his vendetta against Jay.  
          Jay was elected governor in 1795 and was re-elected in 1798 despite 
Livingston’s open and vocal support for opponents in both elections. One of the 
principal features of the ten year treaty Jay negotiated with Britain in 1794 was the 
strengthening of trade between the two countries. Although passed by the Senate and 
ratified by President Washington, the treaty was opposed by Republicans in every 
state, fearing that close links with monarchic Britain would undermine 
republicanism. They favoured France in the European wars and Jefferson’s hatred of 
Britain was such that he hoped that the French would invade England to establish 
liberty and republicanism throughout the island.10 Livingston echoed Jefferson’s 
                                                          
9 Freeman, Selected Letters. Letter, Sarah Jay to John Jay, 10 June 1792, 211. 
10 Henry Augustine Washington, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. IV (New York: Derby & 
Jackson, 1859). 118. 
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sentiments by roundly condemning the treaty during Jay’s 1795 election campaign, 
support which was noted by the future President and rewarded in 1807.11 
          Livingston’s political prevarications were not unusual. Justices William 
Johnson, Story, and Thompson were disappointments to the Republican presidents 
who had nominated them because of their failure to uphold state sovereignty 
vigorously and by generally falling in line with the Federalist agenda of the Marshall 
Court. These changes in political allegiance cast light on the political fluidity of the 
period when earlier expectations of how the Constitution would be interpreted had 
yet to be met. However, Samuel Chase’s conversion to Federalism from fierce 
opposition to the Constitution because it infringed state sovereignty was due in large 
measure to his wish for federal judicial office.12 
          A good illustration of swings in political affiliations is that of the fourth 
president, James Madison. His drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
coupled with his crucial role in the Virginia Ratification Debate placed him as a 
committed Federalist supporting the notion of a strong national government with 
authority over the states.13 The first clear evidence of political change is his 
opposition to an all-powerful central authority contained in an essay he wrote in 
1792 labelling members of his former party as the ‘anti-Republican party,’ and as 
‘stupid, suspicious, licentious’ and ‘accomplices of atheism and anarchy.’14 The 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, passed in the aftermath of the French Revolution 
                                                          
11 Timothy L. Hall, ‘Henry Brockholst Livingston,’ in Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical 
Dictionary (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2001), 56. 
12 James Haw & Ors., Stormy Patriot: The Life of Samuel Chase (Baltimore: Maryland Historical 
Society, 1980), 174-175. Stephen B. Presser, Studies in the History of the United States Courts of the 
Third Circuit (Washington D.C: The Bicentennial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, 1982), 37-38. 
13 Jack N. Rakove (ed.), Madison: Writings (New York: Library of America, 1999). Involvement in; 
Framing and Ratifying the Constitution, 357-358; Federalist Papers Nos. 41-46 226-272; Virginia 
Ratifying Debate (Judicial Power), 393-400; Constitutional Amendments (Bill of Rights), 437-452. 
14 Ibid, ‘Who are the Best Keepers of the People’s Liberties?’ 532-534. 
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and war with France were designed to strengthen national security but were misused 
by the Adams administration and the federal courts to prosecute Republicans who 
ventured to criticize the president or members of his government.15  
          Madison countered the misuse of those acts with an anonymous drafting in 
December 1798 of the Virginia Resolution against the Alien and Sedition Acts 
declaring them to be unconstitutional and asserting the right of states to ‘interpose 
for arresting the progress of the evil.’16 Having been elected president in 1807 
Madison moderated his extreme views and attempted to strike a balance between the 
power of central government and respect for the powers of the states.17 Whilst 
Madison is an extreme example, it does reveal how political views can change when 
new responsibilities are assumed, whether it be the presidency or high judicial 
office. It explains why justices after appointment might be more concerned with the 
stability of government underpinned by a viable judicial system rather than fulfilling 
party expectations. The fact that, by virtue of Article III, Section 1 of the 
Constitution, the justices held office during good behaviour gave them the 
independence to act in a manner they believed beneficial to the nation, unlike many 
state judges whose tenure depended upon the whim of the legislature, party backers, 
and the electorate. 
          Livingston’s ability as a lawyer aside, a seat on the state Supreme Court 
seemed likely through family connections as Edward Livingston was mayor of New 
                                                          
15 Section 2 of an Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, approved July 
14, 1798 in Richard Peters, (ed.), The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, vol.1 
(Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1845), 596-597. 
16 Virginia Resolution approved by the Virginia House of Delegates December 21, 1798 in Rakove, 
Madison: Writings, 589-591. Jefferson went further in his draft of the Kentucky Resolution by 
actually threatening nullification and suggesting that legislation deemed by the states to be 
unconstitutional ‘might drive these states into revolution and blood,’ This was the way in which he 
acted even while Vice-President under John Adams. See Merill D. Peterson, Jefferson: Writings 
(New York: Library of America, 1984), 453-454. 
17 First Inaugural Address in Rakove. Madison: Writings, 681. 
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York and three Livingston in-laws, Thomas Tillotson, Morgan Lewis and Smith 
Thompson were, respectively, Secretary of State of New York, Chief Justice and 
Associate Justice of the New York Supreme Court. In the event his elevation was 
due to Republican and not Federalist patronage. Following his support of Republican 
candidates and opposition to John Jay, Livingston helped carry New York for 
Thomas Jefferson during the presidential elections of 1800 and he spoke publicly for 
Jefferson and against President John Adams. Jay’s son, Peter, recorded that 
Livingston, as voting took place, ‘made speeches to the mob, though he himself was 
one of the candidates.’18 It would appear that the transition from Federalist to 
Republican was complete. 
 
Commercial Law for New York State 
          In 1802 Livingston joined family members Morgan Lewis and Smith 
Thompson on the bench of the New York Supreme Court. He had the good fortune 
to have as a colleague on that bench, James Kent, one of the greatest legal minds of 
his generation which will have greatly enhanced the experience. The New York 
Supreme Court consisted of a Chief Justice and four associates which, when all 
justices sat, enabled the handing down of a majority opinion. The law reports reveal 
that on occasions because a justice was absent through illness, or a recently 
appointed justice had not heard the arguments of counsel, or had been counsel in the 
case, no opinion could be delivered because the court was evenly divided. In 
Jackson v. Horton (1805) the problem of an equally divided court was overcome by 
counsel turning the dispute into a special verdict for determination by the Court for 
                                                          
18 Letter, Peter A. Jay to John Jay, 3 May 1800 in Stahr, John Jay, 360. 
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the Correction of Errors, much in the same way as a disagreement between federal 
circuit and district judge was placed before the United States Supreme Court on a 
certificate of division of opinion.19 
          A very dubious method of resolving the embarrassment of an equally divided 
court occurred in Jackson v. Munson (1806), a case involving land forfeited for 
adhering to the enemy. The case is extraordinary for a breach of the protocol that a 
justice who had appeared for a party in the court below should play no part in the 
appeal. The reports of George Caines and William Johnson contain numerous 
examples of recusals for this specific reason. Despite the convention, Justice 
Spencer, who had appeared earlier as counsel for the Defendant, broke the deadlock 
by holding in favour of his former clients, deciding that they were entitled to 
compensation for improvements to land. He may well have come to the correct 
decision but justice was not seen to be done. He regretted delivering an opinion 
remarking that he did so ‘reluctantly.’ His remorse would have been of little 
consolation to the losing plaintiff.20 
          The law reports of Caines and Johnson give the names of the justices who 
gave the opinion of the court, who concurred and of those who dissented. However, 
those reports reveal that a greater number of the opinions were delivered per curiam 
(by the court) without naming any justice. For example between May and October 
1811 of a total of 304 opinions handed down only 19 were attributable to specific 
justices. Justice Livingston wrote 149 opinions whilst on the New York Supreme 
Court and, when considered with the 47 reported cases from the Second Circuit 
between 1808 and 1822 and the 38 majority opinions, six concurrences, and eight 
                                                          
19 Jackson v. Horton, Caine’s Reports. Vol. 3, 202. August 1805. 
20 Jackson v. Munson, Johnson’s Reports, vol. 1, 283. May 1806. 
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dissents he delivered in the United States Supreme Court, provide a reasonable 
insight into his jurisprudence. An examination of the significant output from his time 
on the state court reveals his own vision for the development of the law, his attitude 
towards jury verdicts, and the dynamics of decision making in New York at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century as well as his grounding in all aspects of 
commercial law. 
          The New York Supreme Court judges were kept extremely busy. Not only did 
they hear appeals, like the United States Supreme Court justices, they were obliged 
to ride circuit and this they did throughout New York State trying, generally with a 
jury, civil and criminal cases at first instance. The judges also sat on the New York 
Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors which heard appeals 
from the state supreme court and the chancery court. There was no separation of 
powers within the Court for the Correction of Errors which was predominantly a 
political body, comprising the Lieutenant Governor, members of the New York 
Senate, the Chancellor and the justices of the state supreme court.   
          This hierarchy made it possible for a judge to try a case on circuit, sit on the 
appeal or writ of error to the state supreme court and, finally, be permitted to explain 
his reasoning to the Court of Correction of Errors but not have a say in the final 
outcome.21 An examination of the state court opinions reveals numerous instances 
where judges not only sat on appeals from cases they tried at first instance but also 
gave the opinion of the state supreme court affirming their original ruling. This, as in 
the United States Supreme Court, was considered perfectly acceptable and the only 
time a judge refrained from delivering an opinion was when he had a financial 
                                                          
21 New York Constitution, 1777, Article 33. 
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interest in the outcome, was related to one of the parties to the suit, or had been 
counsel in the case at first instance. 
          Article 25 of the New York Constitution of 1777 provided for the continued 
use by state courts of British statute and case law which had been adopted by the 
colony prior to April 19, 1776, subject to any amendments by the state legislature. It 
follows, therefore, that the New York State Supreme Court reports are dominated by 
constant favourable references to the decisions of British judges and writers. The 
reports reveal that Hale, Blackstone, Lords Mansfield, Holt, Ellenborough and 
Kenyon, were generally held in high regard by Livingston and Thompson.22 This 
was to be expected given that the legal education of lawyers of this period was based 
on Hale’s Pleas of the Crown and Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England. Livingston was willing to follow post-1776 British authorities remarking 
in the marine insurance embargo case of Penny v. New York Insurance Company 
(1805) that he was willing to adopt the English rule despite it being post Revolution 
and not on the grounds of authority but merely because it was the most reasonable 
approach to the problem.23 He did not always follow English decisions. In Leroy v. 
Lewis (1803) Livingston pointedly announced that he had not founded his judgment 
on a British decision but on a former decision of the state supreme court.24 
          When dealing with admiralty and marine insurance cases Livingston was 
quick to protect insurance companies by examining carefully potentially fraudulent 
claims such as the subsequent insuring of a vessel lost at sea and spurious 
                                                          
22 The law reports of the New York Supreme Court and the Court for the Correction of Errors upon 
which this aspect of the research is based comprise: George Caines, 3 vols. May 1803-November 
1805, 3rd ed. revised by William G. Banks (New York: Banks and Bros. Law Publishers, 1883-1885); 
William Johnson, 3 vols, 1799-1803 and 20 vols, 1806-1823. These two law reporters cover the 
periods on the state court by Justice Livingston, 1802-1806 and Justice Thompson, 1802-1818. 
23 Penny v New York Insurance Company, Caines, Vol III, August 1805. 157. 
24 Leroy v. Lewis. May 1803. Caines, 175. 
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explanations for route deviations. Thus in Watson v. Delafield (1804) he sent out a 
clear warning that a partner who knew that a vessel had been lost was under a strict 
duty to inform the other partner of the crucial fact to prevent him from arranging 
ineffective insurance.25  His expertise in marine insurance was gained by dealing 
with issues such as the seaworthiness of a vessel at the beginning of a voyage; 
whether a mere intention to deviate from an agreed route avoided the policy; who 
was to pay for seamen’s wages and provisions after capture by the enemy; and the 
duty to insure a vessel against the need for repairs on voyage. The list is not 
exhaustive as the reports reveal all manner of maritime issues. What is clear is that 
he was well prepared to deal confidently with admiralty matters upon his elevation 
to the Marshall Court.  
          Livingston’s state opinions on commercial law underpinned the status of 
partnership which he believed to be crucial to the development of trade and industry, 
being aware of the need to protect one partner against the fraud or incompetence of 
another. In Green v. Beals (1804) he held that one partner could not execute a bond 
without the express authority of the other as this would permit him to dissipate the 
partnership assets, declaring that it would otherwise render partnerships more 
dangerous than they were already and might even discourage them altogether.26  He 
continued this theme in Casey v. Brush (1805) by refusing to allow a claim by one 
partner against another in respect of a ‘joint transaction’ when the other had not 
expressly consented to the venture.27 The protection thus afforded by the court 
                                                          
25 Watson v. Delafield, November 1804, Caines, Vol. II, 224. See also Livingston v. Delafield. Caines 
vol. III. p. 53 which turned on the question of whether the insured knew that the vessel had already 
perished. 
26 Green v. Beals, Caines, vol II. November 1804, 255. 
27 Casey v. Brush, Caines. Vol II, February 1805, 295. 
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would allay the fears of and reassure the competent and careful member of a 
partnership. 
          Trade and the maintenance of government revenue required a substantial body 
of federal officials to supervise all aspects of commercial life from seizing goods 
shipped in breach of embargo or non-intercourse laws or the avoidance of customs 
duties to the inspection of foodstuffs to ensure they were fit for human consumption. 
In Henderson v. Brown (1803) a revenue collector was sued personally for trespass 
when he levied execution on a theatre which was wrongly described as a dwelling-
house in a list he had been given. Thompson held the collector liable but Livingston 
favoured the majority view that a government official should not be held liable for 
the mistakes of his superiors and be put in a position where he looked to his 
employers for ex gratia recoupment.28 He confirmed his belief that public officials 
acting in good faith should be protected in Seaman v. Patten (1805) when observing 
that the court would protect from liability government employees who acted 
mistakenly but honestly in the performance of their duties. In that case an inspector 
wrongly condemned a quantity of beef. Livingston directed the jury that the 
inspector should not be held liable unless he acted with malice as it ‘seems cruel not 
to protect them when they act with integrity.’29 Thus, a trader who had suffered loss 
due to the incompetence of an honest official had no redress. 
          Justices, whether on state or federal courts, generally tried cases with a jury 
and the verdict, if disputed, fell for review before the state supreme court and later 
the United States Supreme Court. The jury system was the cornerstone of the United 
States justice system and, as far as criminal trials were concerned, that crucial 
                                                          
28 Henderson v. Brown, May 1803.Caines, vol. I, 94. 
29 Seamen v. Patten, Caines, vol. II. February 1805. 314. 
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protection of the citizen was enshrined in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. 
Most judges considered the verdict of a jury, in civil and criminal cases as 
sacrosanct and were reluctant to inquire into the jury’s deliberations, not welcoming 
evidence of misconduct. Justice Washington, as has been noted earlier, announced 
that in sixteen years sitting on circuit in Pennsylvania a jury had reached a verdict 
contrary to the opinion of the court on two occasions only.30 Furthermore, 
Washington in Harrison v. Rowan refused to look into affidavit evidence from jurors 
complaining that they had been pressured by other jurors to reach a verdict. 
Washington would not interfere with a verdict solemnly delivered in court.31  
           Judges burdened with heavy dockets would not wish to re-open cases, some 
of which had been determined after lengthy argument and consideration. Livingston, 
however, did not believe that juries were infallible and was prepared to hear of 
irregularities in their deliberations, and, in obvious cases, would set aside the verdict 
and order a new trial. Thus, in Smith v. Chetham (1805) he delivered the court’s 
opinion setting aside a jury’s verdict of damages in a libel action condemning it as a 
verdict based on ‘chance or lot’ and not one based on ‘reflection.’ In that case a 
constable supervising a jury in retirement reported that the jury could not agree on 
an appropriate award of damages so each juror put forward his figure and the 
aggregate was divided by twelve. Livingston’s concern was that litigants were 
entitled to a verdict based on the evidence and if they could not rely on jurors doing 
their duty, they might resort to more intemperate means of obtaining redress. In the 
course of his opinion Livingston took the opportunity of rehearsing the many 
instances, both in the United States and England where verdicts had been set aside 
                                                          
30 Willis v. Bucher. 30 F. Cas. 63 (Penn. April 1818). 
31 Harrison v. Rowan, 11. F. Cas. 663 (New Jersey, April 1820). 
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because of jury misbehaviour including the case of Mellish v. Arnold in which the 
jury decided whether $200 or $300 was appropriate by tossing up a cross and a 
pile.32 
          In the same month Livingston, for the court, set aside another jury verdict in 
the land dispute of Brandt v. Ogden, describing it as palpably wrong and against the 
weight of the evidence. The jury had disregarded the evidence of four wholly 
independent witnesses and had preferred the evidence of a single witness who had 
an interest in the outcome of the proceedings.33  In Smith v. Chetham, when referring 
to judges’ unwillingness to question surprising jury verdicts, Livingston wondered 
‘why judges are so tender of the jury.’34 The use of this phrase indicated that he 
recognized that jurors were not above human frailty and he was not was prepared to 
treat all jury verdicts as inviolable. It may also reveal a lack of faith in the jury 
system from one whose wealthy background gave him a sense of superiority and the 
confidence to question the ability of ordinary citizens to properly evaluate evidence 
and put aside prejudices.  His willingness to overturn jury verdicts sets him apart 
from his brethren. 
          When considering the range of cases which form the basis of Livingston’s 
experience on the New York Supreme Court between 1802 and 1806, it is important 
to look beyond the 149 opinions he handed down because in five years he sat on 
over 1,000 cases covering virtually every conceivable point of law. He will have 
participated in the many per curiam opinions and listened to the arguments in and 
heard and contributed to the opinions delivered by fellow justices. In Livingston’s 
                                                          
32 Smith v. Chetham, Caines. Vol. III. May 1805. p. 58; Mellish v. Arnold, Bumb. 51. 
33 Brandt v. Ogden, Caines, vol. III. 10. May 1805. 
34 Smith v. Chetham, supra, 60. 
128 
 
final year on the court, opinions were delivered on 252 cases.35  It follows that 
Livingston’s expertise extended far beyond the points of law involved in his own 
opinions and his New York apprenticeship well prepared for him the challenge of 
the Marshall Supreme Court.  Justice Livingston came to the Marshall Court in 
February 1807, bringing with him his experience as an advocate and five years as a 
puisne and appellate associate justice of the New York court and considerable 
experience in commercial and admiralty law.  
 
A Republican on a Federalist Supreme Court 
          President Jefferson was determined to fill any vacancies on the Supreme Court 
with committed Republicans in an effort to balance its political composition and to 
ensure that the Court did not rival the legislature and the executive in power and 
influence. Although Jefferson considered Livingston as a possible replacement for 
Justice Alfred Moore in 1804, he nominated the more experienced William Johnson 
of South Carolina. When a vacancy arose in 1807 upon the death of Justice William 
Paterson, Jefferson had no hesitation in naming Livingston who had demonstrated, 
by his political activity in New York, that he was a man dedicated to the Republican 
cause. Upon appointment Livingston went on the Second Circuit which meant that 
in addition to his sittings in Washington on the Supreme Court, his previous New 
York state circuit travels were extended to include Connecticut and Vermont. He, as 
did other circuit justices, suffered the physical hardship associated with travelling 
circuit. Apart from the discomfort of travelling many miles on very poor roads, he 
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was on one occasion badly injured. He wrote to Justice Story in 1813 that he was 
suffering violent persistent headaches arising from a stage coach accident.36 
          Livingston’s federal circuit opinions will have run into many hundreds but 
only a very small number have survived to the Federal Cases, in turn extracted from 
the reports of Elijah Paine Jnr published in 1827.37 Paine’s reports contain only one 
case from the April 1813 term at Connecticut despite the fact that the lists were long. 
This was revealed in letter written by Livingston to Joseph Story at the end of that 
term in which he wrote, ‘I have had a very busy term in Connecticut & have no 
doubt laid the foundation for some trouble for yourself and my other brethren at 
Washington.’38 Also there are only four Vermont cases reported, through the whole 
of Livingston’s tenure, strongly suggesting the absence of a law reporter in that 
district. The remaining reported cases are almost equally divided between New York 
and Connecticut. This lack of reporting of federal cases in the early years contrasts 
sharply with the abundance of law reports emanating from the New York Supreme 
Court who had appointed George Caines as its law reporter in 1804. He was the first 
official law reporter anywhere in the United States.39 The United States Supreme 
Court did not appoint an official law reporter, Henry Wheaton, until 1817.40 Despite 
the paucity of reported federal circuit opinions of Livingston, there is a sufficient 
                                                          
36 Letter, Livingston to Story, 23 April, 1813 in Dunne, ‘Story- Livingston Correspondence,’ 226. 
37 Elijah Paine Jnr., Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit Court of the United 
States for the Second Circuit: Comprising the Districts of New York, Connecticut and Vermont, Vol. 
1 (New York: R. Donaldson, 1827). 
38 Gerald T. Dunne, ‘The Story-Livingston Correspondence, American Journal of Legal History, 
Vol.10. No. 3 (1966), 224-236, 226. 
39 Gaines produced three volumes of law reports covering decisions from May 1803 to November 
1805. He was succeeded by William Johnson who between 1806 and 1822 edited 20 volumes of New 
York Supreme Court reports. www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/History/page_24.htm (accessed 
12/08/2013).  James Kent believed that Gaines was incompetent and appointed Johnson who proved 
to be an excellent law reporter. (John H. Langbein, ‘Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal 
Literature, Columbia Law Review, vol. 93. No. 3 (1993) 547-594, 575 & 578-9).  
40 Erwin C. Surrency, ‘Law Reports in the United States,’ American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 
25, No. 1 (1981) 48-66, 56. 
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number when taken with his state court opinions to discern patterns of court business 
as the reported cases appear to have been written up at random covering most 
branches of law and including cases both significant and ordinary. 
          President Jefferson had hoped that the appointment to the Court of Republican 
William Johnson in 1804, followed two years later by the anti-Federalist Livingston 
would go some way to curb what he saw as the excesses of a Federalist dominated 
Court. Whilst Justice Johnson pleased Jefferson by delivering dissents and separate 
concurrences, he had the temerity to censure an executive order of the President in 
an 1808 embargo case in the circuit court at Charleston. This incurred the wrath of 
the President and his Attorney General, Caesar A. Rodney. Jefferson distributed 
widely to the press the Attorney General’s opinion undermining Johnson’s decision.  
Rodney wrote to Jefferson complaining that Johnson had ‘enlisted fairly under the 
banner of the Judiciary, and stands forth the champion of all the high church 
doctrines on the Bench.’ He referred to what he perceived as a Federalist stance 
taken by Johnson in that case as a ‘disease’ and further protested that ‘you can 
scarcely elevate a man to a seat in a Court of Justice before he catches the leprosy of 
the bench.’ Rodney wished to know whether the President wished him to use the 
press to further undermine Johnson.41 This typical reaction of President Jefferson 
and his Attorney General reveals not only the political pressures faced by justices on 
circuit but also the complete failure of some politicians to understand or accept the 
concept of an independent judiciary. 
                                                          
41 The Charleston circuit case was; Ex parte Gilchrist, Federal Cases no. 5420. Letter of Attorney 
General Rodney to President Jefferson, October 31, 1808 Jefferson Papers MSS cited in Charles 
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 1 (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 
1926), 336-337. 
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          The President suffered further disappointment when Livingston deserted the 
Republican cause, reverting to the Federalist principles of his youth. It is reasonable 
to argue that Livingston’s hatred of the arch-Federalist John Jay and support of any 
person who opposed Jay gave the impression that he had espoused a new political 
philosophy when, in fact, the protection of existing property rights, the promotion of 
commercial activity, and the need for a strong federal government were Federalist 
ideals he never abandoned. 
          Jefferson’s nomination having been confirmed by the Senate on December 13, 
1806, Livingston went from the highest court in the state to the nation’s highest 
tribunal, taking his seat on the Court in the February 1807 term. He brought with 
him a confidence flowing from five years as a New York State trial and appeal court 
judge. It was a confidence readily apparent to Story who, whilst still an advocate, 
saw him in action in Washington just one year later. Despite the fact that Story was 
generally fulsome in his praise of all others, Livingstone made a particularly deep 
impression on him. Story, having spent a day observing the Court in action, wrote to 
a friend in 1808, describing the new justice, and future colleague, as ‘a very able and 
independent judge. He evidently thinks with great solidarity and seizes on the strong 
points of argument. He is luminous, decisive, earnest and impressive on the 
bench.’42 Livingston’s experience on the state supreme court was clearly much in 
evidence. He was not the timid new boy. 
          Livingston’s opinions have a refreshing lack of prolixity and an absence of 
convoluted language. Unlike many of his colleagues, he kept his opinions short and 
the content clear. His use of language is what one might expect of a much later age. 
                                                          
42 Letter, Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay, February 25, 1808, in William W. Story, Life and Letters 
of Joseph Story, Vol.1 (London: John Chapman, 1851), 167. 
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A good way of illustrating his crisp and clear style is by contrasting his approach to 
an issue upon which there has been no definitive legal precedent with Justice 
Washington’s much lengthier plaintive discourse. In the New York circuit court 
bankruptcy case of Adams v. Story, Livingston wrote, ‘’After all that has been said, 
the court considers this question as one of considerable difficulty and regrets that it 
has not yet received a decision at Washington, which would produce uniformity of 
judgment; at least in the courts of the United States.’43 In the Pennsylvanian circuit 
case of Odlin v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (1808) Justice Washington when 
faced with the absence of legal authority wrote,  
It is admitted that this precise case has never received a judicial decision in 
any courts of Great Britain or the United State, although it has been 
frequently glanced at by the judges; from whom, however, nothing beyond 
hints of their opinions can be collected. We are sensible of the difficulty of 
the question, as well as its importance to the parties, in this and other similar 
cases; we derive consolation, however, from reflecting that our opinion, if 
wrong, is subject to revision elsewhere.44 
 
The difference in style, language, and brevity is marked. Washington is more 
representative of judicial opinion writing of the time, although the impression he 
gave of a lack of confidence, expressed on more than one occasion, is not.45  
          Livingston’s opinions were further enhanced by his elegant humour which 
was shown at its best in his dissent in the New York Supreme Court case of Pierson 
v. Post (1805), a decision which retains a place in the textbooks of American law 
students today. The case involved a dispute over the ownership of a fox pursued by 
one man and slain by another who came in at the end of the chase. Thompson, 
Livingston’s brother in law and the justice who was to replace him on the United 
                                                          
43 Adams v. Story, 1 F. Cas. 141 (New York. April 1817).  
44 Odlin v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 18 F. Cas. 583 (Penn, October 1808). 
45 McFaden v, The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85 (Penn. October 1811). ‘I feel cheered that the error of my 
judgment, if I have committed one, will be corrected by a superior tribunal.’; Consequa v. Willings, 30 
F. Cas. 55 (Penn. October 1816). ‘I shall not be afraid of adding another precedent, leaving it to the 
Supreme Court, where I perceive this cause is likely to go, to correct this court, if I am wrong.’ 
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States Supreme Court, gave the Court’s opinion in favour of the man who killed and 
carried away the fox. Livingston began his dissent by observing that the case ought 
to ‘have been submitted to the arbitration of sportsmen, without poring over 
Justinian, Fleta, Bracton, Pufendorf, Locke, Barbeyrac, or Blackstone, all of whom 
had been cited.’ As to the character of the fox, he continued, ‘Both parties have 
regarded him, as does the law of nations, as a pirate. His depredations on 
farmers…have not been forgotten…Hence …our decision should have in view the 
greatest possible encouragement to the destruction of an animal so cunning and 
ruthless in his career.’46  He was more able to express humour in a case of little 
moment pursued by men with money to spend and time on their hands. 
          Livingston spent his entire tenure of the circuit court sitting in New York City; 
New-Haven and Hartford in Connecticut; and Burlington, Rutland and Windsor in 
Vermont. He was fortunate in having the same district judge sitting with and 
supporting him in each seat throughout; Elijah Paine in Vermont and Pierpoint 
Edwards in Connecticut. District Judge William P. Van Ness sat with Livingston for 
thirteen years in New York.47 The district judges who were obliged by Congress to 
be local residents were familiar with and would make the circuit judge aware of 
local trade customs and specific problems.  
          Constitutional cases were rare on circuit and there are only two reported 
decisions touching upon the constitutionality of state laws. In Fisher v. Harnden 
(1812), a New York grand jury found an indictment against Fisher, a British subject, 
that he had adhered to the enemies of the state and in October 1783 judgment was 
                                                          
46 Pierson v. Post, 3 Gai. R. 175 (1805). 
47 The names of and dates of service of the district judges and the court venues are taken from Edwin 
C. Surrency, Federal District Court Judges and the History of Their Courts. This is a privately printed 
essay entitled, ‘History of the Federal Courts Pamphlet #1, 1996 which in turn is based on a 
combination of the following essays; 1. 28 Missouri Law Review, 214 (1963) and; 2. 40 Federal 
Research Division, 139 (1966). 
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signed forfeiting all of his real and personal estate. Fisher died in 1798 leaving his 
heirs, also British subjects, in possession of his land. However, by the Treaty of 
Peace between the United States and Great Britain signed on 3 September 1783 any 
confiscation proceedings after the signing of the act were void. Livingston having 
charged the jury that the adoption of the treaty by the United States operated as a 
repeal of state law and the judgment was void, the jury found for Fisher’s heirs.48 
The opinion illustrates a shift in Livingston’s political ideology in that, despite his 
background as a state judge and politician, he did not seek to impose upon the case 
the Republican tenet of state sovereignty and acknowledged the supremacy of 
federal law over state legislation unless it violated the federal Constitution. 
          Livingston took the opposite view in his other constitutional case, Adams v. 
Story (1817). This was by far the most important opinion Livingston wrote whilst on 
circuit and the only case in which Livingston expressly regretted the absence of 
Supreme Court precedent.49 In that case Livingston upheld the right of New York 
State to pass an insolvency law which discharged debtors from liability in respect of 
debts contracted either before or after the passing of the act, and which purported to 
bind out of state creditors. In so doing, by emphasizing the differences between 
bankruptcy and insolvency, he rejected arguments that the state law was in effect a 
bankruptcy measure contravening the right of Congress to ‘establish a…uniform law 
on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.’50  He also refused to 
accept the proposition that the state insolvency law was an unconstitutional 
impairment of the obligation of contract.51 He used his opinion as a means of 
exploring the historical context justifying the granting of relief to debtors from the 
                                                          
48 Fisher v. Harnden, 9 F. Cas. 129 (New York, April 1812). 
49 Adams v. Story, supra, n.7. 
50 Article1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. 
51 Article1 .Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States. 
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time of the first colonists from Britain until its universal adoption by every state of 
the Union. He felt very strongly about the issue believing that if there was no relief 
from debt and imprisonment for debt, the debtor would sink under the burden and 
make no effort to begin anew and contribute to the general good. This opinion was 
music to the ears of Republicans as Livingston was asserting the right of a state to 
legislate without federal government interference unless in clear violation of the 
federal Constitution. 
          However this particular Republican tendency was short lived. His feeling was 
not sufficiently strong to compel him to dissent when the same issue was dealt with 
by the Court in Sturges v. Crowninshield two years later. Chief Justice Marshall, 
writing for a unanimous Court, held that a state law expressed to grant relief to a 
debtor in respect of debts accruing before the passing of the law was an impairment 
of the obligation of contract and therefore unconstitutional.52 He was less 
forthcoming as to whether the sole power of passing bankruptcy laws resided in the 
states or in Congress. Prefacing his remarks with the phrase, ‘Without entering 
further into the delicate inquiry,’ he limited himself to holding that until Congress 
passed uniform bankruptcy laws, the states were not forbidden to pass a bankruptcy 
law provide it did not infringe the Constitution. He did not think it necessary to rule 
on whether the law in question related to bankruptcy or insolvency.  
          The ‘delicate’ nature of the inquiry was revived in Ogden v. Saunders (1827), 
which, whilst it occurred after Livingston’s death, is examined because it reveals the 
judicial compromises in Sturges. When Justice Johnson delivered the Court’s 
opinion in Ogden he felt the need to explain how the justices had reached a decision 
in the earlier case. He wrote that the Court in Sturges was ‘greatly divided in its 
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views of the doctrine, and the judgment partakes as much as a compromise as of a 
legal adjudication. The minority thought it better to yield something than risk the 
whole.’53 The minority he referred to were those justices who supported the right of 
states to pass bankruptcy laws, of which he was one, having so held on circuit, and 
Livingston, another, because of the views he expressed in Adams v. Story.  The 
compromise was the willingness of Johnson and Livingston to join in the holding of 
impairment of contract in return for the remaining justices agreeing that the states 
had the power to pass bankruptcy laws, at least until Congress exercised that power. 
The case shows that, rather than acting as Jefferson had hoped, as a thorn in the side 
of a Federalist dominated Court, Livingston was prepared to acquiesce in the general 
view, despite his own feelings, in an effort to strive for that unity which would 
enhance the authority of the Court in the eyes of the nation. 
          There is a pattern to the six reported criminal cases which Livingston tried on 
circuit. The cases reveal a strict interpretation of the criminal law in favour of a 
defendant, particularly in cases where death would follow conviction. In thirteen 
years, Livingston presided over many criminal cases, the details of which have not 
survived because of the lack of a law reporter. One must always exercise caution 
before reaching conclusions on such a very small sample. We know, however, that 
the six surviving reports of criminal cases, taken with some other circuit opinions, 
reveal a jurisprudence founded, wherever possible, on a compassionate view of men 
and their failings.54  
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          Livingston also demonstrated a pragmatic perspective in two revenue cases 
with a commercial law aspect. He reversed forfeiture orders made by district judges 
accepting, in one case that shippers had entered goods in the New York customs 
house at less than the correct quantity because the goods had been packed in haste in 
France due to a real danger of pillage by advancing Prussian troops.55 In the other 
case he took the view that a valuation of imported goods based on the cost of raw 
material, labour and shipping as opposed to the likely sale price was a sufficient 
estimate worth as to avoid forfeiture for breach of customs law.56 Lest it be thought 
that Livingston was gullible, the manner of his rejection of some of the more bizarre 
explanations of masters for route deviations in maritime embargo cases shows him 
to be an astute observer of human nature. 
          There were fourteen maritime cases in the forty-eight reported circuit 
opinions. By far the most revealing is United States v. The James Wells (1808) in 
which Livingston was not disposed to accept a master’s explanation for breaching 
the embargo by arriving in the West Indies instead of Georgia because of the leaking 
condition of his vessel. Livingston found that the cargo had been chosen for the 
West Indian market and that holes had been bored into the ships bottom to support 
the deviation from route. The case is noteworthy not only for Livingston’s robust 
attitude to this class of case but also for Livingston’s comments on the difficulties 
facing judges who under the embargo act tried cases without a jury. Despite a 
willingness on occasion to set aside jury verdicts, he found the responsibility of 
having to decide law and fact a burden but stressed the importance of ensuring that 
laws were not broken with impunity. He set out the difficulty facing a judge alone 
construing penal statutes and of the temptation of one who might not have the 
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firmness to enforce a statute and who mitigated the severity of it instead of bearing 
down hard.57  He was not timid in enforcing breaches of sailing licences even if it 
meant the forfeiture of vessel and cargo. 
          In The Active (1809) Livingston had no hesitation in forfeiting a vessel for 
breach of commercial fishing licences; the vessel had been passed for cod fishing 
had been found carrying other goods.58 The following year in The Elizabeth he 
affirmed the district judge’s forfeiture order in respect of a vessel licensed only to 
sail on the Hudson River and which had been found 110 miles from New York in the 
Long Island Sound carrying goods for which no manifest had ever been delivered. 
He refused to hold that the embargo laws, which had a vast impact on commercial 
life, were unconstitutional, observing that he would never come to that conclusion, 
unless, ‘it were scarcely possible for any two men to differ in sentiment on the 
subject’ which was another way of saying that it was a matter for the United States 
Supreme Court.59  
          Of the fourteen reported maritime opinions, two were simple breaches of 
licences to trade and in those cases, Livingston affirmed forfeiture orders. However, 
in nine embargo opinions, Livingston affirmed the district judge in two but reversed 
forfeiture orders in the remaining seven cases. Those reversals and the five directed 
acquittals in criminal cases, albeit a very small sample, are indicative of a justice 
unwilling to inflict penalties unless the law was precisely stated and its breach 
clearly established.   
          There is only one reported case on the question of the circuit court’s 
jurisdiction and the commerce clause of the Constitution.  Livingston v. Van Ingen 
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(1811)60 was noteworthy because it involved a dispute over the exclusive right to 
navigate passenger steamboats on the Hudson River granted by United States patent. 
It was a case which had constitutional and commercial implications and in which, 
eventually, free enterprise won the day. The complainants, wishing to preserve a 
monopoly, sought from Livingston an injunction preventing the defendants from 
using their steamboat and from constructing another. Livingston disposed of the case 
on the basis that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try the case, failing to recuse 
himself despite that the fact that the person who held the monopoly was his 
brother.61 Eventually the dispute came before the Supreme Court after Justice 
Livingston’s death entitled, Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) when Chief Justice Marshall, 
for the Court, held that the steamboat monopoly granted to Ogden was 
unconstitutional, basing the decision on the commerce clause of the Constitution 
which vested in Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the 
states. Commerce embraced navigation on lakes, rivers and oceans and, therefore, 
included steamboat traffic. Marshall did not seek to exclude all state control of 
commerce, acknowledging that a state had the exclusive right to regulate all 
commerce which occurred entirely within her borders and did not affect other 
states.62 The decision was a blow to those who sought to monopolize commercial 
transport and an encouragement to those supporters of open competition. 
 
Maritime and Commercial Law for the United States  
          The opinions Livingston delivered on circuit and for the Supreme Court made 
him the leading exponent of commercial law before Joseph Story’s arrival on the 
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scene in 1811. After Story’s appointment the reported cases reveal that both justices 
were heavily involved in formulating business law and procedure to promote 
economic prosperity. Livingston’s Second Circuit cases show a preponderance of 
maritime cases followed closely by opinions resolving commercial disputes; a 
continuation of the type of case he had faced regularly in the state court. The 
reported commercial cases range from the time for completion of a contract to the 
persons entitled to sue upon a contract. In Smith v. Barker (1809) he held that  a 
contract to build a ship within about a month was not fulfilled by completing it in six 
months so as to authorize the enforcement of a note made payable upon fulfilment of 
the contract.63 Livingston refused to permit the United States to sue upon a contract 
to which it was not a party even though it had an interest in the property which was 
the subject matter of the action. He observed that the United States, in a contract 
case, had no privilege or rights beyond those of the individual citizen.64  
          The bulk of Livingstone’s commercial work centred on the liability of the 
parties in respect of bills of exchange, the lifeblood of commerce during this period. 
They enabled the drawer of the bill to order the drawee to pay money to a third party 
(the payee) and when the drawee was willing to undertake the payment he was said 
to have accepted the bill. The usefulness of the bill was in its negotiability as the 
third party was permitted to endorse it to a fourth party, who could further endorse. 
The last endorsee was the holder in due course who was in a very favourable 
position with a right of action on the bill against the original drawer and intermediate 
endorsers regardless of any disputes arising between those others. Bills were a useful 
means of payment for long distance trade, particularly between merchants and 
brokers in the United States and Great Britain and because of their negotiability they 
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were often sold to pay debts. Often disputes on these bills became difficult to resolve 
because of the number of parties involved. 
          It was crucial that merchants who took a bill or note in good faith should be 
protected if commerce was to prosper. Livingston laid down clear rules of law and 
procedure which enabled businessmen to know how the federal court would deal 
with disputed contracts. In Codwise et al. v. Gleason et al. (1808) when 
safeguarding the position of an indorsee, he wrote ‘Gleason & Cowles gave the 
weight of their names to the world and must be responsible to every man who trusts 
the note relying on their credit.’65 Thus, Livingston was emphasizing the obligations 
of indorsees of notes. In Cobb’s v. Haydock (1810) he also protected the indorsee of 
a note who had obtained judgment against one of two joint makers of a promissory 
note. He refused to allow a set off against the judgment debt of a sum owed to him 
personally by the drawee, of which the indorsee had had no notice. Livingston gave 
indorsees further comfort in Childs v. Corp (1810) a case in which the defendant 
sold a bill of exchange, taking the plaintiff’s note in payment and retaining the bill as 
collateral security. The bill of exchange was subsequently protested i.e. there was a 
refusal to pay it and the drawers became bankrupt. The defendant refused to return 
the bill to the plaintiff and took no steps to pursue any dividends in the bankruptcy. 
Livingston held that the defendant was liable to make good the plaintiff’s loss.66  
          Livingston’s view that bills and notes, as binding contracts, were so essential 
to commercial life that in United States v. Barker (1816) he refused to declare illegal 
a bill drawn by a citizen of the United States on a citizen of Great Britain whilst the 
two countries were at war. Furthermore he held that a delay of three months in 
presenting for acceptance the bill drawn in New York on Liverpool was not 
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excessive in view of the state of war. He observed that during the Revolutionary 
War, ‘scarcely a ship sailed from the United States …for any port of Europe that was 
not almost loaded with bills of exchange on British houses.’67   These reported 
opinions reveal, in Livingston’s holdings on bills and notes, a determination to 
inspire confidence in the business world that the court would ensure that bills and 
notes would be honoured. 
         Again, acknowledging the paucity of circuit court opinions, the forty-nine 
cases examined reveal, as one would expect, in busy commercial centres, a variety 
of cases but with a preponderance of commercial disputes and maritime cases which 
would enable Justice Livingston to approach confidently if invited to write for the 
Court on those issues. Chief Justice Marshall was well aware of Livingston’s 
particular expertise because, of the 36 majority opinions he wrote for the Court, he 
was chosen to author twenty one maritime and fourteen commercial law cases which 
shows, as far as this associate justice is concerned, that experience in particular 
branches of law was a very important factor in the Chief Justice’s opinion 
assignment practice. The very first opinion he wrote for the Court was appropriately 
to affirm the forfeiture of the cargo of a vessel which had had imported goods from 
Cuba to Maryland in breach of a licence confining her to United States coastal 
waters.68 
          Livingston wrote ten reported opinions for the Court relating to forfeiture or 
detention of vessels for breaches of embargo and, in a shift away from the pattern 
established in his circuit court opinions, he affirmed each and every forfeiture or 
penalty imposed by the court below. He made it plain in strong terms that he rejected 
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the excuses advanced for the various breaches. Many of these cases offered very 
similar questionable explanations. In The Brig Struggle (1815), Livingston rejected   
the master’s excuse that he was prevented from reaching Charleston because of 
storms, and was obliged to sail to the West Indies in order to save lives. He 
commented on the many cases of ‘fictitious distress’ offered to the courts for 
violations of the embargo and observed that the Court would look ‘with considerable 
jealousy and caution on evidence which is so perpetually recurring.’ He went as far 
as to hold that those who raise the defence of Act of God must establish it as to leave 
no reasonable doubt, thereby reversing the burden of proof in respect of an alleged 
breach of a penal statute.69         
          Livingston’s critical approach to such claims was justified. There was a flood 
of embargo breach cases coming before circuit courts and the Supreme Court. Ship 
owners and masters were becoming desperate and willing to risk losing vessels and 
cargoes. As Wood rightly observes of New England, ‘ships were lying idle in the 
harbors and that thousands of sailors, dock workers, and others employed in 
mercantile activities were out of work.’70 In fact, the embargo was doing far more 
economic damage to the United States than it was to any European power. 
          The vis major embargo defences were not rejected on the ground of public 
policy. Each case was investigated fully before such a severe penalty was affirmed. 
The defence had to have been shown to be spurious. Livingston’s opinion in The 
New York (1818) demonstrated an extensive knowledge of maritime practices when 
examining the master’s explanation and highlighting the deficiencies in his story and 
which caused him to conclude that ‘he has made out as weak a case of necessity as 
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was ever offered to a court in the many instances of this kind which occurred during 
the existence of this restrictive system.’71  
          Public policy considerations did apply in Otis v. Watkins (1815) in which 
Livingston, for the majority, held that a port collector who detained a vessel under 
the Embargo Act 1808, pending instructions from the President, need not show that 
his opinion was correct, nor that he used reasonable care and diligence in 
ascertaining the facts. It was sufficient if he honestly entertained his opinion and did 
not act out of malice. Livingston said, in effect, that if it were otherwise, no public 
official would act for fear of the consequences, Chief Justice Marshall, in one of his 
rare dissents, argued that despite the absence of a requirement in the statute to take 
reasonable care in the collection of the information for transmission to the President, 
there should be such a duty on the collector.72 This would seem to be the preferable 
approach to the issue as it is difficult to understand how the collector could hold an 
honest opinion if he took no care in collecting and transmitting the evidence. 
                    Public policy featured again, this time in contract law in Lee v. Munroe 
& Thornton (1813) when Livingston, for the Court, held that the United States was 
not bound by the declarations of its agent founded on a mistake of fact unless the 
declaration was within the scope of his authority and he was empowered to make it. 
Livingston put it bluntly when he declared that it was better that an individual should 
occasionally suffer than the United States should lose liens on valuable and large 
tracts of land.73                   
                                                          
71 The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 59 (1818). For further examples of Livingston’s hard line 
approach to breaches of the embargo legislation and illegal captures see, The Aeolus, 16 U.S. 392 
(1818); The Rugen: Buhring, Claimant, 14 U.S. 62 (1816); The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298 
(1819); The Santa Maria, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 490 (1822). 
72 Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339 (1815). 
73 Lee v. Munroe & Thornton, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813) 
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          Livingston again supported the United States in Dugan v. The United States 
(1818) when he rejected the argument that the United States should not be permitted 
to sue in its own name and the action should be in the name of the agent who 
conducted the business on behalf of the government department. He questioned why 
the United States should be denied a right which was secured to every citizen.74 
However, he preferred other creditors’ claims to those of the United States in United 
States v. Bryan & Woodcock (1815). The United States had attempted to achieve 
priority of payment out of a bankrupt’s estate who had been surety for a customs 
collector. Livingston held that debt was incurred before the act of Congress 
bestowing priority came into force even though the accounts were not settled until 
after the act’s passage.75 An even handed approach was demonstrated in United 
States v. Giles (1815) when Livingston rejected the claim of the United States on a 
bond against the surety of a marshal who had collected monies under an execution 
on goods and had failed to account to the Comptroller of the Treasury. The marshal 
had collected the monies before the surety had executed the bond even though the 
money was still in the marshal’s hands. 
          Livingston wrote only one slavery opinion for the Court when he rejected a 
defence of entering port as a necessity in The Joseph Segunda (1820) and forfeited 
the vessel because it had been used for the purpose of selling slaves and had entered 
the Mississippi in breach of an act of Congress prohibiting the importation of slaves 
into the United States after January 1, 1808.  He made his feelings clear on the issue 
when affirming the forfeiture order, referring to ‘this inhuman traffic’ and ‘this 
                                                          
74 Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. 172 (1818). 
75 United States v. Bryan & Woodcock, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 374 (1815). 
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unrighteous commerce,’ observing that at that time slaves were being sold at New 
Orleans for $1,000 each.76 
          The maritime case of Hudson & Smith v, Guestier (1810) is noteworthy not 
for the point of law decided but for the fact that the Chief Justice, after Livingston 
had handed down the opinion of the Court,  referred to the Court’s earlier opinion in 
the same case in his dissent. He observed that ‘he supposed [it] had been concurred 
in by four judges, But in this he was mistaken. The opinion was concurred in by one 
judge.’77 A rather fundamental mistake which makes one question how formal the 
justices’ deliberations were at the conclusion of evidence and arguments.  One 
would have expected the Chief Justice as chairman of the post case discussions to 
note carefully those justices who concurred in the opinion to be delivered. 
                    The bulk of Livingston’s opinions for the Supreme Court in commercial 
matters related to negotiable instrument disputes in which, in order to assure those 
taking bills of exchange and promissory notes, he generally favoured the creditor. 
Such an approach recognized the negotiable instrument as the cornerstone of trade 
payments and made merchants confident that the Court would ensure that solemn 
obligations were enforced.  Thus in Riggs v. Lindsay (1813) where the defendants 
ordered the plaintiff to purchase salt for them and to draw on them for the amount he 
expended, Livingston held that they were bound to accept and pay his bills.78 
However, he did hold in Young v. Grundy, in the same year, that where a payee 
failed to perform his part of the contract upon which the promissory note was given 
and a new agreement was reached between the parties in substitution for the old, the 
original failure could not be investigated. Any subsequent indorsee of the note could 
                                                          
76 The Joseph Segunda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338 (1820). 
77 Hudson & Smith v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810). 
78 Riggs v. Lindsay, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 500 (1813). 
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not be affected by any dispute between the original parties.79 Where the bill or note 
had passed through a number of hands Livingston ensured that there was no 
collusion between the parties to an action. Thus, in Marshall v. Beverley, he refused 
to grant an injunction on judgments already obtain until all the parties involved had 
filed answers setting out their cases. He was not satisfied by the agreed assertions of 
just two parties.80 
          Whilst we do not know how co-operative Livingston was in conferences, the 
number of dissents he wrote indicate that he was not the expected Republican thorn 
in the side of a Federalist Chief Justice. He was willing to hide his personal views 
from public view to enable the Court to speak with one voice as he did in Sturges v. 
Crowninshield (ante).  His letters to Justice Story thanking him for and praising him 
for his draft opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1817) indicates 
a spirit of co-operation borne not just from friendship but also of shared fundamental 
values.81 Although ostensibly members of different political parties, the Supreme 
Court justices came from the same affluent background and had the desire to see the 
economy flourish and property rights protected. Therefore, they had a mutual 
interest in furthering trade and preserving existing rights to real and personal 
property, whatever the political label attached to them on appointment. 
 
Conclusion 
          Justice Livingston’s circuit opinions and his majority opinions for the Court 
support the view that expertise gained on circuit was a crucial factor in the 
development of federal law on the Supreme Court and also key to the Court’s 
                                                          
79 Young v. Grundy, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 548 (1813). 
80 Marshall v. Beverly, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 313 (1820). 
81 Letter, Livingston to Story, 27 January, 1819. , Dunne, ‘Story-Livingston Correspondence,’ 231-232. 
148 
 
opinion assignment practice. Livingston differs from Washington in that, although 
he adhered to the doctrine of precedent, the English authorities, for personal reasons 
discussed earlier in this chapter, did not hold the same magic for him. His remark in 
Penny v. New York Insurance Company that he followed the English rule as it was a 
reasonable approach and not because he regarded it as an authority and his pointed 
comment in Leroy v. Lewis that he preferred a state court decision to a British 
authority suggests that, wherever possible, he would look first to federal and local 
laws. 
          Constitutional matters rarely featured at circuit level. Livingston presided over 
two such cases which are notable not just for the important issues in dispute but also 
for revealing the tensions facing a justice appointed by a Republican president, torn 
between state sympathies and a professional role that supported federal power. 
Livingston’s acknowledgment of the supremacy of federal law over New York 
legislation in Fisher v. Harnden and his holding the contrary, in Adams v. Story, that 
a New York insolvency law did not impair the obligation of contract clause of the 
Constitution reveal a willingness to decide each case on its merits without a pre-
conceived partisan approach.   
          The opinions examined here establish Livingston’s specialties on circuit, and 
before that on the New York Supreme Court, as maritime and commercial law. Of a 
total forty-eight surviving circuit court opinions, fourteen covered maritime disputes 
and ten resolved commercial issues.  On the Supreme Court he authored thirty-six 
majority opinions of which twenty one were maritime disputes and fourteen were 
commercial cases. There were a total of 1426 legal categories in the Supreme Court 
opinions delivered between 1801 and 1835. Only 149 related to admiralty and 263 to 
commercial law: this refutes any suggestion that those cases constituted the bulk of 
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Supreme Court work and that is why Livingston authored such a high proportion of 
admiralty and commercial opinions. Virtually all of the opinions Livingston 
authored for the Court were on branches of law in which he had acquired special 
circuit expertise. Of the many legal points in the remaining categories, Livingston 
was never invited to write opinions on crime, constitutional law, international law, 
real property, public lands, or patents.82 This is because he had not demonstrated any 
special circuit expertise in those branches of the law. He was invited to write only on 
those cases involving disciplines with which he was completely familiar and John 
Marshall knew the value of circuit expertise; where it lay; and how best to use it on 
the Court. He would have appreciated that by giving maritime and commercial cases 
to Livingston, other justices would respect the opinions he wrote and waverers might 
be persuaded to the majority view.  
          Although as a state justice and a Supreme Court justice sitting on the Court 
and on circuit, Livingston had to deal with a wide spectrum of legal issues, those 
opinions he delivered in all three jurisdictions mark him as a leading authority on 
commercial law. His opinions began the process of ensuring that men of commerce 
understood their general contractual obligations and specifically their responsibilities 
in relation to negotiable instruments, even in respect of bills drawn on a citizen of 
Britain during wartime. (Codwise et al. v. Gleason et al; Childs v. Corp; United 
States v. Barker). His state court opinions in Watson v. Delafield; Green v. Beals; 
Casey v. Brush clarified the rights and obligations of members of a partnerships 
which he believed integral to the development of trade and industry. His overall 
object was to provide a legal and procedural framework regulating the conduct of 
commerce and promoting trade at home and abroad. Story, himself no mean 
                                                          
82 These figures are taken from Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 117. Table 2, 
Number of Legal Categories in Opinions by Justices, 1801-1835.  
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commercial lawyer, wrote, in the eulogy he delivered in 1823 upon Livingston’s 
death, that the justice’s ‘genius and taste had directed his principal attention to the 
maritime and commercial law; and his extensive experience gave to his judgments in 
that branch of jurisprudence a particular value which was enhanced by the gravity 
and beauty of his judicial elegance.’83  
          Unlike Thompson, Livingston was eager to protect from personal liability 
public officials acting in good faith in the performance of their duties. However, 
when jurors performed their public function, Livingston was quick to reverse 
verdicts with which he disagreed. In Smith v. Cheetham he wondered why judges 
regarded jury verdicts as sacrosanct. He did not regard them so and was very willing 
to investigate alleged irregularities and set aside verdicts which were against the 
weight of the evidence as he did in Mellish v. Arnold and Brandt v. Ogden. 
However, his willingness to overturn jury verdicts and order new trials contradicts 
his sentiments in United States v. James Wells where he described the burden faced 
by judges trying alleged breaches of penal statutes without a jury which might result 
in the forfeiture of a vessel and her cargo. He appears to want the protection of a jury 
when serious consequences flow from an adverse finding but not in the run of the 
mill case.  
          In the busy port of New York, Livingston presided over many allegations of 
breaches of embargo laws, sailing licences, and revenue laws. Like Story, he was 
generally unsympathetic to the dubious excuses advanced by ship-owners and 
masters for route deviations, failures to report on entering harbour, or avoiding the 
correct import duty. (United States v. Five Packages of Linen; Ninety-Five Bales of 
Paper v. United States; United States v. James Wells; The Active; The Elizabeth). 
                                                          
83 Preface to the United States Reports (8 Wheat.) 1823. 
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However, his reversal of seven forfeiture orders of the district judge show him to be 
a justice who was more accepting of defence explanations than Story.  
           Ultimately, Livingston’s most significant contribution, and his legacy to 
United States law was through his commercial and maritime opinions. His writings 
for the Court on negotiable instruments in cases such as Riggs v. Lindsay; Young v. 
Grundy; Lennox v. Prout; and Marshall v. Beverley consolidated business law. His 
clear formulation of contractual rights and obligations gave the business community 
the confidence to trade and accept bills of exchange and promissory notes knowing 
that the federal courts would deal promptly and consistently with any breaches. 
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            Chapter Four                                                                    
     Joseph Story: Admiralty Expertise and the Importation of Common Law 
                                     
          This chapter establishes Justice Story’s influence on the development of 
United States law during his twenty four year tenure of the Marshall Supreme Court 
by focussing on the reports of cases he tried as presiding judge of the United States 
First Circuit Court for Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. 
His circuit opinions reveal his role as a justice who, whilst a master of most branches 
of law, was the Marshall Court’s leading exponent of admiralty law. The chapter 
also investigates his efforts to make United States law more readily accessible and 
easily understood by importing common law principles into admiralty, criminal, and 
commercial law and, by a codification of federal criminal law. The opinions show 
that he brought to the judicial function a more professional approach based on a 
meticulous approach to research, attention to detail, and streamlining of procedure 
by discouraging prolix speeches and written pleadings; all of which led to a more 
efficient dispatch of business. His prolific correspondence is valuable because it aids 
an understanding of his thoughts on how a uniform system of federal law and 
procedure can be achieved. 
          Joseph Story was born on September 18th 1779 at Marblehead, Massachusetts 
into a very large and deeply religious middle class family of English stock. His 
father was a physician who had participated in the Boston Tea Party and served as a 
surgeon during the Revolutionary War.1  Story was graduated from Harvard College 
                                                          
1 This brief introductory biography paragraphs is distilled from a number of sources; Gerald T. Dunne, 
Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Court (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970); and R. 
Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1985. William W. Story’s The Life and Letters of Joseph Story, 2 
Vols. (London: John Chapman, 1851) is the typical adulatory biography by a son of his father but is a 
valuable repository of original material. The extent to which Story’s deeply held religious are examined 
by Jay Alan Sekulow in, Witnessing Their Faith: Religious Influence on Supreme Court Justices and 
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in 1798 and, there being no Law School at the college until 1817, he read law in the 
offices of two Marblehead lawyers where his basic training consisted of mastering 
the four volumes of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.2 He 
bemoaned the absence of American reports which meant that a student was unable to 
apply the learning of the common law to his own country or distinguish what had 
been adopted in the United States.3  Story’s grounding in Blackstone and, therefore, 
in English common law and the decisions of the justices of the Queen’s Bench and 
Chancery Courts constituted the basis of his judicial philosophy, adapted to solve the 
particular problems facing the Early Republic. 
          He was admitted to the Essex Bar in July 1801 and set up office as a sole 
practitioner in the port of Salem at a time when virtually all the offices of 
importance in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were occupied by Federalists.4 
This presented a real problem for Story who had inherited the Democratic 
Republican political outlook of his father. Thomas Jefferson had been sworn in as 
President in March 1801 after a bitter contest with President John Adams and those 
lawyers, including Story who made no secret of their Republican ideals were 
ostracized, Story, wrote in his Autobiography ‘For some time I felt the coldness and 
estrangement’… being left ‘solitary at the bar.’5 His Federalist colleagues were 
                                                          
Their Opinions (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 21-32, which also 
contains  useful information on his early education.  
2 Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Men and Ideas, 1817-1967 Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), 59. This was the common method of training lawyers in the early 19th 
century. University training in law was extremely rare. ‘Law was learned mostly by clerking as an 
apprentice in a lawyer’s office. The apprentice read text books and case reports and entered notes on 
his reading in an alphabetised notebook called a ‘commonplace book.’ John H. Langbein, ‘Blackstone, 
Litchfield, and Yale,’ in Anthony T. Kronman, History of Yale Law School: The Tercentennial Lectures 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 19. For a comprehensive account of legal training during 
this period, see, Steve Sheppard (ed.), The History of Legal Education in the United States: 
Commentaries and Primary Sources, Vol.1. (Pasadena: Salem Press, Third Printing in 2010 by 
Lawbook Exchange of the 1999 ed.).   
3 William W. Story, vol. 1, 70-74. 
4 Ibid. 95-96. 
5 Ibid. 97. 
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clearly finding the idea of a Republican government difficult to accept. Despite the 
political climate, Story, within two years, had built a thriving practice. In 1804 he 
began writing the first of many legal tomes with the publication of his well- 
received, Selection of Pleadings in Civil Actions.6  Within five years of his 
admission as counsel he was opposing the leaders of the Bars of New England and 
had begun the mammoth task of digesting all the reported state and Supreme Court 
opinions on Insurance, Admiralty and Prize law.7  
           He was elected to the Massachusetts legislature in 1805. Although a 
Republican and supporter of the policies of President Jefferson, Story was an 
unusual member of that party because of his admiration for President Washington’s 
vision of a strong national government instead of a loose confederation of states. 
Thus, he was that rare animal, a politician of independent mind who, whatever the 
official party line, voted according to his view of the merits of the issues, remarking 
that a ‘Virginian Republican…was very different from a Massachusetts Republican’ 
and that Virginia’s anti-federalist policy met with little support in his home state.8  It 
is difficult to see how Story could possibly support resolutions which purported to 
grant to the states the power and duty to declare unconstitutional Acts of Congress 
which they believed were not authorised by the Constitution.9 
          Story displayed a freedom to disregard Republican policy by the unpopular 
but crucial role he played in 1806 to establish the salaries of the Federalist judges of 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts on a permanent basis and by his 
eventual opposition to President Jefferson’s embargo policy.10   The Embargo Act of 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 112. 
7 Ibid. 119-124. 
8 Ibid. 128. 
9 Kentucky Resolutions 1798 and 1799; Virginia Resolution 1798. 
10 W.W. Story, 130-135. 
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1807 and the subsequent Non-Intercourse Acts, brought about by the seizure of 
American ships and impressment of seamen by the Royal Navy, restricted American 
ships from engaging in foreign trade during the Napoleonic Wars. The legislation’s 
objectives were to cause economic hardship to the belligerents. It had little or no 
effect on England but caused considerable hardship to the United States, particularly 
in New England. Story originally supported the Act’s objectives on the basis that it 
was preferable to war.11  However, the disastrous effect of the embargo forced him 
to reconsider his support and having taken his seat in Congress, he argued for the 
repeal of the Act, thereby incurring the displeasure of former President Jefferson and 
the Republican Party.12 The embargo, he declared ‘prostrated the whole commerce 
of America and produced a degree of distress in the New England States greater than 
that which followed the (Revolutionary) War.’13 He described the legislation as a 
‘miserable and mischievous failure’ and ‘almost a crime.’ 14  
          Story’s opposition to the Act caused  former President Jefferson to attempt 
persuade to President Madison not to nominate Story to the United States Supreme 
Court describing him as ‘a pseudo-Republican’ who had deserted the republicans on 
the embargo measure,  and was ‘unquestionably a tory…and too young.’15 Story’s 
defence of the Massachusetts judiciary and his stance against the embargo in the 
face of his party’s hostility showed him to be a man whose political independence 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 136-139. 
12 Ibid. 171-172. 
13 Ibid. 183-184.  
14 Ibid. 185. 
15 Letter Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, October 15th, 1810, in James Morton Smith, Republic 
of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 3 Vols. (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), Vol. 3. 1646.  The ‘pseudo-Republican’ epithet was contained in 
a letter President Jefferson wrote to General Dearborn on 16 July 1810 contained in Story, Life and 
Letters, vol.1. 186. In his reply to Jefferson on October 19, 1810, Madison merely said that Story’s 
name had not yet been brought forward. There was a difficulty in filling the vacancy as other 
candidates had refused the nomination and he had to nominate a New Englander. (Ibid. 1648) 
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was an obstacle likely to his attaining high political office but which suited him to 
the judicial role. 
          Throughout his career there is a tension between his membership of a party 
which advocated the right of states to govern themselves and his overriding belief in 
the need for strong national government.  His belief in an independent judiciary to 
monitor the activities of the other departments of the national government, state 
courts and legislatures was a view which flew in the face of Republican policy. 
Justices William Johnson, Livingston, Todd, Duvall and Smith Thompson also 
grappled with the dilemma, having been nominated to the Supreme  Court by 
Republican Presidents whom they disappointed by acquiescing in the establishment 
of  federal laws binding on every state of the Union. 
          Story added to his extensive political and law practice commitments with the 
publication of three major, well received law books: he edited and heavily annotated 
Chitty on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (1809); Abbott on Shipping 
(1810) with extensive notes and references to American decisions and statutes; and 
in 1811 he produced a heavily annotated edition of Laws on Assumpsit.16 This in 
depth research gave him an understanding of how law had developed and been 
applied in other jurisdictions, enabling him to extract those principles of law best 
suited to the United States. 
           Story’s general reputation took him to the shortlist of New Englanders to 
replace Justice Cushing on the Court and to preside over the United States First 
Circuit. He was not the automatic choice as three other prominent lawyers were 
approached and declined the nomination but was offered the appointment as the 
                                                          
16 Story, Life and Letters, vol. 1. 204. 
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most prominent New Englander willing to take it. As a New England Republican, he 
did not exhibit the fervour of those Virginia Republicans such as Thomas Jefferson 
who resented the federal government’s encroachment upon state sovereignty and 
believed the Federalist dominated Supreme Court to be an agency of national 
government control.  On the 18 November 1811 the Senate confirmed President 
Madison’s nomination and Story joined the Court upon which he served for thirty-
three years until his death on circuit in 1845.  
          His enthusiasm and reputation was such that in his first session of the Court, 
he delivered the Court’s opinion in two cases and during his twenty-four years on 
the Marshall Court he delivered 195 majority opinions. It is perhaps unfair to 
contrast Story’s contribution with that of Justice Duvall, a most inactive justice, 
joining the Court on the same day but delivering only sixteen opinions in the same 
period. Story’s workload should be set against that of the next most prolific opinion 
writer Justice William Johnson, handing down 108 opinions between 1804 and 
1834.                                                                                                                                                                 
          Primary material to supplement William W. Story’s Life and Letters and the 
Federal Cases includes Gerald T. Dunne’s 1970 biography of Story, prompted by 
Justice Frankfurter and R. Kent Newmyer’s 1985 account of his life and contribution 
to the Court, both biographies focussing on the justice’s Supreme Court work.17 
There is a useful pen sketch of Story by G. Edward White (1988) who describes him 
as ‘unquestionably the busiest and most productive judge of Marshall’s tenure…and 
                                                          
17 Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Court (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1970). 
R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1985).  See also Newmyer’s, ‘Justice Joseph Story on Circuit and 
a Neglected Phase in American Legal History, The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 14, No. 2 
(1970), 112-135. 
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quite possibly the most the most active in the entire history of the Court.’18 White 
outlines Story’s contribution to the Court in his 2012 Law in American History, but 
merely repeats Dunne & Newmyer and his own The Marshall Court and Cultural 
Change, 1815-1835 (1988), confining himself to Story’s major opinions for the 
Court.19  
          A more recent analytical scholarship on Story is that of Finkleman (1994) who 
looks with a critical eye on just one of Story’s opinions, the Fugitive Slave Act case 
of Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), discussed later in this chapter in an overview of 
Story’s slavery opinions.20  Baker (2014) has contributed the most recent insight into 
Story’s opinion in Prigg.21 Collections of Story’ letters to Justice Livingston and to 
John Marshall are also available.22 Apart from Newmyer’s essay on Story on circuit, 
the main emphasis of scholars has been on Story’s Supreme Court opinions and 
academic achievements. This thesis offers an in depth analysis of his circuit opinions 
to understand his local experiences and how they shaped his judicial philosophy. 
              A Modernizing Influence on Law and Procedure on the First Circuit 
          Scholars naturally focus on Story’s Supreme Court opinions because their 
impact was generally much more widely felt than his circuit opinions. However, it is 
essential to examine those local decisions to see how he established a body of circuit 
                                                          
18 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 355. (First published in 1988, Macmillan Publishing Company).  White 
contributes a very valuable account of Story’s mastery of prize, admiralty and marine insurance law.  
(904-922). 
19 G. Edward White, Law in American History, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
20 Paul Finkleman, ‘Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph 
Story’s Judicial Nationalism,’ The Supreme Court Review (1994), 247-294. 
21 H. Robert Baker, ‘A Better Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania’ Journal of Supreme Court History, 
2014. Vol. 39, No. 2, 169-189. 
22 Gerald T. Dunne, ‘The Story Livingston Correspondence (1812-1822),’ American Journal of Legal 
History, vol. 10, No. 3 (1966), 224-236. Charles Warren, ‘The Story-Marshall Correspondence (1819-
1831),’ William and Mary Quarterly, Second Series, vol. 21, No. 1 (1941). 1-26. See also Howell J. 
Heaney, ‘The Letters of Joseph Story (1779-1845) in the Hampton L. Carson Collection of the Free 
Library of Philadelphia,’ The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 2. No. 1 (1958), 68-86. 
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law and procedure to resolve what he believed to be the most important and 
satisfying function he exercised as a justice. In 1840 he wrote, ‘If my fame shall 
happen to go down to posterity, my character as a judge will be more fully & 
accurately seen in the opinions of the circuit court than in the Supreme Court.’23 He 
was more able to express his views freely in circuit court without the need to 
accommodate the opinions of his brethren on the Court as evidenced by Story’s        
complaint that he had withdrawn a dissent because Justice Washington thought that 
‘dissenting opinions on ordinary occasions weakens the authority of the Court, and 
is of no public benefit.’24 
          Story sat on circuit in the main centres of Boston, Massachusetts; Portland, 
Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Providence, Rhode Island. He rode circuit 
each May and October and, depending on the amount of work awaiting him, each 
circuit might take two months to complete; he would travel each year approximately 
4,000 miles along poor roads often in very trying conditions. He also sat on the 
Court in Washington which could take up to a further two months of his time, so that 
in all he sat for about half of the year.  
          The search for patterns of jurisprudence in Story’s circuit cases has involved 
an examination of the 458 of his opinions, between 1811 and 1835, surviving to the 
Federal Cases. Although Story covered all branches of law on circuit, he spent by 
far the greater part of his time on admiralty matters upon which he became the 
acknowledged expert of his age. 169 of his opinions flow from prize cases, general 
admiralty disputes and marine insurance cases, 101 of which arose between 1812 
                                                          
23 Letter. Story to District Judge Joseph Hopkinson, February 16, 1840, cited from the Hopkinson 
papers by R. Kent Newmyer in Joseph Story, 318. 
24 Letter, Justice Story to Court reporter Henry Wheaton, April 8th, 1818. W.W. Story. Life and 
Letters, Vol. 1. 303-304. 
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and 1813 due to attempts by ship-owners and masters to evade embargo and non-
intercourse acts. According to his son, Story’s docket was overloaded with such 
cases when he first came on circuit due to the inability of his predecessor, Justice 
Cushing, to attend to business because of illness. Story dealt with the backlog firmly 
by removing 130 cases from the docket with one opinion. He held that no appeal lay 
from the District Court to the Circuit Court except in civil maritime and admiralty 
cases and that any jury verdict in the District Court could come up to the circuit 
court only upon a point of law or a writ of error. There was no entitlement to a 
second jury trial.25   This no-nonsense attitude was typical of his approach to circuit 
work, streamlining practice and procedure for the efficient dispatch of business. 
Local lawyers and business men accepted this peremptory clearance of the docket 
because it was never appealed.     
          Story was unhappy with the long accepted tradition of excessively lengthy 
pleadings and legal argument because it stood in the way of a reasonably 
manageable docket. After his first Supreme Court sitting in February 1812, Story 
complained to a friend of lists crowded with overloaded documents and a brief of 
230 pages with legal argument lasting five days.26 His determination to simplify the 
court process was illustrated by his circuit opinion in Harding et al. v. Wheaton et al. 
(1821) when he complained of the length and prolixity of the pleadings which could 
easily have been reduced by half and threatened in future to send such cases to the 
master before trial to be corrected at the expense of the parties.27  His desire to bring 
disputes to the earliest possible conclusion was apparent in his handling of the 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 221. The opinion was in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745. Mass. May 1812. 
26 Letter Joseph Story to Samuel Fay, February 24th, 1812. W.W. Story, Life and Letters, vol. 1. 216. 
27 Harding et al. v. Wheaton et al. 11 F. Cas. 491. Rhode Island, November 1821. 
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circuit cases of Hatch v. Ellis (1812),28  Green v. Watkins (1821),29 Mandeville v. 
Riggs (1829), 30 and Gammell v. Skinner (1814).31 These procedural opinions reflect 
his modernizing influence. 
          In his very first full circuit sitting Story expressed concern over government 
legislative language which he found ‘loose and inartificial,’ giving judges little 
guidance on the intention of Congress or the state legislature.32  His approach to 
imprecise penal statutes was to refuse to punish defendants by giving effect to 
doubtful passages.33 His practice was settled firmly the following term in New 
Hampshire when in the embargo case of United States v. Mann (1812) he declared, 
‘I will not be the first judge sitting in this seat to strain a proviso against a citizen.’34 
These cases show that from his first sittings, Story’s mastery of law and procedure 
from his practice at the Bar gave him sufficient confidence to exert firm authority 
over litigants, sending indirect messages to Congress and state legislatures that he 
was not prepared to remedy deficiencies in drafting at the expense of citizens. 
Unless the meaning of a statute was plain it would be construed in favour of a 
defendant facing a possible penalty such as the loss of a vessel and cargo. It was an 
approach designed to protect the citizen rather than punishing the draftsman.              
 
 
                                                          
28 Hatch v. Ellis, 11 F. Cas. 806. Mass. May 1812. 
29 Green v. Watkins, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 260 (1821). 
30 Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 482 (1829). 
31 Gammell v. Skinner, 9 F. Cas. 1142. Mass. May 1814. 
32 The Argo, 1 F. Cas. 1100. Mass. May 1812. According to the Federal Cases reports, Story had 
actually sat on circuit in Boston during the October 1811 term. There is only one reported case from 
that term dealing with the liability of a carrier of banknotes (Citizen’s Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat 
Co.,5 F. Cas. 719. Mass.) October 1811). He must have tried the case in November because his 
nomination the Court by President Madison was not confirmed by the Senate until November 18, 1811. 
33 The Falmouth, 8. F. Cas. 981. Mass. May 1812. 
34 United States v. Mann, 26 F. Cas. 1153.  New Hampshire. October 1812. 
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Admiralty and the Enforcement of Embargo Laws 
          During Story’s first full term in Boston in May 1812, 21 of the 28 reported 
opinions he handed down involved allegations of breaches of the Embargo Act and,  
despite his opposition to embargo as a politician, he treated established 
contraventions seriously; his opinions reflected his refusal to accept many of the 
excuses advanced for breaches. Hearing the same unconvincing excuses so often he 
became rather cynical in his approach.35 He treated an alleged breach as an offence 
of strict liability, placing the burden of proving that a route deviation was necessary 
on the master and owners of the vessel.36 This reversal of the burden of proof meant 
that in Ten Hogsheads of Rum (1812) the claimants were unable to prove that the 
rum was not of British origin and Story made a forfeiture order to the United 
States.37 This harsh approach was one which reflected his strong nationalism and a 
stance which during the 1812 War would be fully supported across the political 
spectrum. In United States v. Webber (1813) he recounted his experience of similar 
cases when as counsel for ship-owners against the United States, he had felt 
embarrassed that a narrow interpretation of the statute made it easy for commanders 
to excuse a failure to report arrival at a port by claiming entry by necessity. He 
hoped that vigorous examination of defences to breaches of the embargo laws would 
prevent a flood of spurious excuses.38    
                                                          
35 Between 1812 and 1814 privateers commissioned by the president captured an estimated 2000 
vessels. 150 such commissions were granted in Massachusetts alone and Story’s home town of Salem 
sent out 43 privateers, which during the war with Britain accounted for 300 prizes of which 130 were 
condemned by the district and circuit courts. These figures are taken from Capt. Michael H. Rustein, 
The Privateering Stroke: Salem Privateers and the War of 1812 (Salem: Create Space Independent 
Publishing Platform, 2012). See also the Act of January 27, 1813 which set out the procedure for 
applying for Letters of Marque and the rules under which privateers were to operate. (Richard Peters 
(ed.), The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, vol. 2 (Boston: Charles C. Little 
and James Brown, 1850). 759-764. 
36 The Short Staple, 22 F. Cas. 23. Mass. May 1812. 
37 Ten Hogsheads of Rum, 16 F. Cas. 932. Mass. October 1812. 
38 The Boston, 3. F. Cas. 925. Mass.  October 1812. 
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          Story even found a breach and ordered forfeiture in a case in which notice of 
the embargo had not reached the master of the vessel on the basis that everyone is 
presumed to know the law.39  He again applied strict liability in Cross v. United 
States (1812), upholding a penalty of double value of the vessel and cargo for breach 
of embargo even though the owner was unaware of the illegal voyage.40 One can 
understand his harsh approach to those who traded in enemy goods. It was based not 
only on his duty to enforce the legislation but also from a background of public 
indignation at those dealing with an enemy which had invaded the United States 
once more in 1814 and burned many public buildings in Washington, including the 
White House and Capitol Building. 
          Story explained what he believed to be his duty as a judge and his approach to 
enforcement of the embargo laws in his opinion in The George (1814). He cited 
favourably Sir William Scott’s view of the judicial function from the English 
admiralty case of The Rosalie and Betty, (2 C. Rob. Adm. 343), that ‘a judge should 
start out with no prejudice against a party and suppose every case to be a true unless 
fraud is proved, but he should not shut his eyes to what was happening in the world.’ 
Story had in mind the close proximity of the ports of Maine to British territories and 
the great temptation to engage in illicit trade.  He condemned the increasing number 
of collusive captures between American traders and British officers or American 
privateers which he described as ‘very unwelcome guests to the court,’ pointing to 
the records of the district and circuit courts to show how extensive the prohibited 
trade was. 41  
                                                          
39 The Ann, 1 F. Cas. 926. Mass. 1812. 
40 Cross v. United States, 6 F. Cas. 892. Mass. May 1812. 
41 The George, 10 F. Cas. 196. Mass. October 1814. 
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          On two occasions the Supreme Court believed Story had been too quick in 
rejecting explanations and holding vessels and cargo forfeit to the United States. In 
The Short Staple (1812) the Court reversed him on the ground that whilst the 
master’s explanation raised strong suspicions it was not so incredible as to justify 
forfeiture. Story believed that the master had hoodwinked the Court because he 
dissented from the opinion, insisting that a forfeiture order was justified and noting 
that he had the support of one of his brethren.  Story’s other embargo reversal came 
in The Bothnea and The Jahnstoff (1814) where he had found a breach on the basis 
of a collusive capture of two vessels by an American privateer.42  However, an 
inference might reasonably be drawn from the Court’s use of phrases such as ‘spirit 
of adventure’ and ‘talent for enterprise’ by the crew of the privateer, of a strong 
political desire to encourage privateers to harry the enemy and illegal traders and 
reap the rewards of their important trade.43  
          Story felt vindicated by his hard line approach when, in Robinson v. Hook 
(1826), he read secret papers thrown overboard from a vessel hovering off the coast 
of Maine many years earlier in order to effect collusive captures of ships leaving 
ports in the British provinces in Canada laden with British manufactured goods. The 
‘captured’ vessels were to be taken into United States ports to be forfeited to the 
captors, thereby getting highly desirable goods into the United States. The papers 
revealed how many Boston merchants had been involved in such widespread 
breaches of the embargo, The documents had been passed on to the government but 
it would appear from Story’s expressions of surprise in 1826 that the authorities had 
not, at the time, passed to the justices evidence of this large scale conspiracy. The 
                                                          
42 The Bothnea, The Jhanstoff, 3 F. Cas. 962. Mass. May 1814. 
43 The Bothnea, 15 U.S. 169 (1817). 
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1826 case gave Story an opportunity criticize ‘the lenient administration of prize law 
during this period’, and ‘especially in lending an indulgent ear to the claims of our 
own citizens.’ He was reproaching those other judges and the Court for accepting 
dubious explanations for breaches. His remark that ‘the justice of those sentences of 
condemnation, which admitted of most controversy, have in an unexpected manner, 
been confirmed by facts recently brought to light’ was a vindication of his hard-line 
approach to embargo breaches.44    
          Another aspect of Boston maritime circuit work were the trials of the criminal 
offences by seamen whilst on board ship which accounted for twenty-two more 
opinions, ranging from theft to the capital offences of murder and piracy. He 
protected seamen’s right to wages and medical treatment, holding that any 
disobedience must have been habitual or one heinous act to lose pay.45 In Harden v. 
Gordon et al. (1823) he held that where a seaman had to be taken ashore because of 
illness, the cost of food, nursing and lodgings were a charge on the ship, and in The 
George (1832) he extended the same protection to the master of a vessel.46 His 
motives were not altogether altruistic as he remarked in Harden that the protection 
of seamen served commerce and the defence of the nation by encouraging seamen to 
engage in perilous voyages at low wages.47  
          As well as ensuring that the cost of caring for seamen taken ashore due to 
illness was provided for, Story was vigilant in discouraging masters who put 
                                                          
44 Robinson v. Hook, 20 F. Cas. 1017. Maine, October 1826. 
45 See: Spurr v. Pearson, 22 F. Cas. 1011. Mass. October 1816: The Mentor, 17 F. Cas. 15. Mass. 
October 1825. If the claim for forfeiture of wages was based on desertion, Story insisted that the 
desertion had to be entered in the ship’s log on the very day of the desertion for the claim to succeed, 
and if the desertion had been condoned wages were to be paid thereafter. (Cloutman v. Tunison, 5 F. 
Cas. 1091. Mass. May 1833). 
46 The George, 10 F. Cas. 205. Mass. May 1832. 
47 Harden v. Gordon et al., 11 F. Cas. 480. Maine. October 1823. 
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members of the crew ashore in foreign parts just to rid themselves of a difficult 
seaman. In Orne v. Townsend (1827) he sent out a message to masters when he 
declared that the court ‘would look with a vigilant eye for discharges of seamen in 
foreign ports without paying to the U.S. consul the three month’s pay in addition to 
wages accruing in accordance with the Act of 1825.’48  He defined a master’s duty 
towards his crew members in United States v. Ruggles (1828) after the captain had 
forced a seaman into a jail in a foreign port for conduct which could have been dealt 
with quite easily on board ship. He wrote, ‘It is the duty of the master to watch over 
them with parental authority…and he has no right to delegate his authority…to 
gaolers and turnkeys in a foreign country.’ 49  In the United States v. Freeman 
(1827) Story rejected a defence submission that seamen as a class should never be 
believed even on oath.50   
          His desire to ensure a fully manned merchant fleet went hand in hand with a 
wish to see that rescuers of stricken ships were reasonably compensated for placing 
themselves in harm’s way. This is apparent from his favourable citation of a remark 
of the English admiralty judge Lord Stowell who said that the remuneration in 
salvage cases was based ‘not merely on the exact quantum of service 
performed…but to the general interests of navigation and commerce of the country, 
which are greatly protected by exertions of this kind.’ 51 The above cases on wages, 
medical expenses, security abroad, rights to salvage, and witness credibility show 
how Story tempered the harsh realities of life at sea by affording sailors protection 
under the law and at the same time promoting maritime trade.  
                                                          
48 Orne v. Townsend, 18 F. Cas. 825. Mass. October 1827. 
49 United States v. Ruggles, 27 F. Cas. 912. Rhode Island. November 1828. 
50 United States v. Freeman, 25 F. Cas. 1208. Mass. October 1827. 
51 The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 704. Mass. October 1832. 
167 
 
          Story’s admiralty expertise extended to marine insurance, salvage law, and the 
authority of a master to create a lien on a vessel for repairs necessary to complete a 
voyage.  Of Story’s 169 admiralty opinions contained in Federal Cases Reports, 22 
relate to marine insurance disputes. He held policies void for misrepresentations 
which materially affected the risk. Thus failure to disclose that the cargo was not all 
American owned was a breach of warranty and sailing on a date other than that 
agreed was fatal to cover.52 Most disputes which materially affected the risk 
concerned the seaworthiness of the vessel at the time of sailing and deviations from 
route not due to life or property threatening emergencies.53 The evidential burdens 
he set out in Tidmarsh v. Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Inc. (1827) were 
useful to lawyers and their clients. He held that the assured must establish 
seaworthiness and the insurer had the burden of proving a misrepresentation which 
materially affected the risk in order to avoid the policy.54  
          By far the most significant of Story’s marine insurance opinions was that he 
handed down in Delovio v. Boit et al (1815).55 Story reversed the district judge’s 
holding that the district court had no jurisdiction to try a marine insurance dispute as 
it did not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction entrusted to the federal courts by the 
Constitution. If this decision had stood it would have severely reduced the business 
and, therefore, the influence of the federal courts.  Story had earlier held that his 
court had jurisdiction over marine insurance cases, and was determined to reinforce 
that view in Delovio.56 Writing to the court reporter, Henry Wheaton, in 1815, he 
                                                          
52 Bayard et al. v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F. Cas. 1065. Mass. October 1826; Baxter 
v. New England Insurance Co. Inc., 2 F. Cas. 1058. Mass. October 1822. 
53 Glidden v. Manufacturers’ Ins. Co., 10 F. Cas. 476. Mass. October 1832. 
54 Tidmarsh v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 23 F. Cas. 1197. Mass. October 1827. 
55 Delovio v. Boit et al.  7 F. Cas. 418. Mass. October 1815. 
56 The Jerusalem, 13 F. Cas. 564. Mass. May 1815.  The case was decided primarily on competing 
claims for a lien on a vessel for repairs but it also had a marine insurance aspect. 
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described the current state of knowledge of admiralty jurisdiction, law and practice 
as ‘a most shameful ignorance, and it occasions considerable embarrassment in 
practice.’ He said that he intended to write ‘a very elaborate opinion upon the whole 
of the admiralty jurisdiction’ reviewing ‘all the common law decisions on this 
subject…and all original rights before and since the statutes of Richard II.’57 The 
opinion exceeded 70 pages, citing not only common law decisions and statutes but 
also all jurists ancient and modern. It is an exposition based on scholarship and 
research, which the reports reveal to be unique during this period even among 
Supreme Court justices and evidences a modern in depth research based approach to 
opinion writing. He concluded the opinion by wondering, ‘how far a superior 
tribunal may deem it fit to entertain the principles,’ hoping that the parties would 
take the point on jurisdiction to the Supreme Court but they did not. Because a 
district judge was prohibited from taking part in an appeal from his own decision, 
the device of a certificate of division was unavailable. The parties did not even 
return to district judge to conclude the matter. The point jurisdictional issue did not 
reach the Supreme Court until 1870 in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, when Justice 
Joseph Bradley, for the Court, followed Delovio, holding that marine insurance 
contracts were within the admiralty jurisdiction. He praised Story’s ‘learned and 
exhaustive opinion,’ declaring that, despite doubts expressed by other judges as to 
the jurisdiction, the Court was convinced that Story’s view was correct.58 
          A footnote to Delovio appears in a letter written by Story to Nathaniel 
Williams in December 1815 in which he describes the opinion as ‘the most elaborate 
I have ever composed,’ and having ‘devoted all of my leisure time for more than a 
                                                          
57 Letter, Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton, September 5th, 1815 in W.W. Story, Life and Letters, vol. 
1. 267. 
58 Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 77. 
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month to the subject.’ After expressing regret that the Supreme Court would not be 
asked to pronounce upon his opinion, he intimated that the merchants and 
underwriters of Boston were very happy with his holding as the merchants were ‘not 
fond of juries.’59 If the federal courts had jurisdiction the disputes were tried by 
judge alone as opposed to judge and jury in the state courts. Clearly men of 
commerce preferred the more measured approach of a Supreme Court justice to the 
unpredictable verdict of a jury.  
          Whilst Boston merchants had reservations about juries, Story was a staunch 
supporter of the institution, refusing to interfere with a verdict because of an 
innocent separation of the jury after retirement, and refusing to upset an award of 
damages even though he thought the amount high.60 He believed trial by jury in 
criminal matters to be ‘the most sacred constitutional right of every person accused 
of a crime.’ However, he was careful to emphasise that the jury’s verdict must be 
based not only on the facts it found, but also accord with the judge’s directions on 
law, explaining to the jury that if it decided the law there would be no consistency 
and in case of error, the defendant would have no redress. 61 He held the grand jury 
in the same high esteem, remarking in United States v. Coolidge (1815) that ‘it was 
the great inquest between the government and the citizen.’ He expressed the hope 
that the ‘institution be preserved in its purity and that no citizen be tried, unless he 
has been regularly accused by the proper tribunal.’62  
                                                          
59 Letter Joseph Story to Hon. Nathaniel Williams, December 3rd, 1815, W.W. Story, Life and Letters, 
vol. 1, 269-270. 
60 Burrill v. Phillips, 4 F. Cas. 832. Rhode Island, November 1812 (separation); Thurston v. Martin, 23 
F. Cas. 1189. Rhode Island, June 1830. 
61 United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042. Mass. October 1835. 
62 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622. Mass. May 1815. 
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                    The remaining 289 of Story’s reported circuit opinions covered most 
aspects of jurisprudence. The major categories were commercial disputes, including 
contracts, negotiable instruments, banking, partnerships and insolvency (72); land 
(45); criminal law (39); practice, procedure, and evidence (21); wills (16); and 
patents (14). These opinions were of great importance to the parties but, unlike his 
admiralty holdings many were not precedents or rules to be applied, or of particular 
concern, outside the First Circuit. 
          Although few in number, his opinions on the slave trade and slavery in general 
were the subject of national interest. Story had always opposed slavery publicly and, 
although there are only five of his reported circuit opinions prior to 1835, they 
reflect his views on this troubling issue. In 1815 in Fales et al. v. Mayberry, Story 
held that no action could be maintained between parties engaged in the slave trade, 
describing it as ‘a most odious and horrible traffic contrary to the plainest principles 
of natural justice.’63 It was a theme he returned to when he ordered the forfeiture of 
the vessel and imposed terms of imprisonment for two years and fines of $2,000 on 
persons involved in the slave trade.64 In The Alexander (1823) he forfeited a vessel 
patently employed in the slave trade even though no slaves had been taken on 
board.65  
          Story denounced what he described as ‘that most detestable traffic the slave 
trade’ in a powerful charge to the grand jury at Boston in the October term of 
1819.66 He did not apologize for a lengthy speech, charting the history of the slave 
trade and the efforts of men such as William Wilberforce to put an end to it. He let 
                                                          
63 Fales et al. v. Mayberry, 8 F. Cas. 970. Rhode Island. November 1815. 
64 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1167. Mass. October 1820; United States v. La Coste. 26 F. Cas. 
826. Mass. October 1820. 
65 The Alexander, 1 F. Cas. 362. Mass. May 1823. 
66 W.W. Story, Life and Letters, vol. 1, 335-348. 
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the people of Boston know of the horrors involved by explaining how ‘Husbands are 
stolen from their wives, children from their parents, and bosom friends from each 
other.’ He described how the slaves were shackled on the ocean journey in 
accommodation not much larger than a coffin and that about one half perished 
within two years of first captivity. His observations were based on his examination 
of debates in the British Parliament and from a study of first-hand accounts of those 
engaged in the trade or eye witnesses to its operation. That in depth research is 
further evidence of the professionalism of a new breed of justice. His attacks on the 
slave trade were not confined to circuit opinions and charges to the grand jury. He 
made his stand at public meetings. At the only political meeting he attended whilst a 
judge in Salem in 1819 he spoke in support of a resolution calling on Congress to 
ban slavery in all of the territories of the United States and against the proposed 
compromise to permit Missouri to join the Union as a ‘slave state.’67 
          One of Story’s circuit slavery opinions had an international complication. In 
The United States v. La Jeune Eugenie (1822) he affirmed the district judge’s 
forfeiture of a captured French ship fitted out for the slave trade. Story emphasized 
his duty as a judge not to bow to executive and foreign pressure but to ‘extinguish a 
trade abhorrent to the great principles of Christian morality, mercy and humanity.’ 
However, and despite his positive assertion of judicial independence, he did later 
accede to a request made by President Madison, through the district attorney, that he 
permit the French authorities to dispose of the matter on the basis that that their 
attitude towards the slave trade was that of the United States.68    
                                                          
67 Ibid. 359-361. 
68 Ibid. 348-358. 
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          Story’s moral and humanitarian attitude towards the slave trade and all other 
aspects of his work arose from his Unitarian beliefs. He was a deeply religious man, 
evident from his reference to ‘Christian morality, mercy and humanity’ in La Jeune 
Eugenie.  His religious beliefs impinged upon his judicial duties because he was 
convinced that a man without religion was unworthy of belief, as lacking 
conscience. He declared in Wakefield v. Ross, (1827) ‘Persons who do not believe in 
the existence of God, or of a future state, or have no religious views are not entitled 
to be sworn in as witnesses and that a person with no such belief feared no religious 
sanction if he lied on oath.’69 Because all testimony had to be sworn non-believers 
were not permitted to give evidence, despite the fact that Article II, Section I of the 
Constitution gave the president the option of taking the oath of office or affirming. 
As late as 1908, nine states, including seven of the original colonies, still excluded 
the testimony of ‘non-believers’.70  
                    When called upon to interpret state legislation Justice Story looked, in 
the first instance, for guidance to the opinions of the state justices; a practice 
confirmed when he later delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell v. Morrison 
(1828) in which he preferred the practice in Kentucky of a five year limitation period 
for actions instead of the generally accepted six years provided by English law, 
writing that he would follow the local law whose rules of interpretation must be 
presumed to be founded on a more just and accurate view of their local 
jurisprudence.71 The case demonstrates the building of a body of law, based not on 
                                                          
69 Wakefield v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1346. Rhode Island. November 1827. 
70 Paul W. Kaufman, ‘Disbelieving Non-Believers: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn 
of the Century,’ Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, vol. 15:2 (2003), 416. 
71 Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.), 351 (1828). 
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theoretical principles but founded on proven regional custom and practice reflecting 
the needs of the local business and property owning community.  
          He also made it clear in United States v. Slade (1820) his relief at not having 
to give the first construction of a state statute when he could turn to state decisions 
for guidance.  He believed the following of state decisions to be a matter of ‘public 
policy and public interest,’ to achieve consistency and certainty in litigation so that  
citizens did not have to contend with conflicting opinions of federal and state 
judges.72  That, wherever possible, he followed the decisions of state courts and 
upheld the constitutionality of state legislation, demonstrated he was not just an 
agent of a federal government determined to ride roughshod over states’ rights. He 
had a desire to forge a partnership between federal and state courts. This enhanced 
his popularity in New England. He was adept at sending out such messages in his 
circuit opinions. 
          He was somewhat apprehensive of his new role but quickly settled into the 
business of the Court and found himself very much at ease.73 In letters to his friends, 
he gave a rare insight into the decision making process of the Court. Writing to 
Harvard colleague and probate judge, Samuel Fay, soon after his first sitting on the 
Court, he referred to the ‘frank intimacy of his brethren’ and reported that the 
‘familiar conferences at our lodgings often come to a very quick and, I trust, 
accurate opinion in a few hours.’74 The following week, Story assured his wife that 
the lodging house accommodation was very agreeable and was made so by the 
companionship of the other justices. ‘Perfect harmony’ was how he described the 
                                                          
72 United States v. Slade, 27 F. Cas. 1125. Mass. May 1820. 
73 Letter Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams, February 16th, 1812. W.W. Story, Life and Letters, vol.1, 
213-215. 
74 Letter, Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay, 24th February, 1812. Ibid. 215-216.  
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justices’ relationships.75 This bonding borne out of a common philosophy and by 
communal living was essential to the solidary of the Marshall Court and was the 
foundation of the single opinion of the Court. That the justices were a band of 
brothers made it easier to compromise and speak with one voice. 
          In his 23 years on the Marshall Court, Justice Story delivered 183 opinions of 
the Court. Aside from Chief Justice Marshall who took the lion’s share with 537 of 
1236 opinions, no other justice matched Story’s contribution. Justice Johnson was 
the nearest with 112 majority opinions in 29 years. Justice Duvall over the same 
period as Story contributed a mere 16 opinions and Justice Todd only 12 in 18 years. 
These figures show Story as the dominant Marshall Court associate justice and are 
accounted for by his learning, enthusiasm and capacity for hard work.76 There was 
no honeymoon period. Story delivered two majority opinions in his first year, seven 
during 1813, and ten in 1814. No other associate justice experienced such a flying 
start.  
          His Supreme Court opinions comprised 57 admiralty matters, 48 Land 
disputes, and 28 commercial cases including contract and negotiable instruments all 
of which were his main areas of expertise in the circuit court. Putting his admiralty 
contribution in perspective one looks to the United States Reports which contain 252 
admiralty opinions of the Marshall Court. Chief Justice Marshall reserved to himself 
90 so that that Story’s 57 opinions over 24 years constituted 35% of the balance.  No 
other associate justice approached Story’s impact on this speciality. Justice Johnson, 
over 29 years, delivered 35 opinions.  Livingston achieved 18 over 16 years, and 
Washington handed down 17 in 29 years. That Justice Thompson delivered only five 
                                                          
75 Letter, Joseph Story to Mrs Sarah W. Story, March 5th, 1812. Ibid. 217. 
76 The figures have been calculated from a count of the opinions in the United States Reports between 
1801 and 1835. 
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admiralty opinions in 20 years is explained by the fact that the 1812 War and 
embargo cases were fading memories by the time of his appointment to the Court in 
1823. 
          Story’s hard-line attitude to embargo cases in the circuit court was maintained 
in his writing for the Court. He was resolute in enforcing breaches of embargo and 
penalizing evasion of custom duties. In ten such cases it was thought appropriate that 
he should write the unanimous or majority opinion affirming his own finding in the 
circuit court. This he did in The Julia (1814) by giving a short opinion and attaching 
his circuit decision, remarking that it had been shown to his brethren, a majority of 
whom had agreed with it.77 He again affirmed his circuit opinion in The Ship 
Octavia (1816) this time by making extensive references to that opinion.78 His rigid 
approach was demonstrated in the forfeiture proceedings concerning The Pizarro 
(1817) when he complained of the district court’s failure to follow proper procedure. 
He believed that the lapse enabled the crew to concoct a defence. He felt that the 
ship’s papers should have been produced in court and the crew asked individually to 
answer specific questions concerning the voyage and not allowed to give evidence 
after conferring with counsel.79   
          Marshall decided which associate would write the Court’s opinion and the 
United States Reports show a marked disparity in the allocation of opinion writing 
between, say, Justices Story and Duvall, indicating assignments on the basis of 
expertise in the subject matter and a willingness to write. Story was assigned so 
many admiralty opinions because his colleagues, and the Chief Justice in particular, 
were aware that maritime cases constituted the bulk of his work on circuit as 
                                                          
77 The Julia, 12 U.S. 181 (1814). 
78 The Ship Octavia, 14 U.S. 20 (1816). 
79 The Pizarro, 15 U.S. 227 (1817). 
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advocate and justice.  Therefore, they would be happy that he took the lead in the 
admiralty business because of his renown in the field.  
 
Consistency by the Sharing of Expertise 
           Letters passing between Story and Marshall confirm the extent to which the 
Chief Justice relied upon Story in maritime cases and support the suggestion that 
Story would have had a hand in some of the ninety admiralty opinions delivered by 
Marshall and in opinions on other branches of the law.80  The letter Story wrote to 
Samuel Fay in April 1814 reveals how Story contributed to the Court’s opinion 
delivered by another justice. He described a heavy list and a prize law case which he 
did not identify, writing ‘I worked very hard and my brethren were so kind as to 
place confidence in my researches.’ He continued, ‘Juniores ad Labores’ but did not 
complete the quotation which ends, ‘Seniores ad honours; a complaint that the 
juniors did all the hard work and the seniors took the credit.81 If his researches had 
resulted in his being assigned the opinion, he would not have complained. 
          Marshall’s letter to Story in July 1819 requested Story’s help on the authority 
of the master of a vessel to hypothecate her in a state other than that of her home 
port. He had earlier asked Justice Washington the same question.82 In the July letter 
Marshall thanked Story for his assistance in another case, and informed him that he 
would decide next term the case of the United States v. The Schooner Little Charles 
in accordance with Story’s reasoning which he thought was ‘perfectly sound, and 
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were this even questionable, the practice of the courts ought to be uniform.’ 
Marshall also confirmed that preparation of the Court’s opinion in ‘the militia case’ 
had been committed to Story and ‘could not be in better hands,’ but said that he 
would prepare an outline opinion himself and was confident that they would not 
differ.83  In the event, Justice Washington delivered the Court’s opinion, and Story 
and one other justice, unnamed, but probably Marshall, joined in the dissent.84 This 
letter is important because it reveals not only the practice of the Chief Justice 
seeking help from a colleague but also that when an opinion was committed to a 
specific judge, another judge would also sketch out an opinion. Furthermore, 
subsequent discussions showed Story not to hold the majority view, so the opinion 
was re-assigned to Justice Washington from whose court the writ of error came.85 
          Marshall continued to seek advice from Washington and Story and after 
Washington’s death in November 1829 Marshall’s surviving letters reveal Story as 
the sole source of guidance. The following correspondence reveals Marshall’s 
requests for help from Story on an insolvency problem (1821); debt and forfeiture 
(1821); marine salvage and piracy (1823) a commercial case (1827) and admiralty 
(1831).86  When the two friends were together in Washington, Story would be happy 
to assist the Chief Justice in any way possible. He always replied promptly to 
Marshall’s written requests with heavily researched opinions.87 Writing to Story in 
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November 1823, Marshall wished to know whether it was possible to have a mixed 
jury of citizens and non-citizens in a criminal case, having been by counsel that 
Justice Thompson had allowed such an application on circuit in New York. The 
letter also reveals Marshall’s intention to discuss the point with the judges the 
following February to ensure a consistent approach across the circuits.88 The letter is 
relevant not only to the practice of consultations on circuit but also to the quest for 
uniformity. 
          Consistency was also important to Story and Washington who regularly 
exchanged circuit opinions to achieve as much uniformity as possible. Writing in 
December 1826, Story promised Washington an abstract of all the cases he had dealt 
with on circuit that term. Thanking Washington for the opinions he had sent, Story 
noted that they had adopted the same practice in similar cases on a jurisdictional 
point.89 The importance to Story of uniformity is evident from Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee (1816) when, denying the right of state courts to interpret the Constitution, he 
wrote that it was not because of bias but a question of preserving uniformity of 
federal law.90 Too many different interpretations would cause much confusion. This 
correspondence between justices establishes how important it was that justices 
exchanged information if a uniform system of federal law was to be achieved.              
          Story gave a hint of a lack of commitment by other justices when writing to 
Harvard Law Professor Ashmun in 1832, informing him that ‘the Charlestown 
Bridge case had not yet been decided because some of the judges had not prepared 
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their opinions when they met to discuss the case 91 Even the Chief Justice found it 
difficult to cope with an ever expanding docket, writing to Story in 1829 that he had 
not been able to give to two great cases the consideration they deserved and he 
hoped that Story had been able to give them his attention and asked that he put his 
thoughts on paper.92 These letters again show Story’s professional approach. He was 
in a league of his own when it came to the effort he put into his work on circuit and 
on the Court and all this while editing and writing formidable works of legal 
jurisprudence, and teaching law at Harvard University. 
          Circuit opinions gave Story the opportunity to make his mark on a number of 
branches of the law but permitted him no impact on constitutional law. He remedied 
that omission shortly after joining the Court in his opinion in Mills v. Duryee (1813) 
holding that, if a judgment was conclusive in one American state, it must be 
recognized and enforced in other states under the ‘full faith and credit’ clause of 
Article  4, section 1 of the Constitution.93  He delivered his most                                                                               
influential constitutional opinion three years later in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 
which, as well as asserting the power of the Court over federal departments and state 
legislatures and tribunals, evidenced the marked political and philosophical change 
from the mild Republican tendencies of his early years to the ardent supporter of a 
strong national government and federal judiciary.94  
          In Martin, the Virginia Court of Appeals refused to accept the holding of the 
Supreme Court in a land dispute delivered in the February 1813 term, on the ground 
that section 25 of the Judiciary Act 1789 giving the Supreme Court the power to 
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review the decisions of state tribunals infringed the Constitution. Story resolved this 
stand-off on a matter of great constitutional consequence in a very firm manner 
when the case returned on a writ of error. He held that the Supreme Court had 
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions which purported to interpret federal 
law. He argued that federal power was given by the people and not by the states and 
pointed to Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution which expressly 
provided for the Supreme Court to have appellate jurisdiction on law and fact in all 
cases mentioned in the section where it has no original jurisdiction. He addressed the 
mischief which would arise if state tribunal were permitted to interpret federal law, 
treaties and even the Constitution without the appellate oversight of the Supreme 
Court. Judges of equal learning and integrity in the various states might well reach 
different conclusions, throwing federal law into total confusion. The emphasis on the 
people, and not the states, as the source of authority for the Constitution is key to the 
philosophy of Marshall and Story and enabled the Court to interpret the intent of the 
Founding Fathers in such a way as to provide for a strong national government, but 
at the same time, guaranteeing the citizens’ property and commercial rights.  
          The Court’s declaration in Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the Judiciary Act 
1789 was unconstitutional on the ground that Congress was not permitted by the 
Constitution to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction was a crucial step in 
Marshall’s quest to strengthen the Court’s authority.95  Story’s recognition, in 
Martin, that the Constitution gave the Court an appellate supervisory role of state 
courts further enhanced the Court’s status giving it the confidence to extend its 
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sphere of influence in three constitutional cases decided in a three week period in 
early 1819.96   
          In Sturges v. Crowninshield, the Court held that a New York law which 
purported to apply a bankruptcy law retroactively violated Article 1, Section 10 of 
the Constitution because it impaired the ‘Obligation of Contracts.’ Impairment of the 
obligation of contacts raised its head once more eight days later in the Dartmouth 
College case. Yet again, and in such a short space of time, the Court struck down a 
state statute, Marshall holding, controversially, that a charter granted to the college 
by the British Crown in 1769 constituted a contract. This meant that an attempt by 
New Hampshire’s legislature to gain control of the college by altering its status from 
a private to a public institution, violated the contracts clause. Story delivered a 
powerful concurrence, and using the example of a bank or insurance company, 
expressed great concern at the prospect of a legislature attempting to replace the 
directors appointed by the stockholders with people who had no connection with the 
company.  His holding and Marshall’s opinion, would have re-assured the 
commercial community that the Court supported free enterprise and would protect 
the interests of business corporations from federal or state interference. 
          The Court further enhanced its influence two weeks later in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, when it held that Congress had the power to establish a national bank and 
Maryland’s tax on the bank, because it was not chartered by the Maryland 
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legislature, was prohibited by the Constitution.97 Maryland’s action was a direct 
challenge to the federal government’s right to impose its authority upon a state, and 
the Court determined, by reference to the Constitution, to define the extent of the 
powers of Congress, and to demonstrate that states’ rights were subordinate to the 
acts of the national legislature.  Although the Constitution did not expressly grant to 
Congress the power to establish the Bank of the United States or any bank, writing 
for a unanimous Court, the Chief Justice held that such a power was to be inferred 
from Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 18 of the Constitution. Clause 1 gave 
Congress the power to…provide for the general welfare of the United States and, by 
Clause 18, Congress received the authority to make all laws ‘necessary and proper’ 
for carrying into effect powers earlier enumerated in the section which included the 
powers to coin money, collect taxes, borrow money and regulate commerce between 
the states. The establishment of a national bank, whilst it itself not ‘necessary and 
proper,’ was absolutely essential if Congress was to exercise those fiscal 
responsibilities entrusted to the national legislature by the Constitution. The 
establishment of the national bank was a procedural step to implement the powers 
granted to Congress. Having concluded that the establishment of the bank was 
within the Constitution it was a small step for Marshall to hold that Maryland’s 
attempt to tax the bank was unconstitutional as the United States law establishing the 
bank was, by virtue of Article 6 of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, 
binding upon the legislatures and tribunals of every state.98 
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          Thus, in the space of three weeks, the Court had established not only the 
supremacy of the federal government over claims of state sovereignty but also the 
position of the Court as the sole interpreter of the language and meaning of the 
Constitution by construing it in a such a way as to strengthen the union and send a 
message to the more vociferous states’ rights activists of the Supreme Court’s 
determination to uphold all federal laws and institutions authorised by a 
Constitution, ratified not by the states but by the citizens of the United States.   
                    Story had a further opportunity to rehearse his constitutional philosophy 
in Green v. Biddle (1823). Virginia had entered into a compact to cede to the United 
States the land which subsequently became the state of Kentucky with a condition 
that existing land grants would be recognized. He held that Kentucky statutes 
restricting those grants were constitutional infringements of the compact which was 
protected by the ‘full faith and credit’ clause of Article 4, Section 1 of the 
Constitution. Kentucky sought a rehearing at which Justice Washington confirmed 
Story’s view.99 
          Story shaped commercial law by stressing the position of negotiable 
instruments as the cornerstone of trade in Mandeville v. Welch (1820), holding that 
bills of exchange and promissory notes were distinguishable from all other forms of 
contract because they were prima facie evidence of valuable consideration between 
the original parties and against third parties.100 He was also active politically, 
drawing up a memorandum to Congress in June 1820 on behalf of the merchants of 
Salem protesting the intention of Congress to discontinue credits on revenue bonds, 
abolish drawbacks, and other restrictions on commerce; controls which in his view 
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would ‘injure, if not eventually destroy some of the most important branches of the 
commerce and navigation of the United States.’ The memorandum was lengthy, 
well-reasoned, and displayed a detailed, practical and theoretical understanding of 
business economics and was well received by Salem men of commerce.101   
          As has been observed, merchant seamen benefited from Story’s opinions 
alleviating the rigours of an often harsh existence. They had the benefit of those 
fundamental unalienable rights of ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’ 
guaranteed to them by the Declaration of Independence but, in practice, denied to 
African slaves and Native Americans. As the southern state courts refused to 
recognize these basic rights, the only hope of redress for the disadvantaged lay with 
the federal courts. On the Court, Story did his best for the oppressed Cherokees but 
failed to aid the subjugated African-American.102 
          Story’s protection of Native Americans got off to a poor start in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh (1823) when he silently acquiesced in the unanimous opinion delivered by 
Marshall that the Indian tribes did not own the land on which they lived. They were 
mere tenants at the will of the United States, to whom the land, formerly owned by 
the Crown by right of discovery, had passed upon independence.103 Story made 
amends in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) when the Cherokees sought to invoke 
the original jurisdiction of the Court by way of an injunction to prevent Georgia 
from exerting repressive laws over their nation. The majority held the Cherokee 
Nation not to be a foreign state but merely a ‘domestic dependent nation,’ and, 
therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. Justice 
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Thompson in his dissenting opinion, joined in by Story, declared the Cherokees a 
foreign state within Article III and that an injunction was necessary to prevent 
further breaches of Cherokee treaties by Georgia.104 Story, writing to Richard Peters 
at the conclusion of the case, expressed his feelings on the plight of the Cherokees 
when he ‘rejoiced that Mr Justice Thompson has done what I requested, that is, 
stated my concurrence with him. I am more than satisfied we are right.’105 
          In Worcester v. Georgia, (1832) Story was a member of the Court which held 
unlawful Georgia’s imprisonment of a missionary who had entered Cherokee lands 
without obtaining a licence from the state. The Court declared unconstitutional 
Georgia’s law imposition of such a requirement, holding that the United States had 
the sole right of dealing with the Indian Nations. Although not accepting the 
Cherokees as the owners of the land, the Court sent a clear message to Georgia that a 
state had no right to harass the Cherokees. Unfortunately it was a pyrrhic victory as 
Georgia continued to force the Cherokees off their land and President Andrew 
Jackson refused to intervene.106 
        Story’s letters provide evidence of his feelings which could never express in a 
formal opinion, but provide an insight into his support for the majority opinion in 
Worcester. Before John Marshall delivered the opinion, Story wrote to his wife that 
he had been so impressed with by the two Cherokee chiefs he had met in 
Philadelphia but feared for the destruction of their race. He felt ‘as an American, 
disgraced by our gross violation of the public faith towards them.’107 Writing to 
Professor George Ticknor after the opinion had been delivered, Story correctly 
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predicted that Georgia, ‘full of anger and violence, would continue to harass the 
Cherokees and that the President would not interfere.’ He continued ‘The Court has 
done its duty, Let the nation do theirs.’108  The letters are noteworthy in two respects. 
Apart from revealing Story’s compassion for the Cherokees and his disgust at the 
nation’s treatment of them, it also shows his realization, that despite the rise in 
influence of the Court by the 1830’s, its orders were completely ineffective when 
faced with an intransigent state unwilling to obey them, and an unfriendly President, 
content to see them ignored. 
          Story’s sympathy for subjugated classes of society is evidenced by his efforts 
to stamp out the international slave trade. His circuit opinions demonstrated a 
determination to enforce stringently the 1807 Slave Trade Act prohibiting such 
traffic but he had little opportunity, writing for the Marshall Court, to expound his 
views. In The Plattsburgh (1825) he ordered forfeiture of a vessel for slave trade 
breaches where the original voyage began in the United States and held that the 
Court had jurisdiction whether or not the vessel was owned by citizens or 
foreigners.109 His views on the slave trade were re-stated and received world-wide 
attention in the Supreme Court opinion he wrote for the Court in The Amistad, an 
important case considered by the Supreme Court at that time on that issue.110 
Although decided in 1841, six years after the death of John Marshall, and, therefore, 
outside the scope of this research, no analysis of Story’s moral and judicial attitudes 
towards the kidnapping and transportation of Africans would be complete without a 
consideration of this opinion. He held that those abled bodied, of the 36 African men 
and boys and three girls, who had risen up, killed the master and taken over the 
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vessel, were exercising their right to freedom. The Court accepted them to be native 
born free Africans who had been unlawfully kidnapped and forcibly transported 
aboard a vessel engaged in the ‘heinous’ slave trade, and discharged them from 
custody, free to return to their homeland. They were not property to be returned to 
Spain. 
          Although Story rigorously enforced the 1807 Act, he was unable to help those 
slaves already in the United States. The Constitution, whilst not expressly using the 
word slave, in Article IV, Section 1, Clause 3, permitted the recapture of ‘any person 
held to service or labour in one state’ who had escaped to another state. In Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania (1842) Story, writing the majority opinion, upheld the Fugitive Slave 
Act 1793 and overturned the conviction of a man who had forcibly removed from 
Pennsylvania and returned a woman and her children to her ‘owner’ in Maryland. 
The removal contravened the 1826 Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law which 
provided for a judicial investigation before removal. Story held the Fugitive Slave 
Act constitutional because it was within Article IV. The Court struck down the 
Pennsylvania statute purporting to aid fugitives on the basis it ran contrary to the 
Constitution and federal law.111 Story laid emphasis on the belief that the Southern 
States would not have joined the Union had that clause been omitted from the 
Constitution. The holding was a victory of federal law over state law, in that only the 
federal authorities had the power to administer the Act was small comfort to the 
woman and her children returned to slavery in Maryland.  Story’s strict adherence to 
the Constitution prevailed over his religious and humanitarian beliefs that slavery 
was an evil institution. 
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          His academic achievements were of great importance because they 
underpinned his judicial contribution. Appointed the Dane Professor of Law in 1829, 
he strengthened the Harvard Law School and successfully promoted academic 
training for lawyers, replacing the sometimes hit and miss apprenticeship in a 
lawyer’s office. He introduced his students to the study of law through text books, 
lectures, and moots, and brought to life dry topics by relating his experiences on 
circuit and on the Court.112   Story’s academic output would have been prodigious 
for a man focussed wholly on scholarship. His industry was even more remarkable 
considering his commitment to the Court and the First Circuit. Between 1809 and 
1845 he edited or wrote thirteen works covering many branches of law, and, at the 
time of his death in 1845, he had begun to write Commentaries on Admiralty and 
Commentaries on the Law of Nations, and an autobiography.113 Arguably Story’s 
most important academic contribution to United States law was his three volume 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833). Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes speaking to the Harvard Law School Association in 1886 was fully 
justified, when referring to ‘Story’s epoch making Commentaries,’ in asserting that 
‘he has done more than any other English speaking man in this century to make the 
law luminous and more easy to understand.’114 
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Importing Common Law into the Federal Legal System 
                   It should be observed, immediately, that Story wished for a common law 
which could be modified to meet the needs of the United States. He said, when 
writing for the Court in Van Ness v. Pacard (1829), ‘The common law of England is 
not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with 
them its general principles and claimed it as their birth-right, but they…adopted only 
that portion applicable to their situation…The country was a wilderness, and the 
universal policy was to procure its cultivation and improvement.’115 Story was 
referring to the need for stability, the accommodation of an increasing population, 
and economic growth. He made it clear in a letter he wrote to the Supreme Court 
reporter, Henry Wheaton, in 1825, that his wish to codify United States law was 
borne not out of a visionary desire to establish new law but to make existing laws 
more accessible and understandable to the general public and to avoid the ‘labours 
and exhausting researches of the profession.’116   
          He did more than any other justice to promote English common law as the 
basis of United States jurisprudence, arguing that ‘The whole structure of our 
jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the common law.’117 He 
began, on circuit, by using common law to remedy criminal conduct not then 
covered by United States statutes, disagreeing with Justice Samuel Chase who, in 
United States v. Worrall, (1798) had insisted that before an act became a crime, it 
was for Congress to define the offence, fix a penalty, and give jurisdiction to a court 
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to deal with the matter.118 Chase’s circuit view was not followed by other justices on 
circuit but prevailed in the Supreme Court fourteen years later in United States v. 
Hudson and Goodwin, an allegation of libel on the President and Congress.119  That 
neither the Attorney General nor defence counsel argued the point made the decision 
to deny a common law jurisdiction in crime that much easier. The reasoning in 
Justice Johnson’s opinion of the Court was as much political as legal and is shown 
by his declaring the question ‘as having long been settled by public opinion.’120 The 
decision was not unanimous and, as there were no written dissents, it is not possible 
to identify those justices who refused to join the majority. Preyer (1986) believes the 
dissentients to have been Justices Washington and Story. She includes Story because 
within three months of the Hudson decision he was pressing government to 
authorize federal courts to use the common law to deal with public crimes not 
covered by statute.121   
          Unable to achieve a political solution, Story used the circuit court as a public 
platform to express his dissatisfaction with Hudson. In United States v. Clark 
(1813), when unable to deal with an allegation of perjury as a common law offence, 
Story remarked that he had never been able to satisfy himself as to the accuracy of 
Hudson and Goodwin.122  In the same term as Clark, Story attempted to draw a 
distinction between common law offences in the admiralty jurisdiction as opposed to 
the general criminal law, holding that the forcible taking of a prize was an offence 
contrary to common law in admiralty. Because the district judge disagreed the 
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matter came before the Supreme Court on a certificate of division of opinion. Story 
lost the day. Justices Livingston and Washington were prepared to join Story in 
reviewing Hudson and Goodwin but the Attorney General refused to argue the case, 
and Justice Johnson, delivering the Court’s opinion, once more had an easy task to 
reject the existence of common law jurisdiction in admiralty.123 Undeterred, Story 
changed tack and endeavoured to achieve consistency in federal criminal law by 
drafting a criminal code which later saw life as the Crimes Act 1825. The Act 
remedied the deficiencies of the Crimes Act of 1790 which made no provision for 
federal offences such as rape, burglary, arson, and many other serious crimes. It 
should be noted, however, that any deficiencies in federal criminal laws had a 
limited effect on the general administration of justice as the vast majority of criminal 
offences were dealt with under state laws.  
          His efforts to gain recognition of a common law jurisdiction in crime and 
admiralty having failed, Story turned his attention to commercial law and, in 
particular, to the federal courts’ jurisdiction in diversity cases where the parties were 
from different states. In Swift v. Tyson (1842), writing for the Court, Story held that 
whilst the federal courts were obliged to apply state statutory laws they could ignore 
state common law as the state courts’ decisions were merely evidence of what the 
law was. In the absence of an applicable state statute, the federal courts were entitled 
to formulate and apply rules of federal common law.124 Story regarded a body of 
federal common law essential to a uniform system of business law across the nation. 
Despite the fact that the decision was generally regarded as a diminution of state 
sovereignty, Swift v. Tyson stood for almost one hundred years until overruled by 
                                                          
123 United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. 415 (1816). 
124 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938).125 Unsuccessful in importing English 
common law into United States criminal and admiralty law, Story persevered and 
achieved his objective with federal commercial law. 
 
Conclusion 
          The many circuit and Supreme Court opinions of Justice Story reveal him as a 
justice who contributed to United States jurisprudence on many fronts, the most 
importance of which was his development of admiralty law both on circuit and on 
the Court. His circuit opinions reveal that he had more experience of admiralty cases 
than any other justice. That he wrote far more admiralty opinions for the Court than 
any other justice supports the view that he was the acknowledged expert. A 
comparison of his circuit and Supreme Court opinions show him to have had a 
consistently hard-line approach to breaches despite his opposition to embargo as a 
New England politician and as an advocate who defended many a ship’s master in 
forfeiture proceeding; a change of tack necessitated by his judicial role.  
          Story led the way in the strict enforcement of the embargo prohibition and set 
a standard for other justices to follow. In The Boston he called for a vigorous 
examination of defences to breaches of embargo laws to prevent a flood of what he 
considered to be spurious excuses, and, as he declared in The George, the increasing 
number of collusive captures of vessels. He felt that other justices were too ready to 
accept dubious excuses and said so in Robinson v. Hook when the widespread nature 
of the breaches was revealed in captured documents. He declared allegations of 
embargo breaches offences of strict liability and, in The Short Staple, he reversed the  
                                                          
125 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. 
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burden of proof  by holding that the owner or master of the vessel must show that 
the route deviation was necessary. He did the same in Ten Hogshead of Rum. This 
robust disposal of cases led to two reversals by the Court, in The Short Staple and in 
The Bothnea and The Jahnstoff. The Court held in both cases that Story had been too 
quick to condemn. Story dissented in the Short Staple, feeling strongly that the 
master had hoodwinked the Supreme Court.  Despite Story’s personal feelings, these 
cases show that, as a justice sworn to uphold the law, he was duty bound to enforce 
the embargo laws. That he did so with vigour and encouraged other justices to do 
likewise, reflected the great animosity felt by the nation towards Britain’s invasion 
of American soil during the War of 1812. The fact that the harmful economic effects 
of the embargo were more keenly felt by America than Britain mattered not. The 
Courts were there to enforce the will of the people through the edicts of the 
Congress. 
          Story’s admiralty contribution extended beyond the embargo cases. In Harden 
v. Gordon et al; The George; Orne v. Townsend; and United States v. Ruggles, he 
tempered the harsh realities of life at sea by laying down rules which protected the 
wages and working conditions of masters and seamen and, at the same time, went 
some way towards ensuring that merchant ships were adequately manned. He   
clarified the law and evidential burdens in marine insurance cases on such 
misrepresentations as to seaworthiness, sailing dates, and deviations from route 
which were material to the risk and avoided the policy. (Tidmarsh v. Washington 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co, Inc; Bayard v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. Inc; Glidden v. Manufacturers’ Insurance Co.). The importance of 
Story’s most notable marine insurance opinion, Delovio v. Boit et al, holding that the 
federal courts had jurisdiction under the Constitution over marine insurance cases, is 
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demonstrated by the fact that it was a circuit opinion followed by the Court in 
Insurance Company v. Dunham some fifty-five years later.                                                                                                                                      
          The extent to which the United States or individual states had adopted English 
common law was very much an issue during the formative years of the federal courts 
and Story was in the forefront of that debate. He believed the common law to be the 
fundamental basis of federal law but that it should be modified in such a way as to 
meet the particular needs of the American people. His efforts to import common law 
into the criminal jurisdiction foundered with the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Hudson & Goodwin and his further attempt to deal with perjury at common law 
failed in United States v. Clark. He did, however, achieve success in clarifying the 
criminal law when his draft code saw life as The Crimes Act 1825.  Story was again 
reversed by the Court when his attempt to import common law into admiralty law 
failed in United States v. Coolidge but his perseverance paid off in Swift v. Tyson 
when he established that, in diversity cases, the federal courts were entitled to apply 
rules of federal common law in diversity cases. The importance of Story’s impact in 
this aspect of United States law is that Swift v. Tyson stood for almost 100 years. His 
objective in promoting the common law, as it was with his codification of the law, 
was to give United States law more certain foundation to enable citizens and their 
legal representatives to have a better understanding of their rights and obligations. 
          Story’s opinions and correspondence are valuable insights into the inner 
workings of the Marshall Court and the justices’ resolve to achieve the necessary 
uniformity of federal law and procedure to ensure a smooth transition from colony to 
republic. The letters passing from Marshall to Story reveal how the justices assisted 
each other with issues they met on circuit and the exchange of semi-annual reports 
between Story and Washington of interesting cases on their respective circuits 
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indicate the importance to the justices of consistency in decision-making throughout 
the federal jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee is a good example of Story’s 
desire for uniformity. His denial of the right of state courts to interpret the 
Constitution was based solely on the need for uniformity and to avoid the confusion 
of opinions which might vary from state to state.  Story’s letters to his friends reveal 
how keenly the justices felt the need to present an authoritative face to the nation 
with the single opinion of the Court; how the pleasant collegiality of the justices’ 
lodging house facilitated unanimity; and how, despite the view of some scholars that 
most associates contributed little, there was full discussion before decisions were 
reached.  
          Joseph Story was by far the most effective associate justice of the Marshall 
Court. His was the greatest contribution to the Court and to the shaping of United 
States law. His development of the admiralty jurisdiction, his codification of 
criminal law, the establishment of common law as the basis of federal commercial 
law in disparity cases, and his willingness to assist other justices to achieve 
uniformity, mark him as a judge whose influence on United States law played its 
part in the stability of the Early Republic.      
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Chapter Five                                    
Justice Smith Thompson: Promoting Commerce, State Sovereignty, and the 
Protection of Minority Interests 
 
          Justice Smith Thompson is another associate justice of the Marshall Court 
whose jurisprudence has been largely ignored by scholars, despite his service as a 
state and federal judge for thirty-six years. All past examinations of his career have 
emphasized his political aspirations; his ambition to be President of the United 
States and New York State Governor. This research looks beyond efforts to achieve 
high political office to evaluate his jurisprudence by an examination of his state and 
federal opinions and to establish the extent to which those opinions contributed to 
the shaping of United States law between 1802 and 1835. Whilst the opinions 
disclose a considerable expertise in commercial law based on a desire to encourage 
trade and free enterprise, the chapter focusses the two most important aspects of his 
judicial writing. First, before he went to the U.S. Supreme Court, his efforts to 
promote the right of states to govern their own affairs without excessive federal 
government interference and second, whilst on the Court, his attempts to interpret 
and influence federal law in such a way as to protect the perilous position of the 
Native American and African slave. 
          There is no recent scholarship on Thompson and no analysis of his work as a 
Supreme Court justice sitting on circuit. Dunne’s seventeen page outline, in 
Friedman & Israel, was written forty-three years ago.1 Roper’s excellent biography, 
although published in 1987, was a PhD thesis submitted fifty years ago and focusses 
on Thompson’s political aspirations, his time on the New York Supreme Court, and 
                                                          
1 Gerald T. Dunne, ‘Smith Thompson,’ in Leon Freidman & Fred L. Israel, The Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court, 1789-1969; Their Lives and Major Opinions (New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1969), 475-492.  
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contribution to the opinions of the Marshall Court. Roper did not examine 
Thompson’s opinions on circuit in New York, Connecticut and Vermont. 2  White 
wrote an eleven page portrait of Thompson which emphasized his political 
aspirations but that was some twenty-five years ago.3 It follows, therefore, that this 
research is the first in depth examination of both Justice Thompson’s state and 
federal circuit opinions in order to understand the development of his jurisprudence 
in each jurisdiction.  
          Other scholars agree with White that Thompson was a man desperately 
seeking high political office. They base their views on the fact that, notwithstanding 
having received an offer of a seat on the Supreme Court, he sought support as a 
presidential candidate and, whilst a serving Supreme Court justice, he stood 
unsuccessfully against Martin van Buren for the governorship of New York in 1828. 
Clearly Thompson’s involvement in New York politics and his time as Secretary of 
the Navy gave him a taste for political power. Dunne described Thompson as ‘one of 
the most politically active and ambitious Justices ever to sit on the Supreme Court;’4 
a view echoed by Hall (2001) in a four page sketch, highly critical of Thompson, 
painting him as ‘a man of insatiable political appetites.’5 When too much emphasis 
is placed by scholars on Thompson’s political aspirations there is a real risk that his 
jurisprudence is neglected. His political manoeuvring has no bearing on his 
                                                          
2 Donald Malcolm Roper, Mr Justice Thompson and the Constitution (New York: Garland Publication, 
1987) A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, July 1963. 
3 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 307-318. Eight of the eleven pages 
detail Thompson’s efforts to achieve political office. 
4 Dunne, ‘Smith Thompson,’ 475. 
5 Timothy L. Hall, ‘Smith Thompson,’ Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary (New 
York: Facts on File Inc., 2001, 70-73, 70. 
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performance as a justice which is why this chapter focusses on his state and federal 
jurisprudence. 
          There is in the scholarship only passing mention of Thompson’s work as a 
judge. Hall regards Thompson as a justice of only modest ability whose tenure was 
‘a mostly unremarkable service.’6  Dunne’s evaluation of Thompson is not as harsh 
but he has difficulty in in deciding whether he was a real man of stature.7 Whilst 
nowhere near as active as Marshall and Story, Thompson, like Livingston, was far 
removed from the near silent acquiescence of Justices Todd and Duvall. An 
examination of his state and federal opinions reveals a significant contribution to the 
shaping of American law in the fields of contract law and states’ rights. He was also 
a justice prepared to speak out in support of causes he held dear which defied the 
convention of unanimity and put him in dissent, particularly by his support for the 
Cherokee Nation in their fight for relief from Georgia’s oppression. 
          Both Dunne and Hall address the impact of Thompson’s presence on the 
deliberations of a Court largely composed of justices holding Federalist views. 
Dunne describes Thompson as ‘a frontrunner…leading the reaction against Chief 
Justice Marshall’s ideas on the pre-emptive nature of centralist federalism’; pre-
emptive in the sense of a tactical interpretation of the Constitution to consolidate the 
power of national government.8 Hall rightly points out that Thompson’s presence on 
the Court in Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) placed Marshall in dissent.9 He goes a step 
further by asserting that Thompson’s presence on the Court ‘spelled… the gradual 
                                                          
6 Hall, ‘Smith Thompson.’ 70. 
7 Dunne, ‘Smith Thompson,’ 490. 
8 Ibid. 475.  
9 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). Thompson joined Washington, Johnson & 
Trimble in holding that a New York insolvency law which relieved debtors of their obligations in 
respect of debts created after the passing of the law did not violate the prohibition in the Constitution 
of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Story and Duvall joined in Marshall’s dissent. 
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eclipse of John Marshall’s momentous influence over the course of American law.’10 
However, Thompson’s recorded dissents only offer mild criticism of Marshall’s 
federalist centralism.  He dissented in only one in eighty cases on the Marshall Court 
as opposed to one in ten on the New York Supreme Court.11 He was not as active in 
opposition as his colleague Justice William Johnson who between 1824 and 1833 
wrote fifteen dissents out of a total of four hundred and forty-four cases, a ratio of 
approximately one in thirty cases.12 Abraham (1974) observes that, although 
Thompson occasionally stood up to Marshall toward the end of the Chief Justice’s 
tenure, like most others, he generally fell under Marshall’s influence despite their 
political differences.13 I see the main reason for Thompson generally falling in line 
with his brethren as not due to Marshall’s charm but rather to his acceptance of the 
need for unanimity.  
 
              State Supreme Court: Statutory Interpretation and New York ‘Hard Law’ 
          By the time he was nominated by President James Monroe in 1823 for a seat 
on the United States Supreme Court, Thompson had already held high political and 
legal office, having been elected to the New York State Legislature in 1800 and the 
following year serving as a delegate to the New York Constitutional Convention. In 
1802 he was appointed to the New York Supreme Court where he served as an 
associate justice for twelve years until named as Chief Justice, resigning in 1818 in 
                                                          
10 Hall, 73. 
11 The proportions of Supreme Court dissents are calculated by joining the data in Roper, 110 with the 
chart of Donald Morgan, William Johnson: The Great Dissenter, 189 and counting the number of 
Supreme Court cases between 1824 and 1835 which results in 7 dissents from 551 cases.  
12 Calculated from the number of cases in the United States Reports and a combination of the dissents 
set out in the charts of Roper and Morgan set out above. 
13 Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents and Senators (Lanham: Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1999), 69. First edition, 1974. 
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order to take up the duties of Secretary of the Navy in President Monroe’s cabinet. It 
follows that when he began sitting on the United States Supreme Court in 1824, he 
brought with him the huge political and legal expertise gained over almost a quarter 
of a century and was well qualified to have an impact on the development of federal 
law. 
           Thompson achieved high judicial office because, ability apart, he was very 
well connected. He was born in Dutchess County, New York in 1768. His father was 
a prosperous farmer who had been an anti-federalist delegate to the New York 
ratification convention of 1788. Thompson was graduated from Princeton in 1788 
and read law in the local office of James Kent with whom he would later spend 
many years on the New York Supreme Court. In 1792 he went into partnership with 
Kent and Gilbert Livingston, a member of the very politically powerful New York  
family whose Republican leanings dominated state politics for many years. His 
integration into the family was complete when he married, in 1794, Gilbert’s 
daughter Sarah, cousin of Brockholst Livingston whom Thompson was to replace on 
the Marshall Court.14   
          As with Justice Washington, precedent loomed large in Thompson’s 
jurisprudence. In Jackson v. Sill (1814) Thompson remarked that it was preferable to 
follow established legal principles even though it might mean injustice in particular 
cases. He was against bending legal principles to suit a particular case.15 Thus, on 
occasion, consistency triumphed over justice.  He was also reluctant to hold as 
unconstitutional any New York state laws.  Apart from a general inclination to 
preserve the status quo and uphold states’ rights, Thompson was unwilling to strike 
                                                          
14 The above biographical details are taken from Gerald T. Dunne, ‘Smith Thompson,’ in Friedman and 
Israel, Justices of the United States Supreme Court, supra, 475-476. 
15 Jackson, ex dem. Van Vechten et al. v. Sill et al., 11 Johnson’s Reports, 201, 220 (1814). 
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down state legislation. This was because he had sat on the New York Council of 
Revision whose task, between 1777 until its abolition in 1821, was to review all bills 
before they became law. The Council had the power to return the bill to the 
legislature with written objections for reconsideration. On extremely rare occasions 
bills were passed despite objections provided there was a two thirds majority of the 
Senate and the Assembly. Between 1800 and 1821 of seventy bills vetoed by the 
Council, only seven bills became law despite Council objections and during his time 
on the Council, Thompson raised objections to only four bills.16 It was, therefore, 
most unlikely that a justice who had played a large part in the passage of legislation 
would be eager to declare that law unconstitutional. This was the result of the failure 
of an immature system of government to follow the concept, crucial to any 
democracy, of separating the powers of the state legislature and the judiciary.     
          Thompson went further in his support of legislation by examining the 
background to state legislative acts when, in People v. Utica Insurance (1818), he 
declared that the Court must look to the intention of the framers of the statute when 
its words were obscure or doubtful. Surprisingly, he took the view that even where 
the wording of the legislation was clear it should be ignored if it conflicted with the 
makers’ intention. He declared that the intention of the legislature ‘ought to be 
followed… in the construction of a statute, although such construction seems 
contrary to the letter of the statute.’17 Justice Spencer, in disagreeing with 
Thompson, handed down an approach to statutory interpretation which would have 
had more appeal to lawyers advising clients on the import of legislation. He asserted 
                                                          
16 This data has been extracted form tables in Alfred Billings Street, The Council of Revision of the 
State of New York: Its History, a History of the Courts with which its Members were Connected, 
Biographical Sketches of its Members, and Its Vetoes (Albany: William Gould, 1859). 
17 The People v. The Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johnson Reports, 380-381. 
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that ‘Courts of law cannot consider the motives which may have influenced the 
legislature, or their intentions, any further than they are manifested by the statute 
itself.’18 Thompson’s attitude to statutory interpretation in Utica owed more to 
politics than the law. 
          Where the wording of a statute coincided with legislative intent, Thompson 
interpreted the legislation strictly. This he did in Tillman v. Lansing (1809) when 
construing an act of 1801 allowing debtors the liberty of the jail. This device 
avoided keeping the debtor in a cell and permitted him the freedom of the jail walls 
so that he could conduct some business in an attempt to repay his debts. A kindly 
sheriff permitted the debtor to attend church each Sunday outside the jail walls. 
Thompson ruled against the sheriff in an action against him by creditors for 
permitting the debtor to ‘escape’ (even though he had not escaped) because the 
debtor’s voluntary return after each service was not permitted by the statute.19 Roper 
uses Tillman as an example of what he described as ‘New York Supreme 
Court…hard law.’20 By ‘hard law’ he means handing down justice in a manner in 
which the strict letter of the law was paramount to the apparent justice of the case. 
The state reports reveal several opinions supporting this analysis. Thus in 
Thompson’s first reported state opinion, Henderson v. Brown (1803), he held 
personally liable a revenue collector who had levied execution on goods in a theatre 
which was mistakenly designated as a dwelling-house on a list provided by his 
superiors. Fortunately for the collector, Justice Livingston writing for the majority 
held that he should not be held responsible for the mistakes of his superiors.21 
                                                          
                 18 Ibid. 394. 
19 Tillman v. Lansing, 4 Johnson Reports, 45. 
20 Roper, supra, 50. 
21 Henderson v. Brown, Caines’ Reports, vol. 1, 92, May 1803. 
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Undeterred, Thompson tried again. This time in Walker v. Swartout (1815), 
Thompson held an army quarter-master general personally liable for work done for 
the army by boatmen simply because he had said, ‘My word is sufficient. I will pay 
you when the work is done.’ Happily for the officer, the majority of the court 
disagreed, preferring the view taken by Chief Justice Marshall in Hodgson v. Dexter 
that when a public officer acted in the line of his duty and by legal authority, his 
contracts were public and not personal.22 Marshall had observed in Hodgson that no 
prudent man would consent to become a public agent if he was to be held personally 
liable on a public contract.23  
          Thompson managed to carry the court with him, in Gill v. Brown (1815), 
holding an army quartermaster personally liable for the cost of hiring a schooner 
solely for government use simply because he did not make it clear that he was 
merely an agent of the federal government.24  Thompson’s unwillingness to protect 
public officials even when they acted in good faith was further demonstrated by his 
opinion for the Supreme Court in Imlay v. Sands (1804) where a collector seized the 
plaintiff’s brig and cargo for an alleged breach of the non-intercourse laws. The 
seizure was confirmed by the state district judge, only later to be reversed by the 
state circuit judge. Thompson acknowledged that the officer’s actions were bona fide 
and according to his best judgment, and it appeared that he should be protected from 
personal liability, but held that the Court was bound to ‘pronounce the law as we 
find it and leave cases of hardship to legislative provision.’25 This restrictive 
approach was inconsistent with his general attitude towards encouraging commerce. 
                                                          
22 Walker v. Swartout, Johnson’s Reports. Vol. 12, 445. October 1815. 
23 Hodgson v. Dexter, 5 U.S. 345, 363 (1803). 
24 Gill v. Brown, Johnson’s Reports. Vol. 12. p. 386. October 1815. 
25 Imlay v. Sands, Caine’s Reports. Vol. 1 p. 572. February 1804. 
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An appreciable amount of business was carried on between the citizen and officials 
on behalf of local and national governments which required officials to focus on the 
terms of the contract and not to worry about the possibility of personal liability.   
          Thompson’s and the New York court’s ‘hard’ case law was of little help to 
purchasers of goods which were not up to standard unless there was fraud or an 
express warranty as to fitness. This left the unfortunate buyer facing the maxim 
‘caveat emptor.’ An extreme case was that of Seixas v. Woods (1804) in which the 
plaintiff bought wood described in an advertisement as braziletto. He was supplied 
with the much less valuable peacham wood.  Justices Thompson and Kent, with 
Chief Justice Lewis dissenting, reversed the jury’s verdict in favour of the plaintiff, 
holding that in the absence of fraud or an express warranty, the plaintiff failed. It is 
difficult to understand why the court did not consider the advertisement or the bill of 
parcels accompanying the wood describing it as braziletto as an express warranty. In 
effect the Court placed on purchasers the burden of examining the goods before 
finalizing the contract.26 The problem with that decision was that it put the purchaser 
at risk of receiving inferior quality goods when it was often impracticable to 
examine the merchandise because of the distances involved in travelling to inspect. 
It also was contrary to the general trend of the courts to promote commercial activity 
by ensuring that purchasers actually received the goods for which they had 
contracted. In this respect the decision lagged behind economic change and 
purported to impose face to face contractual relationships when often inspection was 
not possible because merchants were trading very much at arms-length when deals 
had to be effected quickly or be lost whilst, for example, a New York buyer 
                                                          
26 Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines Reports, 48.  
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spending time arranging for an agent to inspect the sellers goods in New Orleans. A 
purchaser who bought braziletto should not have been obliged to accept some other 
inferior product. 
          Despite the occasional unfathomable opinion, Thompson believed that that the 
court should promote commercial life by ensuring that merchants knew clearly the 
basis on which contractual rights would be protected. His general approach was that 
all contracts were to be construed according to the law of the place where the 
contract was made and any contract which offended common law or violated the 
policy or spirit of a statute would be void ab initio.27 In his first reported state 
opinion, Carpenter v. Butterfield (1802), he held that it was not permissible, after the 
plaintiff had sued the defendant for debt, for the defendant to purchase a promissory 
note from a third party payable by the plaintiff in order to set it off against the 
plaintiff’s claim. Thompson took the view that to allow such a ploy ‘would 
embarrass the circulation of this species of paper,’ as it would make it unsafe for a 
creditor to sue if he had paper outstanding against him.28 Furthermore, in Mumford 
v. M’Pherson (1806) he held inadmissible a parol warranty that a vessel was copper 
bottomed where the written contract was silent on the issue. He considered it unsafe 
to allow a contract to rest partly in writing and partly in parol. His reasoning was 
clear. The parties must ensure that all material terms were reduced to writing, 
otherwise the outcome of any action on the contract would be difficult to predict.29 
The promissory note case of Tittle v. Beebee (1811) is typical of Thompson’s 
opinions protecting the rights of honest men of business when he observed, ‘It has 
been repeatedly ruled in this court, that we will recognize and protect the rights of an 
                                                          
27 Smith v. Smith, 2 Johnson’s Reports, 241 (1807). 
28 Carpenter v. Butterfield, Johnson’s Reports, 1799- 1803. vol. 3. 145. July 1802. 
29 Mumford v. M’Pherson. Johnson’s Reports, 1806-1823. vol. 1. 417. August 1806. 
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assignee of a chose in action. (e.g. the right to enforce payment of a debt).’30 Bills of 
exchange and promissory notes were crucial to the smooth running of commercial 
life and the court had to ensure, if confidence was to remain in these documents, that 
the holder in due course would have his rights enforced. 
          Crucial to any system of justice, whether it be at state or federal level, was the 
speedy resolution of disputes as all too often justice delayed was justice denied. 
Thompson was aware of the need to simplify legal principles to achieve that object. 
He demonstrated this in the marine insurance case of Stevens v. Columbian 
Insurance Company (1805) when he had to decide whether on the total loss of a 
vessel the gross or net amount of freight was recoverable.  He held for what he 
considered to be the straightforward gross amount which was ‘equal, simple, and 
easily ascertained.’ The net amount, on the other hand, would lead to much litigation 
and uncertainty as to the deductions to be made such as wages and provisions had 
the vessel arrived safely in port.31   
          His wish for certainty in the developing law and, wherever possible, the 
preservation of existing rights to property was illustrated by the admiralty case of 
Grant & Swift v. M’Lachlin (1809). In that case a vessel illegally captured by the 
French was taken to a Spanish port and left to rot. The Defendants paid $50 for her 
at auction, and having spent $2000 on repairs sailed her back to New York where the 
original owners claimed her back. Thompson had no hesitation in holding that the 
sale by the Spanish authorities to the Defendants must be recognized if derivative 
titles were to be safeguarded.32  
                                                          
30 Tuttle v. Beebee, Johnson’s Reports, 1806-1823. vol. 8. 154. May 1811.  
31 Stevens v. Columbian Insurance Company, Caine’s Reports, vol. 3, 46. May 1805. 
32 Grant & Swift v..M’Lachlin, Johnson’s Reports, 1806-1823, 39. February 1809. 
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          The juries in state cases, just as in federal circuit courts, were the cornerstone 
of the developing legal system and their verdicts were supported by justices 
wherever possible. This is shown by Thompson’s refusal of a new trial in the marine 
insurance case of Barnewell v. Church (1803) when he observed to counsel, ‘These 
points were decided by a respectable jury of merchants.’ The remark also gives an 
insight into the quality of juries, at least in commercial cases.33 However, 
Thompson, like Livingston, was prepared to reverse a jury’s verdict when he 
believed it was plainly wrong. Thus in McConnell v. Hampton (1815) he ordered a 
new trial in a case where a jury had awarded $9,000 damages to a private citizen 
who had been wrongfully arrested and detained for five days by an army officer with 
threats to court martial and hang him as a spy. Thompson thought that the jury’s 
passions were so inflamed as to mislead their judgments on the amount of 
damages.34 Whereas, in Borden v. Fitch (1818) a jury had awarded $5,000 to the 
plaintiff when the defendant had enticed the plaintiff’s daughter away by falsely 
representing that his wife had died and he was unmarried. Thompson thought the 
award was high but refused to intervene.35 Two apparently conflicting approaches 
are explained by the aggravating features of each case. In McConnell  it was 
accepted that the officer had acted under an honest although mistaken opinion that 
he had the right to try the plaintiff on a charge for treason, whereas, in Borden, the 
Defendant had ‘debauched’ the plaintiff’s daughter by falsely representing that his 
former wife was dead. In McConnell, Thompson underlined his support of the jury 
system by stressing that applications to set aside jury awards should be looked at 
with caution and declaring that he would do so only where the damages were 
                                                          
33 Barnewell v. Church, Caine’s Reports. vol.1, 230. August 1803. 
34 McConnell v. Hampton, Johnson’s Reports, vol. 12, 235. May 1815. 
35 Borden v. Fitch, Johnson’s Reports, vol. 15, 139. January 1818.  
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outrageous or manifestly exceeded the injury sustained. Overturning a jury’s award 
of damages is a difficult area because it involves a judge usurping the function of a 
jury to order a new trial. The perennial problem is where the line is to be drawn. 
Justice Van Ness by his dissent did not feel the jury McConnell had awarded a 
manifestly excessive sum.  
          Throughout the whole period of Thompson’s sixteen year tenure the state 
court looked for guidance to past state supreme court authorities which, of course, 
were readily retrieved because of the excellent system of law reporting in place in 
New York. It also relied heavily on English authorities and there are very few 
opinions reported in Caine and Johnson without favourable references to Lords 
Mansfield, Holt, Ellenborough, Kenyon and Sir William Blackstone.  Blackstone is 
cited so often as his four volume Commentaries on the Laws of England, first 
published in 1764, quickly became required reading for every colonial lawyer and an 
American edition, which included United States cases, was first published by St. 
George Tucker in 1803.36  Tucker’s version was based on his lectures at the College 
of William and Mary where John Marshall and Bushrod Washington had attended to 
hear the law lectures of George Wythe.  The frequent references to Blackstone in 
New York State Supreme Court reports and the United States Supreme Court reports 
support the contention of  MacGill and Newmyer that his Commentaries did more to 
shape American legal education and thought than any other single work.’37 
                                                          
36 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Reference to The Constitution and Laws, of 
the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Philadelphia: 
William Young Birch, and Abraham Small, 1803). Lawbook Exchange reprint, 2011). 
37 Hugh C. MacGill and R. Kent Newmyer, ‘Legal Education and Legal Thought, 1790-1920’ in 
Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins, The Cambridge History of Law in America. Vol II. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 40. 
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          Novel points arose or conflicting opinions required resolution for which 
Blackstone and others had no answer, and the court had to make the first ruling as 
occurred in Foot v. Tracy (1806) where the court had to decide whether in a libel 
action the defendant could give general evidence of the plaintiff’s character. 
Thompson observed that counsel had been ‘unable to furnish us with much aid from 
the decided cases and our practice on circuit has not been uniform, We are left, 
therefore, pretty much at large to establish such a rule as will be most just.’38  
          Justice Thompson’s judicial experience at the date of his appointment to the 
United States Supreme Court was far greater than that of Justice Livingston. 
Although Thompson delivered only 250 opinions during his 16 years in New York 
he will have heard the arguments and the court’s opinions in almost 4,500 hearings 
during that period as opposed to Justice Livingston’s 1000 cases in 4 years. Whilst 
Livingston’s judicial experience upon appointment to the Court may properly be 
described as extensive, Thompson as both associate and chief justice had had a far 
superior grounding as a judge than any justice who sat on the Marshall Court. He 
was, therefore, admirably qualified to take his place on the nation’s highest court.  
          His sixteen year tenure as an Associate and later Chief Justice in New York 
was characterized by a determination to preserve property rights and to promote 
commerce by formulating principles of contract law and practice, and to assure 
merchants that rights and obligations arising under bills of exchange and promissory 
notes would be enforced by the court. His rigid adherence to precedent which he 
accepted occasionally might result in injustice and his willingness to find officials 
personally liable when acting for state and national government give the impression 
                                                          
38 Foot v. Tracy, Johnson. Vol. 1, 46. February 1806. 
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of an unsympathetic tribunal; very much at odds with his later efforts on the 
Supreme Court to protect vulnerable minorities. There is a tension apparent between 
his function as a judge and as a politician demonstrated by a refusal to strike down 
state legislation and an insistence on looking beyond the clear wording of an Act to 
seek the political intent of its framers.     
 
Contractual Obligations on the Second Circuit and on the Court 
         Of Thompson’s seventy-seven federal circuit opinions reported in Elijah 
Paine’s casebook and included in the Federal Cases, only fifty-five are dated before 
1835. As Thompson sat until 1843, it is not possible to confirm that the remaining 
undated opinions were delivered during the life of the Marshall Court. Where it was 
not possible to discern from the body of the opinion an approximate date, the 
opinion has been disregarded. Consequently, there are only fifty-five reported cases 
which definitely fall within the period under review, which means that it is possible 
to present only an outline of Thompson’s circuit jurisprudence. However, that 
deficiency is alleviated to an extent by the knowledge of the justice’s considerable 
contract law experience on the New York Supreme Court underpinned by a 
knowledge of state supreme court opinions as there was no appreciable shift in 
approach from state to federal circuit court. Thompson continued to promote trade 
and was yet another justice who realized the need to protect the position of 
vulnerable seamen. His no-nonsense approach to the resolution of disputes and his 
firm handling of jury problems are evident from his circuit opinions. 
          Land disputes, commercial law and maritime cases account for most of the 
Thompson’s reported circuit opinions. His commercial law opinions cover the fields 
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of contract, partnership, bankruptcy and bills of exchange. Thompson’s enthusiasm 
to promote trade and encourage business enterprise was echoed in his federal circuit 
court opinions. Thus in Six Hundred and Fifty-One Chests of Tea v. United States 
(1826), he reversed the district judge’s forfeiture order upon a breach of payment of 
the correct amount of customs duties, ruling that forfeiture was appropriate only 
where there had been fraud, misconduct or negligence. He believed that care should 
be taken not to shackle trade or check the industry and enterprise of the merchant by 
penalizing him for genuine mistakes.39  His opinion in United States v. Hatch (1824) 
advanced maritime trade by ordering the forfeiture of a bond given by the master of 
a vessel because he had left his crew behind after a foreign voyage. Thompson 
praised the legislation which required such a bond and which was designed to guard 
against seaman being abandoned abroad. His observed that ‘our national strength 
depended upon it.’40 
          Thompson’s protection of seamen extended to ensuring that they were 
remunerated for their efforts and not at the mercy of unscrupulous masters or 
owners. In The Elizabeth v. Rickers et al (1831) he held that the punishment of 
seamen by the master after absence without leave, and continuing them in his 
employ, was a waiver of any claim to forfeiture of wages.41 Although in the previous 
year in The Cadmus v. Matthews et al. Thompson had held against the seamen for 
deserting the ship for trivial reasons, he believed that the Court should watch over 
and protect their rights because they were, ‘’generally ignorant and improvident and, 
probably very often signing the ship’s articles without knowing what they contain.’42 
                                                          
39 Six Hundred and Fifty-One Chests of Tea v. United States, 27 F. Cas. 253 (New York, April 1826). 
40 United States v. Hatch, 26 F. Cas. 220 (New York, April 1824). 
41 The Elizabeth v. Rickers et al. 8 F. Cas. 470 (New York, December 1831).  
42 The Cadmus v. Matthews et al., F. Cas. 977 (New York, December 1830). 
212 
 
          Thompson displayed a pragmatic approach to the preservation of long-
standing titles to land. In Barker v. Jackson (1826) a New York Act of 1797, which 
appointed commissioners to settle land disputes, had been sanctioned by state courts 
for thirty years, yet, the district judge held the act unconstitutional. In the report of 
the appeal to the circuit court no reasons are given for the district judge’s holding 
which, if undisturbed, would have resulted in the overturning of a large number of 
titles held by soldiers for military service.  Thompson overruled the district judge 
and his holding is a further demonstration of a common sense approach based very 
much on the reality of the situation and the preservation of the status quo. It was the 
solution of a politician. Had he held otherwise it would have thrown into confusion 
many titles to military bounty land.43  
          Thompson also encouraged tenants to take care of their holdings in Albee v. 
May (1834) by holding constitutional a state act of 1820 permitting the recovery of 
the value of improvements. He took the view that an ex post facto law was 
unconstitutional only if it was penal or criminal in nature.44 He also believed in 
attempting to achieve, wherever possible, the intention of a title deed, as in Jackson 
v. Sprague (1825), where the boundaries described in a deed were inconsistent with 
each other, Thompson did not avoid the document. He resolved the case by 
accepting those boundaries which best served the prevailing intention set out in the 
deed. In other words, he was a judge who sought solutions rather than taking 
technical points which defeated the parties’ wishes.45  
           His opinions on procedural points reveal a confident and very practical 
approach to the disposal of court business. This was particularly so in discharging 
                                                          
43 Barker v. Jackson, 2 F. Cas. 811 (New York, October 1826). 
44 Albee v. May, 1 F. Cas. 134 (Vermont, May 1834). 
45 Jackson v. Sprague, 13 F. Cas. 253 (New York, September 1825). 
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juries unable to agree. He was not one for keeping a jury out for long periods if there 
was no possibility of agreement. In United States v. Perez (1823), an allegation of 
piracy, Thompson discharged the jury against the wishes of the district judge when 
the jury had retired for only four hours. He rejected the argument that juries should 
be discharged only for reasons of exhaustion, intoxication or mental illness. The  
Court affirmed his view on a certificate of division of opinion.46 Similarly in 
Cochrane v. Swartout (1834) he discharged a jury after only three hours when they 
could not agree on whether coke was coal and therefore liable to duty.47 In Brewster 
v. Gelston (1825), an action by an informer to recover part of forfeited goods, the 
jury returned a verdict which Thompson set aside and ordered a new trial. He made 
it plain that where a verdict was so obviously and palpably against the evidence, the 
judge had a duty not to permit it to stand.48 This was a confirmation of his view on 
the state supreme court of the fallibility of juries. 
          Thompson’s practical approach was again shown by his opinion in Griswold 
v. Hill (1825). Under the common law the death of a party abated the suit. However, 
adopting the English chancery practice, Thompson overcame the problem by 
predating the judgment to the day before the defendant’s death.49  He was a judge 
who liked to get to the heart of a case and disliked unnecessarily lengthy pleadings. 
In United States v. Williams (1826) when reversing the district judge and ordering a 
new trial, he complained that the records coming from the Northern District Court of 
New York were ‘vexatiously voluminous and…an abuse of pleading.’ He requested 
the district court to reduce the number of pleas in each appeal.50 This common sense 
                                                          
46 United States v. Perez, 27 F. Cas. 504 (New York, September 1823) 
47 Cochrane v. Swartout, 5 F. Cas. 1144 (New York, October 31, 1834). 
48 Brewster v. Gelston, 4 F. Cas. 82 (New York, April 1825). 
49 Griswold v. Hill, 11 F. Cas. 60 (New York, September 1825). 
50 United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 608 (New York, April 1826). 
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problem solving approach which eschewed technicalities and sought solutions was 
an ideal model for the efficient despatch of federal court business. 
          There is just one reported circuit opinion of Justice Thompson which reveals 
the importance to him of achieving cross circuit consistency. In United States v. 
Sturges et al. (1826), Thompson held that the Secretary of State’s discharge from 
imprisonment of a person indebted to the United States did not discharge him or his 
sureties from their obligations to pay the outstanding debt. In reaching this 
conclusion, Thompson followed a circuit opinion of Justice Story which was directly 
on the point and observed that it was crucial that there should be uniformity of 
decisions in the construction of statutes. He noted that Justice Story’s opinion had 
not been reviewed by the Supreme Court and stated that if the instant case was 
appealed there would be an opinion binding upon all United States circuit and 
district courts.51 Thompson’s observation reveals not only his view of the 
importance to the citizen and his lawyer of being able to make a reasonably accurate 
prediction of an action’s success, but also the esteem in which he held Justice 
Story’s opinions.  
          On the New York Supreme Court Thompson was one of five justices. By the 
time of his first sitting on the United States Supreme Court in Washington in 1824, 
he was one of seven.52 However, he was no ordinary newcomer. His expertise and 
confidence were high after sixteen year as a judge of New York State. He was well 
qualified to contribute to the discussions and his voice would be listened to with 
                                                          
51 United States v. Sturges, 27 F. Cas. 1358 (New York, April 1826). Justice Story’s circuit opinion 
was in the case of Hunt v. United States.12. F. Cas. 948 (Massachusetts, May 1812).  
52 The Judiciary Act of 1789 set the number of justices at six. The short lived Judiciary Act of 1801 
reduced the number to five and the Act of 1807 increased the bench to seven justices. 
215 
 
respect. His four years as New York chief justice and his political experience taught 
him the necessary man management skills and the benefits of group harmony. 
          During his years on the Marshall Court Thompson delivered 59 opinions of 
the Court.  He sat for 8 years after Marshall’s death, contributing a number of 
significant opinions whilst a member of the Taney Supreme Court. The majority of 
Thompson’s opinions of the Court mirrored his earlier judicial experience of 
commercial law and land disputes. There are thirteen commercial and ten land 
dispute opinions reported. The commercial cases included negotiable instruments, 
partnership and general contract disputes. Thompson applied his favoured  maxim of 
caveat emptor in The Monte Allegro (1824) when holding that neither the owner nor 
the marshal selling tobacco under a forced sale were liable for the inferior quality of 
the tobacco, as the owner had no control over the sale and the marshal had no 
authority to warrant the goods. It was for the buyer to inspect and satisfy himself on 
quality before the purchase.53 
          Thompson’s particular expertise lay in the regulation of rules facilitating 
commerce through the use of promissory notes and bills of exchange and he 
authored nine opinions setting out clear rules for merchants to follow. In Renner v. 
The Bank of Columbia, (1824) Thompson upheld the banks’ practice to demand 
payment of a note discounted by it up to the fourth day after the time specified in the 
original note.54 Banks often purchased the amount due under a promissory note at a 
discounted rate. Although he received a lesser sum, the merchant was saved a longer 
wait for the full amount and improved his cash flow. Further, in Bank of Columbia v. 
Lawrence (1828) Thompson set out rules of service of notices of non-payment of 
                                                          
53 The Monte Allegro, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 616 (1824). See the same principle applied at state level in 
the ‘braziletto wood’ case of Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines Reports, 48.  
54 Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 22. U.S. 581 (1824). 
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notes as ‘it was important for the safety of holders of commercial paper.’ In that case 
the Court reversed the circuit court and held that leaving the notice at the post office 
in Georgetown close to the defendant’s home was good service.55  In Boyce & Henry 
v. Edwards (1830) Thompson held that there must be clear evidence that a bill had 
been accepted.  Further guidance was given in Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, 34 U.S. 
33 (1835) when Thompson held that notice of dishonour should be given with 
reasonable diligence and a small difference in the description of the amount owed, 
particularly when there was only one note subsisting between the parties was not 
fatal to the claim.56 Thompson simplified an emerging system of credits so that 
traders knew their rights and obligations. 
           Whilst an analysis of Thompson’s opinions are useful in ascertaining his 
views on  states’ rights and the promotion of commerce, they also give an insight 
into how circuit experience was put to use in the full Court. United States v. Morris 
(1825) is a case in point. Thompson wrote the majority opinion absolving a marshal 
from liability who had levied execution but had handed the proceeds to the debtor. 
He had done so because the Secretary of the Treasury had exercised his power to 
remit a forfeiture or penalty under the revenue laws at any time after judgment and 
before monies were handed over to the collector. As the remission was in time the 
marshal’s actions were justified. The case is noteworthy, not because of the Court’s 
opinion but because of remarks made by Justice Johnson during his concurring 
opinion. He observed that he had considered this problem repeatedly on his circuit 
and he had reached his expressed view more than twelve years before. Such remarks 
were rarely expressed when actually delivering an opinion but it is likely that in 
                                                          
55 Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 26. U.S. (1 Pet.) 578 (1828). 
56 Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, 34 U.S.  
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conference after argument or during the course of counsel’s submissions, a justice 
would volunteer how he had dealt with the issue on circuit more than once in the 
past, thereby giving the court the undoubted benefit of  circuit court expertise. 
 
State Sovereignty 
          Perhaps the most difficult question which the courts had to determine from the 
beginning of the federal justice system was the legal and political relationship 
between the federal government and the several states. Whilst the Supreme Court 
consisted of justices allied to the Federalist cause, the Court was united in its 
construction of the Constitution in favour of federal government supremacy. 
However, justices, such as Johnson and Thompson nominated by Republican 
presidents, argued, wherever possible, for the right of states to regulate their own 
affairs.  Their dissents on this issue opened up healthy public debates essential to the 
democratic process.    
          Dunne classifies Thompson’s state court jurisprudence as ‘a states’ rights 
mercantilism tempered with a humanitarian overlay.’ Thompson acknowledged the 
right of the federal government to exercise the powers granted to it by the 
Constitution but those powers, wherever possible, were to be exercised concurrently 
by the states, particularly in relation to commerce. The issue faced by Thompson and 
other justices was where to draw the line between state and federal regulation. 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution empowered the federal government to 
control many matters including interstate commerce, laying and collecting certain 
taxes, coining money, and protecting the rights of authors to their writings. Obvious 
difficulties relating to state control presented themselves in those cases in which a 
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party had complied with the requirements of state law but had failed to follow the 
procedures laid down by federal law. An example of such a problem is to be found 
in Thompson’s dissent in the intellectual property dispute between law reporters in 
Wheaton v. Peters (1834). Henry Wheaton had reported and published twenty five 
volumes of Supreme Court opinions which he had annotated and included the 
arguments of counsel. His successor Richard Peters, heavily abridged Wheaton’s 
reports reducing them to six volumes which had a disastrous effect on the sales of 
Wheaton’s reports. Wheaton lost his copyright action essentially because of his 
failure to protect his work by complying with the provisions of federal copyright 
statutes. Justice John McLean, for the Court, held that there was no federal copyright 
common law. Thompson failed to carry the Court with his argument that a state was 
entitled to protect the intellectual rights of its citizens even though federal statutory 
protection was in place and that Wheaton should succeed because he had complied 
with Pennsylvania copyright law.57 This is a further example of the Thompson’s 
failure to persuade his colleagues that the states had the right to regulate their own 
affairs, despite that, by this time, the Chief Justice was the only remaining Federalist 
on the Court. All six associates had been nominated by presidents for their 
commitment to Republican values, the most important of which was the states’ 
power of self- government.58 It is plain that, Johnson and Thompson apart, the 
Republican principles held by the justices faced a twofold challenge upon 
appointment to the Court. First, the pressure to present a united front to the nation 
and second, coping with the Federalist centralization of the Marshall Court with its 
                                                          
57 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834). 
58 Justices Johnson, Todd and Duvall had been nominated by President Jefferson; Story by President 
James Madison; Thompson by President James Monroe; and McLean by President Andrew Jackson. 
See, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Beginnings & Its Justices, 1790-1991 (Commission 
of the Bicentennial of the United States, 1992).  
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emphasis on the supremacy of federal government and federal law in the 
preservation of vested property rights and the promotion of commerce. Dunne’s 
reference to Thompson’s ‘humanitarian overlay’ is more difficult to discern because, 
whilst Thompson attempted to mould the law to favour the interests of African 
slaves and the Cherokee Nation, his hard line approach to precedent on occasion 
disregarded the hardship to deserving litigants by sacrificing justice in individual 
cases for a more certain decision making process.  
          As an example of ‘states’ rights mercantilism,’ Dunne cites Thompson’s 
opinion in Livingston v. Van Ingen (1812) for the New York Court for the 
Correction of Errors in which he held that the state’s grant of a steamboat monopoly 
on New York waters did not infringe the power entrusted to Congress to regulate 
commerce.59 In that case Thompson was outspoken in his support of states’ rights 
observing that he viewed New York as ‘an independent sovereignty not having 
surrendered any of its constitutional powers to the United States.’ He believed that 
courts should declare legislative acts unconstitutional with ‘great caution and 
circumspection’ because those laws had been approved by the Council of Revision 
which included members of the judiciary.60 Twelve years after Livingston v. Van 
Ingen, the United States Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden strengthened the power 
of the federal government by holding that such a monopoly contravened the 
Constitution. Thompson was denied the opportunity of a powerful dissent as the 
opinion was handed down shortly before he took his seat on the Court.61  
          He was not always so strident over states’ rights. He concurred with Chief 
Justice Kent in denying a writ of habeas corpus to a father who wished his young 
                                                          
59 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507 (1812). 
60 Ibid. 562-563. 
61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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son’s discharge from the army. Thompson accepted that the state court had no right 
to intervene, although he thought that there might be cases in which it would be the 
duty of the state court to act but gave no indication of the circumstances which 
might provoke intervention. He did concede, however, that questions of jurisdiction 
between federal and state courts were ‘generally nice and delicate subjects,’ thereby 
highlighting the tension between federal and state jurisdictions.62  
          As a United States Supreme Court justice, Thompson’s attitude towards 
jurisdictional disputes between federal and state courts was influenced by his 
political and judicial connection with New York over many years and his general 
states’ rights stance. This is demonstrated by his reported circuit opinion in The 
Robert Fulton (1826). The plaintiffs obtained an order in state court for the 
attachment of a vessel for non-payment of a bill for work done and materials 
supplied. The owners subsequently attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
federal court. Thompson held that as there were concurrent jurisdictions the tribunal 
which first exercised jurisdiction should retain the claim.63 There was no suggestion 
that the issue should be re-opened by a ‘superior’ court. He was content that the state 
court was well able to deal with the matter.  In Ward v. Arrendo (1825) Thompson 
laid down strict conditions before a case could be transferred to federal circuit court. 
One defendant could not compel a co-defendant to transfer against his will and if a 
transfer was granted and the parties failed to enter appearances in circuit court, the 
case would be remanded to state court.64 Therefore, the transition from state to 
federal justice, in the early years, had no effect on his states’ rights judicial stance.  
                                                          
62 In the Matter of Jeremiah Ferguson, a Soldier in the United States Army, Johnson, vol. 9, 241. 
(August 1812). 
63 The Robert Fulton, 20 F. Cas. 869 (New York, April 1826). 
64 Ward v. Arrendo, 29 F. Cas. 167 (New York, April 1825). 
221 
 
          Three cases in 1827 demonstrated Justice Thompson’s determination to fight 
for his views on states’ rights.  In Ogden v. Saunders, Thompson’s vote was vital as 
the Court divided 4-3. He supported the majority view that a New York State 
insolvency statute which protected the property of debtors in respect of contracts 
subsequent to the statute did not contravene the contracts clause of the Constitution. 
The majority accepted that any legislation attempting to affect existing contracts 
would fall foul of ‘impairment of contracts’ clause but in respect of future contracts 
the parties were presumed to know the law. Thompson was not averse to a federal 
insolvency law but saw no reason why the states should not play a concurrent role in 
dealing with debtors within a state who were incapable of meeting their 
obligations.65  
          In Brown v. Maryland Thompson dissented from the majority holding that an 
act of a state legislature requiring all importers of foreign goods whilst still in the 
original packaging to pay for a licence or suffer penalties in default was 
unconstitutional.  He observed that at the founding of the Union the states had a 
sovereign power to tax imports and that the Constitution had not extinguished that 
right.66 He was alone in that view. His opening remarks reveal the general desire of 
the Court to present a united front to the world. That a justice regretted dissenting 
was a sentiment generally expressed. However, Thompson went further by admitting 
that had this not been a case of constitutional importance, he would have refrained 
from dissent even though he did not accept the majority view. Thompson concluded 
his states’ rights analysis for 1827 in the case of Mason v. Haile an action for breach 
of a bond securing a debtor’s detention in prison. Thompson, for the Court, held that 
                                                          
65 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
66 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
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there was no liability under the bond as the Rhode Island legislature had accepted 
the debtor’s petition that he be discharged from prison. State legislatures had the 
power to abolish imprisonment for debt. There was, therefore, no unlawful escape 
and no liability under the bond. Justice Washington dissented because he had 
consistently set his face against state legislation which purported to interfere with 
contracts retrospectively.67   
          When Thompson arrived on the Court, the Chief Justice had begun to delegate 
more opinions to his associate justices. However, despite the considerable expertise 
Thompson brought to the Marshall Court, the opinions assigned to him were of no 
great moment and of little constitutional importance.68 Thompson went on to write 
more significant opinions under Chief Justice Roger Taney but, whilst on the 
Marshall Court, his dissents were more noteworthy than his majority opinions and 
concurrences. His dissent in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, below, was the most 
significant.  
          If there was an expectation of a serious clash between Thompson’s states’ 
rights philosophy and the centralism of the Marshall Court, it was not apparent in the 
early years. Indeed in his first year on the Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States (1824) he agreed with the majority view that a state had no power to tax the 
Bank of the United States and that any attempt to enforce payment of the tax would 
be met with a federal injunction. Thompson did not always align himself with local 
legislation when conflicts arose between state and federal law and in Bank of United 
                                                          
67 Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12. Wheat.) 370 (1827).  
68 In 1824 Thompson’s first full year on the Court, Marshall delivered only 15 of the 41 opinions of 
the Court, whereas in 1809 he had taken the lion’s share by handing down 32 of 46 opinions. As time 
went on Marshall handed down fewer opinions. Towards the end in 1830 the chief justice delivered 
less than half of the Court’s opinions, 25 out of 56. These figures are taken from the United States 
Reports. 
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States v. Halstead (1825) a shift in his attitude is evident. A Kentucky law of 1821 
prohibited the sale of property taken under execution for less than three quarters of 
its appraised value. The marshal refused to sell the land because he was offered only 
$5 per acre instead of $26. Thompson authored the Court’s opinion which held that 
the Kentucky law could not bind a sale following the execution of a judgment of a 
federal court. Thompson argued that an officer of the United States could not be 
governed by state laws as he acts under the authority of the federal government.69 
His opinion has in it an element of pragmatism as he expressed the fear that 
disparate state laws would frustrate orders for sale issuing out of federal courts. He 
adroitly avoided the issue of whether the Kentucky law was unconstitutional by 
basing the opinion on the fact that the state law did not expressly cover marshals or 
federal court executions.70 
 
The Cherokee Nation and the African-American Slave 
          Whilst Thompson was sympathetic to the plight of the Native Americans, he 
was unable to further their cause in Jackson v. Porter (1825). The case concerned 
the ownership of land which had been purchased from an Indian tribe. Thompson 
held that, as the Indian tribes had only a right of occupancy of the land, a purchase 
from them did not confer title.71 He was obliged to follow the Court’s ruling in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), a case decided before his appointment.72 However, he 
gave his view on Indian titles in a notable dissent, joined in by Justice Story, in 
                                                          
69 United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. 51 (1825). 
70 Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
71 Jackson v. Porter, 13 F. Cas. 235 (New York, September 1825). 
72 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 12 U.S. 571 (1823), in which Chief Justice Marshall giving the opinion that 
title to the land was in the European discovers and the Native Americans were mere tenants. For an in 
depth analysis of this decision see, Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of 
America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). The majority held that the Court had no 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction prohibiting Georgia passing laws which deprived 
the Cherokees of their right of self-government because they were not a foreign state 
within the meaning of the Constitution and merely a domestic dependent nation.73 
That ruling meant that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear their 
grievances. Thompson had argued that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign sovereign 
state entitled to come to the Court for relief. He based his conclusion on the fact that 
the Cherokees had always been dealt with as such by the United States government 
both before and after the adoption of the Constitution. His argument was simple but 
compelling. The Native Americans held the land long before the arrival of European 
settlers and would have been regarded by the rest of the world as a foreign nation. 
He failed to see how under the law of nations, the arrival of the Europeans could 
have altered the position when the tribes continued to live apart from the new 
arrivals and had been permitted the right of self-government, particularly as they had 
never been conquered and all wars had been concluded by peace treaties.74   
          Worcester v. Georgia (1832) was a different proposition and the Court was 
able to assert jurisdiction on the ground that the missionary, Samuel Worcester, was 
a United States citizen. He had been imprisoned by a Georgia court for refusing to 
obtain a state licence permitting him to be on Cherokee lands. The Court upheld the 
laws and treaties of the Cherokees against Georgia enactments which included laws 
abrogating all Cherokee laws, abolishing their government, and confiscating land for 
the benefit of Georgia whites. Chief Justice Marshall, citing the provisions of 1802 
Act regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, declared that the federal 
                                                          
73 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 1 (1831). 
74 Ibid, 80. 
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government, and not the states, had authority over Native American affairs. His 
reasoning followed closely the substance of Justice Thompson’s dissent in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia.75 In reaching his conclusion in Worcester, Marshall adopted the 
research carried out by Thompson in the earlier case and traced the many dealings 
between the United States and the Cherokees through the Treaties of Hopewell 
(1785) and Holston (1791).  Both treaties had dealt with the Cherokees as a national 
entity separate from the State of Georgia and explicitly recognized their right to self-
government and guaranteed their right of occupation of their lands.76 Thompson, in 
his Cherokee Nation dissent, wrote that ‘the Cherokee Nation of Indians have, by 
virtue of these treaties an exclusive right of occupation of the lands in question, and 
that the United States are bound under their guarantee, to protect the nation in the 
enjoyment of such occupancy.’77 Marshall in Worcester used words which were very 
similar to those earlier uttered by Thompson. Having rehearsed the treaties and 
statutes, Marshall declared that those laws:  
manifestly consider the several Indian Nations as distinct political communities, 
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a 
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but 
guaranteed by the United States.   
          Thompson’s dissent in Cherokee Nation arose from his refusal to condone 
Georgia’s oppression of the Cherokees. He based his view on the fact that the 
Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution gave the Court jurisdiction because the 
Cherokees had been treated by the United States as a foreign nation. Whilst his 
agreement with the majority view in Worcester, at first sight, seemed to contradict 
his long held view of a state’s right to control its internal affairs, the Court supported 
the Cherokee position on the ground that the Constitution expressly gave to the 
                                                          
75 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832). 
76 Ibid. 556-557. 
77 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 74-75. 
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federal government, and not to the states, the power to control relations with the 
Indian tribes. 
          Whilst Thompson was able in both cases to show publicly his support of the 
Cherokees, his efforts to alleviate the suffering of the African already a slave within 
the United States met with little success because his hands were tied by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. The problem was quite different and 
could not be resolved by deciding whether a distinct body of people was a ‘foreign’ 
or ‘domestic dependent’ nation. The African slaves were regarded in law as 
individual items of ‘property’ crucial to the economic prosperity of the South. They 
were not citizens. They had not the ‘blessings of liberty’ enshrined in the preamble 
to the Constitution.  In fact the Constitution endorsed the ownership of slaves and  
prolonged the institution by declaring that Congress had no power to prohibit, prior 
to 1808, the ‘migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now 
existing shall think proper to admit.’ 78  So that there could be no doubt about that 
prohibition, Article 5 expressly forbade any constitutional amendment to remove 
ban until 1808. 
          The outlawing of the slave trade went a long way towards the protection of 
Africans in their homeland but the situation of the American slave was not finally 
resolved until the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution on December 6, 1865.79 It followed, therefore, that a justice sworn to 
uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States faced an impossible task in 
attempting to influence federal law to alleviate the position of the African-American. 
                                                          
78 Article 1, Section 9, Clause 1. 
79 The United States Census of 1810 reveals 1,130,781239,881 slaves out of a total population of 
7,239,881.http://thomaslegion.net.african_american_population_in_the_us_total_black_population_in
_us.html    (accessed 12.07.2014).  
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Thompson was one justice who did make the effort. Although the surviving reports 
do not contain any circuit opinion on slavery he may have written, he delivered three 
such opinions for the Supreme Court.  
          In McCutchen v. Marshall (1834) a testator bequeathed his slaves to his wife 
and upon her death all slaves of full age were to be freed. Those under 21 were to be 
inherited by his brother and brother-in-law and were to be freed when they became 
twenty-one. The Court dealt with the position of two children born after the 
testator’s death and whilst his wife was still alive. Thompson, writing for the Court, 
was constrained under the terms of the will to hold that the children remained slaves 
because their mother had not been freed at the dates of their birth.80 However, in the 
remaining two cases, Thompson was able to demonstrate the humanitarian approach 
to slavery later shown in his circuit opinion in The Amistad.81 In The Emily and the 
Caroline (1824) Thompson held that the offence of preparing a vessel for sail  
contrary to the Slave Trade Act of 1794 did not require that the vessel should have 
been completely fitted out and ready for sea. The Court affirmed the forfeiture of the 
vessel.82 This case demonstrates Thompson’s determination to enforce strictly the 
provisions designed to end further attempts to import more slaves and was much 
easier to achieve whereas the sentiments expressed by Thompson in his opinion for 
the Court in Lee v. Lee (1834) are remarkable given that the freedom of existing 
slaves was the matter in issue. The Court reversed a holding of the District of 
Columbia circuit court that slaves had not gained their freedom after having been 
moved to Washington from their birthplace in Virginia. There was a dispute as to 
whether they had been hired out but the Court ordered a new trial on the basis of the 
                                                          
80 McCutchen v. Marshall, 33 U.S. 220 (1834). 
81 The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841). 
82 The Emily and The Caroline, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381 (1824). 
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justice’s misdirection to the jury. A preliminary objection was made to the Court’s 
jurisdiction and an application was made to introduce affidavits showing that the 
value of the two slaves was beneath the jurisdictional threshold of $1,000. 
Thompson gave short shrift to the application remarking, ‘The matter in dispute is, 
therefore, the value of their freedom and this is not susceptible of a pecuniary 
valuation.’83 
          The most celebrated opinion on slavery delivered by Thompson was his first 
instance opinion in the Schooner Amistad. Although outside the timeline of this 
research, it is relevant because it is the culmination of Thompson’s enlightened anti-
slavery views. Africans (Mende) kidnapped from Sierra Leone were being 
transported by sea from Havana to plantations along the coast of Cuba. The slaves 
rose up and took command of the vessel, killing the captain and the cook. The ship 
was later intercepted off Long Island Sound by a United States revenue cutter and 
the slaves were taken into custody and later charged with murder and piracy. 
Thompson presiding in the Connecticut circuit court upon findings of fact by the 
jury, dismissed all of the criminal charges against the slaves, holding that the circuit 
court had no jurisdiction over crimes alleged to have taken place at sea on a foreign 
owned vessel. Thompson was not able to order the release of the slaves because they 
were the subject of a ‘property’ claim pending in the district court. In January 1840 
District Judge Andrew Judson held that the Mende were not slaves and ordered them 
to be delivered to the President for return to their homes.  On appeal to the circuit 
court, Thompson affirmed the opinion of the district judge. He dismissed the claims 
of the Spanish government that the Mende were slaves but allowed an appeal to be 
made to the United States Supreme Court. On the 9 March 1841, the Court, which 
                                                          
83 Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S. 44 (1834). 
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included Thompson, affirmed the opinions of the district and circuit courts ordered 
the Connecticut circuit court to free the Mende. Thompson as the circuit judge for 
Connecticut subsequently formally ordered the release of the Mende.84 
          Whilst the opinion of the Supreme Court in Amistad was praiseworthy, the 
justices were merely enforcing existing laws prohibiting the international slave 
trade. It is important to make the distinction between slavery and the slave trade. 
When it came to the position of the African already held to slavery in the United 
States, the justices were constrained by the Constitution and existing federal 
legislation. Whatever the personal views of justices such as Thompson they could do 
nothing to ease the suffering of the slave population.  
 
Conclusion 
          The defining ethos of Justice Thompson’s judicial philosophy was the 
sovereign right of a state to determine its internal affairs. If that goal was beyond 
reach, he sought to advance, wherever possible, respect for both state and federal 
jurisdictions. The opinions examined earlier in Livingston v. Van Ingen; Brown v. 
Maryland; Ogden v. Saunders and his dissent in Wheaton v. Peters provide clear 
support for this guiding principle. Thompson was a very political animal as his 
desire for the Presidency and his unsuccessful attempt at the governorship of New 
York demonstrate but those ambitions did not interfere with his judicial duties.  
          Despite his Republican background Thompson realised that the survival of the 
Supreme Court depended upon its members presenting a united face to the nation. 
                                                          
84 The United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 15 Peters, 518 (1841). The facts of the case are 
taken from Bruce A. Ragsdale, ‘Amistad: The Federal Courts and the Challenge to Slavery,’ (Federal 
Judicial Center, Federal Judicial History Office, 2002). 
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He toned down the views he expressed in the New York Court for the Correction of 
Errors case of Livingston v. Van Ingen that New York was an independent 
sovereignty which had never surrendered any of its constitutional powers to the 
United States. His observation, in the same year in In the Matter of Jeremiah, a 
Soldier, that questions of jurisdiction between federal and state courts were 
‘generally nice and delicate subjects,’ revealed that he was capable of moderation..   
          As the small number of Supreme Court dissents show, he did not set out to 
disrupt the Marshall Court or undermine its authority. He was prepared to modify his 
states’ rights views in Osborn v. Bank of United States and he also accepted in Bank 
of United States v. Halstead that state laws could not frustrate the implementation of 
a federal circuit court order. While Dunne rightly points to Thompson as a man 
prepared to express dissenting views, the cases examined here do not support the 
view that he led a reaction to Marshall’s ‘federalist centralism.’ Nor do those 
opinions confirm Hall’s contention that Thompson’s presence on the Court ‘spelled 
the gradual eclipse of John Marshall’s influence over the course of American law.’ 
This research favours Abraham’s contention that, whilst Thompson occasionally 
disagreed with Marshall, he generally adopted the majority view. This was not a 
huge political transition as the two party system was in its infancy; political 
allegiances were still fluid and the responsibility of assuming high office carried 
with it the need to re-consider loyalties and decide upon a course best suited to the 
nation’s interests. 
          His unwillingness to strike down state legislation stemmed from his 
concurrent judicial and legislative roles in New York State. Sitting as a justice and 
as a reviewer of state legislation on the Council of Revision and clearly conflicted 
with the concept that good government required to separate the functions of the 
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judiciary, executive, and the legislature. His constitutionally incompatible functions 
in New York also led to an approach which sought the intention of the legislature 
even when the words of the statute were clear. 
          A firm belief in preserving the status quo and a strict adherence to precedent  
were elements of Thompson’s judicial restraint which preferred consistency to the 
occasional injustice (Jackson v. Still). While he furthered economic growth by 
settling law in cases such as Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, Bank of Columbia v. 
Lawrence, Boyce & Henry v. Edwards, and Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, enabling 
merchants to more readily enforce promises made in bills of exchange and 
promissory notes, his rigid application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in Seixas v. 
Woods and in The Monte Allegro did little to ensure that a purchaser received full 
value for money. He made no allowance for trading at arms-length with little 
opportunity to inspect the goods beforehand. His inflexible interpretation of a 
statute, as shown in Tillman v. Lansing, is another example of the strict letter of the 
law triumphing over the justice of the case as are his refusals to protect from 
personal liability public officials acting in good faith. (Henderson v. Brown; Walker 
v. Swartout; Imlay v. Sands). 
          The preservation of the status quo is shown by Thompson’s reluctance to 
overturn established land titles, particularly those granted for military service. This 
rigidity of judicial restraint was to some extent alleviated by his compassionate 
approach to the troubling issue of slavery and his efforts to alleviate the plight of the 
Cherokee which revealed a humanitarian overlay which continued after the Marshall 
era in his handling, on circuit, of the Mende Africans in The Amistad.  
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          His attitude towards juries differed from those of Washington and Story. 
While generally supportive of jury verdicts, Thompson made it clear in Brewster v. 
Gelston that a verdict should not be permitted to stand if the judge believed it to be 
clearly against the weight of evidence which contrasts with Washington’s pride in 
declaring in Willis v. Bucher et al. that he had refused to accept jury verdicts only 
twice in sixteen years. Thompson was also quick to discharge a jury if he thought 
they would not be able to agree, despite the custom of discharge in cases of 
exhaustion, intoxication or mental illness. His robust views on the fallibility of juries 
was more in line with that of Livingston, from the same New York stable. 
          Thompson’s contribution to United States law during his period on the 
Marshall Court did not match the expectation one would have of a justice  who had 
the most extensive judicial experience of all of the justices before joining the Court. 
One would have anticipated a greater volume of opinions and some of significant 
impact. This is explained, only to a limited extent, by the Chief Justice’s practice of 
reserving to himself the bulk of the Court’s opinions and particularly those with a 
constitutional element. However, by 1823, John Marshall had begun to assign more 
opinions to associates and the law reports show that Justices Johnson and Story were 
not slow in coming forward to deliver the Court’s opinion on a wide range of issues.                                                                                                                       
          Thompson’s place in the development of early United States law is assured by 
his efforts to ensure that states, whilst far from fully self-governing, had some say in 
their internal affairs, by his opinions which engendered confidence in commercial 
activity, and by his endeavours to shape federal law to alleviate the plight of the 
African and Native American. Hall’s description of Thompson as a judge of ‘modest 
ability’ whose contribution to the court was ‘mostly unremarkable’ is inaccurate and 
uncharitable. Thompson’s stand in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia alone takes him out 
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of the category of an also ran. In that dissent he espoused a cause unpopular to the 
majority of Americans and, in particular, to the State of Georgia and President 
Andrew Jackson, In order to take this position, he abandoned his states’ rights 
sympathies and roundly condemned the Georgia government for its actions. The 
opinions considered in this chapter establish Thompson’s valuable role in the 
development of state and federal law at this crucial period of the life of the new 
Republic.
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            Conclusion 
          This research establishes the United States circuit courts as key to the 
development of the federal court system in the Early Republic and balances the 
approach of scholars who, when examining the rise in influence of the Supreme 
Court, have focussed on the impact of John Marshall and the Court’s landmark 
cases. Whilst the Supreme Court’s major constitutional opinions were important in 
settling a body of United States laws, it was left to the justices on circuit, in the early 
years, to construct a system of federal law which was fair, consistent and effective. 
The output of the Jay and Ellsworth Courts between 1798 and 1800 was so small as 
to be of little assistance to the justices riding circuit who, individually and 
collectively, had to source and fashion American to resolve the nation’s criminal and 
civil litigation. The justices were further hampered by the lack of federal legislation 
to guide them in their task. 
          In short, this thesis maintains that a significant factor in the rise in influence of 
the United States Supreme Court was the shaping of law by the justices on circuit. It 
follows that the success of the federal court system fed up from the ‘inferior’ circuit 
courts rather than down from the Supreme Court to the lower levels. An examination 
of the neglected role of the federal circuit courts and a consideration of a large body 
of circuit reports has enabled one to look through a little used lens to see an evolving 
nation; the cases tried in those courts indicating momentous issues facing the new 
democracy; and the ways in which the justices met those events and constructed an 
essential foundation of stable government. 
          It was an arduous task; much more so than sitting together in the comparative 
comfort of a courtroom in the nation’s capital and during the evenings in the same 
reasonable lodgings. Aside from the great physical hardship of travelling thousands 
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of miles each year along poor roads, there was the emotional distress of separation 
from family and friends for months at a time and it is, therefore, not surprising that 
some justices refused the appointment or resigned after short periods of circuit duty. 
It did not end there. Once they reached their circuit destinations they had to dispense 
justice often without the benefit of a law library. They also had to contend with the 
absence of written state statutes, no law reporters and case citations which often 
failed fully to record the issues and arguments. Despite these considerable problems, 
certainly by 1835, they had produced a system of federal justice eminently fit for 
purpose and it all began by their exercise of the circuit court jurisdiction.   
          The reports show that by the sheer volume of work circuit sitting enabled the 
justices to hone skills acquired from practice at the Bar or as a judge of a state 
supreme court.  It was also an ideal way of familiarizing themselves with branches 
of the law with which they had little experience. Day to day exposure to all manner 
of legal issues endowed them with the essential expertise to conduct their business in 
the Supreme Court more effectively and with greater self-assurance. It also made 
them acutely aware when sitting on appeals of the problems encountered by justices 
across the circuits. This thesis argues that the circuit experience underpinned the rise 
of the Supreme Court from a position of weakness to an authoritative and effective 
department of the federal government. Further, that the expertise and confidence 
gained on circuit was a factor in the federal judiciary’s ability to withstand political 
attacks by Republican opponents led by President Jefferson during the vulnerable 
formative years of the Marshall Court.  
          This thesis contributes to our knowledge of how the law was shaped in those 
early years through the depth of its inquiry into the legal issues facing the justices on 
circuit. A total of 1975 Supreme Court, circuit court, and state court opinions handed 
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down by Justices Washington, Livingston, Story and Thompson have been examined 
to identify the nature of the work undertaken on circuit, analyse how the justices 
decided the legal issues, assess the expertise gained, and evaluate the use to which 
skills acquired on circuit featured in their Supreme Court contributions. The research 
has also shown how federal justice was received on circuit; from the acceptance with 
acclamation by the grand juries to the charges presented by the early justices in 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to the outright 
rejection by the Augusta grand jury in 1791 of the need for federal justice and of 
federal government interference in state affairs.1  
          This examination of the nature of the litigation before the justices and the way 
in which each justice faced the particular problems of his circuit has revealed not 
just constitutional attitudes but also general jurisprudence as the circuit reports cover 
virtually every point of law resolving issues of national importance to opinions of 
interest merely to the parties to the case. The reports have also disclosed the 
determination of all four justices to uphold existing property rights and promote 
inter-state and international trade and how Justices Livingston and Thompson laid 
down definitive guidelines for the conduct of commercial relationships, particularly 
in respect of negotiable instruments, the essential currency of economic prosperity.             
          Washington’s opinions reflect an approach to stability in the justice system 
based on the certainty which precedent brings to the law despite the occasional 
injustice caused by too rigid an application. Story’s circuit opinions have shown not 
only a justice comfortable with all branches of law but also one whose pre-
occupation was to import common law principles into criminal and civil law to 
                                                          
1 Marcus, Documentary History, vol. 2, Grand Jury responses, Pennsylvania (45); Delaware (53); 
Boston (61); New Hampshire (113) and Georgia (224). 
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supplement the few federal statutes and Supreme Court authorities and in order to 
clarify American law and make it more readily understood. 
          A justice’s circuit opinion is generally a more reliable indicator of his 
jurisprudence than his opinion for the Supreme Court. Whilst a justice on circuit 
sometimes sat with a district judge, the justice’s view of the law or facts usually 
prevailed and the opinion occasionally expressed his personal and political views on 
the issues before him . This was not always the case with the Supreme Court opinion 
which often required the compromise of strongly held views for unanimity. Hence 
Justice Story’s assessment that his character as a judge would be more accurately 
reflected in his circuit rather than his Supreme Court opinions.2         
          Chapter One, by examining the debates of the Constitutional and Ratification 
Conventions and the fierce arguments in Congress over the Judiciary Bill 1789, has 
highlighted the deep divisions between Federalist and Republicans. A common 
theme running through all debates was the Republicans’ fear that a federal judicial 
system would undermine the authority of state courts and legislatures. They were 
also afraid that the Republic, under the Federalists, would be modelled on the British 
monarchy with government by an elite minority. The Federalists were deeply 
concerned that the United States was under threat of a French style revolution 
because of widespread popular support within the United States for the French wish 
for freedom from oppression if not for the means by which they sought to achieve it. 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 examined in Chapter One were a knee-jerk 
reaction by the Federalists to the perceived possibility of civil disobedience. The 
justices’ conduct of the criminal trials of prominent Republicans under legislation 
                                                          
2 Letter, Joseph Story to District Judge Hopkinson, February 16, 1840 from the Hopkinson Papers 
cited in Newmyer, Joseph Story, 318. 
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which criminalized criticism of officers of the federal government left much to be 
desired. The Sedition Act was a clear infringement of the right to the freedom of 
speech and of the press guaranteed by the 1791 First Amendment to the 
Constitution.  Justices Paterson and Chase refused to hear arguments as to the 
constitutionality of the acts and their partisan conduct of the trials denied 
Republicans facing loss of liberty due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment. I argue that this controversial legislation produced not only the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 but also adversely affected the standing 
of the Federalist Party in the country and was a factor in Jefferson’s success in the 
1800 presidential election. 
          These deep divisions caused by the emergence of the two political parties 
added to the burden of the justices on circuit. It meant that those early circuits were 
both legal and political experiments; legal in the sense of establishing federal justice 
across the nation and political in order to secure public support for the concept of 
federal justice and government. The justices’ main task was the resolution of 
criminal cases and civil disputes between individual citizens or a citizen against a 
state. However, they were expected to, and did, promote the concept of a strong 
federal government by use of the charge to the grand jury at the commencement of 
each circuit sitting. Those messages were generally well received but not in those 
states opposing the very concept of a national government and a federal judiciary. 
The political element of the grand jury charge is best illustrated by the fact that 
Chief Justice Jay’s charge to a jury in 1793 explaining why the United States refused 
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to be drawn into European conflicts was later sent to Europe as an explanation for 
neutrality.3 
          Such overtly politically motivated grand jury charges in the Court’s first 
decade gradually disappeared with the advent of John Marshall and the emerging 
concept of an independent judiciary; the justices confining themselves to handing 
down instructions on aspects of the law relevant to the grand jury’s duty to issue 
presentments (indictments) or to those cases which the petty juries were likely to try 
during the current session of the court.  The falling into disuse of the grand jury 
charge as a political tool was due, in the first instance, to the justices’ fears of further 
impeachments of state and federal judges by the Republicans and, when that threat 
had disappeared by 1807, to the fact that the new federal institutions began to gain a 
general acceptance and there was no need to hammer home the virtues of central 
government. 
          Justices Livingston, Story and Thompson, all politically active in the 
Republican Party before appointment, disappointed their respective nominating 
presidents by failing vigorously to defend states’ rights from federal encroachment. 
This thesis offers explanations for the justices’ pragmatic political shifts. First, 
whatever political party allegiance had been formed by class and family ties, the 
justices came from very similar backgrounds and shared the same fundamental 
values. Justice Washington, the favourite nephew and heir to the President’s estate, 
inherited his uncle’s vision of future prosperity and political stability under a strong 
central authority. Livingston was an active politician who, despite having served as a 
Federalist in the New York Assembly, supported the opposition and conducted a 
                                                          
3 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty, 412-413. 
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vigorous campaign which helped carry New York for Thomas Jefferson in the 1800 
presidential election. Thompson sought high political office as a member of a 
Republican administration. Story was a New England Republican whose 
commitment to the Jeffersonian vision was not as strong as that of the President’s 
Virginian followers. The nation was finding its way, experimenting with democratic 
government and allegiances were fluid. Political support might waver if expectations 
were not met or after assuming new responsibilities and Republican nominated 
justices were not the only people dealing with change as is shown by James 
Madison’s political manoeuvres described in the Introduction to this thesis. 
          Second, as revealed in Chapter One, the federal bench and Federalist state 
judges were under constant threat of impeachment by Republicans under the 
direction of President Jefferson who lost no opportunity to undermine the judiciary 
privately and publicly. These attacks had the effect of uniting the Supreme Court 
justices, whatever their political persuasions, against all opponents. The Court at the 
turn of the nineteenth century was the weakest department of government facing a 
ruling party which had suspended its sittings for over a year in the Judiciary Act 
1802. Not only did Jefferson attack the judiciary in private correspondence at every 
available opportunity, he also attacked Marshall publicly in his Second Inaugural 
Address for his conduct of the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. He was the instigator 
of impeachment against state and federal court judges and connived with Republican 
supporters to attack the federal judiciary in the Press. One can, therefore, understand 
why the justices united and felt the need to tread carefully in politically sensitive 
cases. Marbury v. Madison is evidence of a compromise to avoid a direct 
confrontation with the Jefferson administration.  Stuart v. Laird, is further proof of 
compromise when the justices, despite serious privately expressed opposition, 
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meekly submitted to the re-introduction of circuit riding under the Judiciary Act 
1802, refusing to challenge its constitutionality4  The Court feared retaliation from a 
Republican dominated Congress.5  The task of developing a federal judicial system 
was made much more difficult by this constant sniping at the judiciary. Marshall 
believed that the Court was the final arbiter of the meaning and intent of the 
Constitution and Jefferson felt strongly that the Court was usurping the function of 
executive and legislature to undermine state sovereignty.  
          Third, the convention of the single opinion of the Court had the effect of 
achieving unanimity through compromise because of the need for unity in the face 
of a determined opposition, resulting in all members of the Court being more 
amenable to the general view. The fact that, for the greater part of the Marshall era, 
the justices conducted their deliberations in the same lodging house in which they all 
resided during term time made for lasting friendships and facilitated unanimity is 
apparent from Story’s description of judicial conferences. Whilst a justice may still 
have maintained the same views he held as an advocate or state justice, he was less 
strident in expressing them through the medium of a dissent. The relaxed and 
friendly atmosphere of lodging house conferences appears from a conversation Story 
had with a Harvard graduate in 1826 describing the convivial spirit of the lodgings. 
Story spoke of the justices’ general rule that they would take wine only when it 
rained. Marshall would make the following request, ‘Brother Story, step to the 
window and see if it does not look like rain.’ Story added that if the sun was shining 
                                                          
4 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803). 
5 Chief Justice Marshall doubted the constitutionality of Supreme Court Justices sitting as circuit 
judges and Justice Chase was firmly against it. However Justices Cushing, Paterson, and Washington 
felt that as it had been the practice for a number of years, it was too late to object. (See letters of the 
justices between April and June 1802 in Hobson, Papers of John Marshall, vol. VI, 108-121). The 
extremely short opinion handed down by Justice Paterson in Stuart v. Laird did not touch upon any 
constitutional issues and expressly stated that because the justices had been acting as circuit judges 
for so long, it was an established practice which could not be challenged. 
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brightly the Chief Justice would sometimes reply, ‘All the better; for our jurisdiction 
extends over such a large territory that it must be raining somewhere.’6  
          Whilst the justices each held firmly in mind the need for consistency across 
circuits, they approached the task in different ways.  The circuit reports examined in 
Chapter Two have established that Justice Washington’s judicial philosophy was 
dominated by the need for a uniformity of law and procedure flowing from strict 
adherence to the doctrine of legal precedent. He searched English law and state 
authorities to find grounds for an opinion, expressing anxiety if he was obliged to 
deliver an opinion devoid of past authority. He believed that a strict following of 
past decisions was essential to preserving existing land titles and the sanctity of 
contracts and, if this approach resulted in occasional injustices, it was for 
government to solve the problem.  
          Livingston’s attitude towards precedent, as Chapter Three demonstrates, was 
markedly different. Whilst he believed that precedent was essential for stability, his 
reported circuit cases show less enthusiasm for the doctrine than those of 
Washington. Wherever possible Livingston preferred state supreme court opinions to 
the English authorities, taking pride in the emerging body of United States law. One 
detects an antipathy for the English authorities. He had less reason than the other 
justices to admire England because of his capture and imprisonment by the British 
on the voyage home from Spain in 1782 and the condemnation by the British in 
1804 of a vessel with cargo in which he had a heavy financial interest. Livingston, 
like John Marshall, preferred to found his opinions on general principles of law 
rather than the culmination of an exhaustive study of past cases.  
                                                          
6 Josiah Quincy, Figures of the Past from the Leaves of Old Journals (Boston: Roberts Bros., 1883). 
189-190. 
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          Whilst on federal circuit Thompson drew heavily on state supreme court 
authorities of which he had great experience given his sixteen year tenure as a New 
York Supreme Court Justice. He was more willing than Livingston to import English 
precedents into the growing body of American law. Story’s circuit opinions have 
revealed a readiness to mine any source of law which would enhance the authority of 
his decisions. He, therefore, looked to state law, the works of European jurists and 
had the highest regard for the decisions of English judges and text book writers. His 
circuit opinions were erudite and reviewed every relevant authority and were, 
therefore, held in high regard by his brother justices.  
           Wherever possible, the justices followed the opinions of state supreme courts. 
Washington was prepared to follow a state opinion even though he was not sure it 
was correct because of his desire for harmonious federal and state jurisdictional 
relationships.7  Livingston and Thompson were kindly disposed to guidance from 
that quarter, having sat as state supreme court justices. When Thompson handed 
down his opinion in the federal circuit court case of Vermont v. The Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel he cited no fewer than twenty-four New York State 
Supreme Court opinions.8 Story circuit opinions cite numerous state court decisions. 
His approach arose not only for the sake of comity but also from the perspective of 
public policy and public interest in avoiding conflicting opinions of federal and state 
judges.9 When delivering the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell v. Morrison, Story 
followed his practice on circuit and declared that the local rules of interpretation of 
state statutes  must be presumed to be founded on a more just and accurate view of 
                                                          
7 Mott v.Morris, 17 F. Cas. 905 (1808). 
8 Vermont v. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 28 F. Cas. 1155 (1827).   
9 United States v. Slade, 27 F. Cas. 1125 (1820). 
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the local jurisprudence.10 He was arguing that state courts and legislatures were best 
placed to identify and provide solutions to local problems and, therefore, ought to be 
considered with respect. However, with the advent of an increasing body of federal 
legislation and Supreme Court authorities, the need to look elsewhere for guidance 
diminished.  
          The advent of the professional law reporter made the justice’s task much 
easier but the reports whether at circuit or Supreme Court level, had to be full and 
accurate. Story emphasized this when writing to the Supreme Court law reporter, 
Henry Wheaton, who had failed to record that Livingston and Story had dissented in 
Mutual Assurance Society v. Taylor. Story was concerned lest the case be later 
treated as a unanimous holding.11  
          The justices’ letters, and particularly those of Joseph Story, reveal that when 
the justices met in Washington, either on the Court or in their lodging house, they 
conferred and exchanged experiences of particular problems, how they had been 
resolved, and sought advice on future cases in their circuit lists. They wrote letters 
seeking advice on unfamiliar topics. The exchange of semi-annual reports between 
Justices Washington and Story of interesting cases they had decided on their 
respective circuits is particularly important in the quest for consistency.12  
          A further means of achieving uniformity was the use of the certificate of 
division of opinion when there was a disagreement between the justice and the 
district judge as to the applicable law. In this way the circuit court was able to send 
                                                          
10 Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 351 (1828). 
11 Letter, Story to Wheaton, August 31, 1816 in W.W. Story, Life and Letters, vol. 1, 153.  
12 Letters Bushrod Washington to Joseph Story of June 19, 1821 and December 4, 1821 in Joseph 
Story Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, cited in White, The Marshall Court and 
Cultural Change, 348.  
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the case to the Supreme Court for a definitive ruling on a troublesome issue which 
regularly faced the circuit courts. This device was so useful that on occasion the 
justices feigned disagreement to have the law clarified. Thus, in De Lovio v. Boit, 
Story and District Judge Davis agreed to disagree on the extent of the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction in admiralty matters.13 In the event, Story was disappointed because the 
parties accepted his view and did not take the matter further. Story adopted the same 
ploy in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.14  
                    A comparison of circuit and Supreme Court opinions has revealed that 
some justices, because of local issues or the location of their circuit centres, 
achieved an expertise in certain branches of the law which affected the Chief 
Justice’s opinion assignment practice. Provided a justice’s view of a case coincided 
with that of the majority, the Chief Justice considered him a candidate for authorship 
of the majority opinion. The opinions of the Court assigned to each justice reveal a 
great disparity; for example, Justice Story positioned himself as a frequent volunteer 
for the task whilst Justices Todd and Duvall maintained a very low profile. A factor 
just as important as a willingness to write was John Marshall’s awareness of the 
special expertise gained by his associates on circuit. That he knew his associates’ 
strengths has been established in his letters to Justices Washington and Story 
requesting guidance on unfamiliar branches of law.  
          There is a definite correlation between circuit expertise and opinion 
assignment practice. The state and federal circuit court opinions of Livingston reveal 
a preponderance of maritime or commercial opinions. On the Supreme Court, out of 
a total of thirty-six majority opinions he was asked to write, all but one concerned 
                                                          
13 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 441. 
14 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 64 New Hamp. 473 (1817). 
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maritime or commercial law. Thompson’s state and federal circuit opinions 
demonstrate his specialities as commercial and land law. On the Court he was asked 
to write fifty-nine opinions, thirteen of which concerned commercial disputes and 
ten involved the disposition of lands. Of the commercial disputes nine covered his 
practice of setting guidelines for the regulation of promissory notes and bills of 
exchange. The majority of the remaining opinions related to procedural and 
jurisdictional issues. 
          An analysis of Washington’s 520 circuit cases shows he sat on 215 admiralty 
cases and land disputes. On the Supreme Court he handed down eighty opinions of 
the Court of which thirty-five involved admiralty and wills, far more than any other 
branch of law he dealt with on the Court. Story presided over many admiralty, land 
and commercial cases on circuit but admiralty disputes in the busy port of Boston 
constituted his main source of work. His authority in admiralty cases was reflected 
in the large number of Supreme Court opinions he was chosen to deliver. Out of a 
total of 252 admiralty opinions, the Chief Justice reserved 90 to himself which 
meant that Story wrote 35% of the remainder. It follows, therefore, that circuit 
expertise was the major factor in deciding who had the Chief Justice’s confidence to 
draw other justices together not just to join in the result but also to persuade them to 
accept the reasoning behind the holding. The circuit experience meant that the 
Court’s authority was enhanced by a justice writing the opinion who was expert in 
the relevant branch of law.  
          In Chapter One I argue that in the early years of the Republic it was the not 
the Supreme Court but the justices, individually and collectively on circuit, who 
shaped federal law. Whilst the early use of the grand jury charge facilitated the 
regional acceptance of federal law, the justices still had to contend with the 
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determined and persistent attacks by President Jefferson and his followers to 
undermine their efforts, which led in part to the disappearance of the political 
element of the charge and compromise opinions to avoid confrontation with the 
executive.  
          The remaining chapters have examined the day to day workload of a justice on 
circuit to gain an insight into the events and problems of the Early Republic. Each 
chapter has also examined the value of circuit experience to the Supreme Court 
opinion as well as focussing on particular aspects of each justice’s jurisprudence and 
the part his specialities played in shaping United States law. Story’s assessment of 
Washington as ‘a good old fashioned Federalist’ with ‘a cautious mind’ who was 
‘distinguished for his moderation,’ has been confirmed on numerous occasions by 
his circuit court and Supreme Court opinions which also reveal his view that 
interests of individual states were secondary to those of the nation as a whole. 
Evidence of his conservative Federalism has also emerged from his preservation of 
existing property rights and the formulation of rules facilitating interstate and 
international trade in manufactured goods as the means of achieving economic 
prosperity as opposed to the Republican desire for national wealth through agrarian 
self-sufficiency.15  
          Despite the occasional injustice resulting from a rigid adherence to the 
doctrine of precedent, it is generally accepted that a system which enables a 
reasonably reliable prediction of the outcome of litigation is far preferable to 
attempting to forecast the whims of particular judges. Counsel in Philadelphia and 
                                                          
15 Thomas Jefferson, ‘Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIX, The Present State of Manufactures, 
Commerce, Interior and Exterior Trade, 1787 in Peterson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 290-291. 
Jefferson believed that the United States should import manufactured goods from Europe and that 
Americans should farm as ‘those who labour on the land are the chosen people of God.’ 
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Trenton who researched the authorities would be well placed to advise their clients 
appearing in Washington’s circuit courts as to the prospects of success because of 
his strict application of precedent. The research has also revealed how Washington’s 
view of his own slaves, as items of personal property to be disposed of as and when 
he saw fit, influenced his judicial stance on slavery when he expressed himself 
unable to comprehend that removing a slave from one ‘owner’ to another in a far 
distant land did not worsen the slave’s plight.  
          Even if Justice Washington had a more enlightened view of slavery it is 
unlikely he would have made an impression on this troubled issue as the other 
justices felt constrained by the Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Act 1793 to 
endorse the status quo. The cases show that the justices rigorously enforced the 1808 
prohibition on the international slave trade but apart from freeing a slave who had 
accompanied his owner to a non-slave state and resided there beyond a permitted 
period, the justices made no impact whatsoever on the institution of slavery within 
the United States which was not formally abolished until the 1865 Thirteenth 
Amendment.16  
            Livingston’s politics reflected the fluidity of party allegiances in the early 
Republic as did his approach to the delicate balancing of state sovereignty and the 
powers of the federal government. His state and federal circuit opinions on 
commercial law underpinned the status of partnership and inspired confidence in the 
commercial world by setting out the rights and responsibilities of drawers, indorsees, 
and payees of bills of exchange and promissory notes, the cornerstone of trade 
payments. Before Story arrived on the scene, Livingston was the Court’s leading 
                                                          
16 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Constitution, Article IV. Section 1, Clause 3. 
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authority in maritime law dealing mainly with breaches of embargo and forfeiture of 
vessels for contravening licencing regulations.  
          Story mastered every branch of law to which he turned his hand but among the 
most important aspects of his shaping of United States law was his repeated efforts 
to import English common law into federal law. He was firmly of the view that a 
common law of federal crime was necessary because of the government’s failure to 
enact laws covering all aspects of criminality on land and at sea.17 Whilst his efforts 
on circuit and on the Supreme Court to establish a common law jurisdiction failed in 
respect of criminal and admiralty matters, he was successful in realizing his 
ambition when he established in Swift v. Tyson a federal common law in commercial 
disputes in diversity cases where the parties to an action came from different states.18 
He overcame the rejection of his plan for a federal common law of crime by drafting 
a criminal code which later saw life as the Crimes Act 1825 which set out 
comprehensively and clearly the federal criminal law then in force.  
          Thompson’s state, federal circuit, and Supreme Court opinions, highlight the 
pressures facing a justice attempting to balance the powers of the federal 
government with the right of a state to control its own affairs. His approach stemmed 
from a lack of separation of powers in New York State where he sat as a judge and 
also on the Council of Revision where he was tasked with the approval of state 
legislative bills. Generally unwilling to strike down such legislation, he promoted 
state sovereignty wherever possible, or at least attempted to achieve concurrent 
                                                          
17 Letter, Story to Nathaniel Williams August 3, 1813 complaining about the ‘deficiencies of our 
criminal code,’ and requesting Williams to put pressure on his representative in Congress and to use 
the press to remedy the lack of legislative diligence. W.W. Story, Life and Letters, vol. 1, 246-247. 
18 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
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powers. However, with so few dissents, he did not fulfil President Monroe’s 
expectations and all too often succumbed to the collegiate unanimity of the Court.  
          From time to time a public figure will challenge mainstream opinion and 
speak as the nation’s conscience for an oppressed minority, despite determined 
opposition to such humanitarian views. Justice Thompson was one such person. The 
federal government, led by President Andrew Jackson, and the State of Georgia were 
determined to drive the Cherokees from their homeland in Georgia across the 
Mississippi to the wastelands of Oklahoma. The majority of the nation either agreed 
with this ‘removal’ policy or were indifferent to the fate of this the most ‘civilized’ 
tribe of Native Americans. Thompson’s endeavour to shape federal law to protect 
minorities is demonstrated by his powerful dissent in favour of the Cherokees in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and constituted the foundation of the Court’s 
enlightened approach towards the Cherokees in the later opinion of Worcester v. 
Georgia.19 The Cherokee cases are noteworthy not only as evidence of a 
humanitarian side to Thompson’s jurisprudence but also as an example of a justice 
setting aside his belief in state sovereignty in an attempt to halt a state’s oppression 
of a particularly vulnerable minority group. 
          In addition to identifying the sources from which federal law was fashioned 
and highlighting particular aspects of each justice's part in the law’s development, 
the circuit opinions shed light on the way in which the nation was changing in this 
period and how emerging issues were faced. The opinions have revealed how the 
circuit justices formulated commercial law in an expanding economy. The opinions 
of Justices Washington, Story and Thompson have also disclosed how they 
                                                          
19 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
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promoted an important aspect of trade by protecting the working conditions, pay, 
health and general well-being of seamen, making it plain that fully manned vessels 
were essential for interstate and international commerce and for the protection of the 
Union.20  
          Challenges to land titles arising from the need to accommodate a rapidly 
increasing population formed an appreciable part of Washington’s circuit docket 
where the absence of man-made boundaries or failure to survey or register land led 
to numerous possession actions. The opinions of all four justices reveal a 
determination to uphold existing property rights in land.21  
          The numerous embargo and non-intercourse circuit court opinions expose the 
vulnerability of the United States during the period of hostile relations with Britain 
prior to and during the War of 1812. The cases show how rigorously the justices 
enforced the trade prohibitions by handing down opinions forfeiting the vessel and 
cargo of any owner or master who ventured to disregard the regulations. They were 
obliged by the nature of their office to take such draconian action despite the fact 
that the legislation had little impact apart on Britain and severely damaged United 
States trade interests. 
          The circuit opinions also reveal extremely politically volatile cases which 
aroused great local public agitation such as Justice Washington’s criminal trial of the 
Pennsylvanian general who, on the orders of his state governor, had by force of arms 
prevented a United States marshal from serving a federal court writ.22 Washington’s 
consideration of the right of a state to protect its natural resources from outsiders 
                                                          
20 The George, 10 F. Cas. 205 (1832). United States v. Hatch, 26 F. Cas. 220 (1824). 
21 Milligan v. Dickson et al., 17 F. Cas. 376 (1817). Barker v. Jackson, 2 F. Cas. 811 (1826). 
22 United States v. Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (1809). 
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also had far reaching consequences.23 A most troublesome and politically sensitive 
circuit case was the trial of President Jefferson’s former Vice-President Aaron Burr 
for treason. Chief Justice Marshall presiding declared it the most difficult case he 
had ever met when he called upon his associates for assistance on the relevant law.24 
Whilst some of the work of the justices on circuit was mundane, on occasion they 
faced issues of national importance which prepared them for duty on the Supreme 
Court. 
          This examination of this large number of state, federal circuit, and Supreme 
Court opinions of four prominent Marshall associate justices reveals many important 
factors in the development of law in the Early Republic. It has demonstrated the 
sources from which the justices on circuit established a uniform system of law 
across the nation to resolve everyday disputes and inspire confidence in the federal 
court system. The justices’ opinions, however, reveal much more than that because 
they are windows on those crucial events in the nation’s history such as its 
vulnerability to hostile European powers, the expansion of commerce, and the thirst 
for land to accommodate a rapidly expanding population, one aspect of which was 
the displacement of the Cherokees. The continued struggle for power between the 
federal government and the demand of the states to govern their own affairs 
constantly features in the circuit and Supreme Court law reports.   
          There have been a number of questions addressed in this thesis which firmly 
establish its main argument that the federal circuit courts were the foundation of 
United States law because it was in that jurisdiction that the justices shaped every 
aspect of federal law and procedure. This thesis has detailed precisely how they 
                                                          
23 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (1823). 
24 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807).  Letter Marshall to Justice Cushing, June 29, 1807, in 
Hobson, Papers of John Marshall, vol. VII, 60-62. 
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managed that difficult task and the benefit of that experience to the Supreme Court. 
The day to day work of the circuit court gave the justices the expertise and authority 
to better perform their duties on the Supreme Court and the confidence to resist 
those who sought to restrict its powers.  
           This thesis begins the long overdue process of evaluating the circuit courts’ 
role in the general acceptance of and rise in influence of the United States federal 
court system. I contend that this examination of the opinions of four prominent 
Marshall Court associate justices proves that the circuit court was vital to the federal 
court system because, in those very early years, it was the circuit experience and not 
the Supreme Court which shaped United States law and prepared each justice for a 
more informed discharge of his duty on the nation’s highest tribunal. These justices 
found American law a skeleton at the beginning of the nineteenth-century. Their 
work in the circuit courts, in the early days and later in their duties on the Supreme 
Court as that tribunal’s workload increased, left a fully formed body of federal law 
to which later generations have added. That structure is still recognizable today and 
is the legacy of which the circuit work of Washington, Livingston, Story, and 
Thompson is a crucial and central part. 
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